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I. INTRODUCTION
In MedImmune v. Genentech,' the U.S. Supreme Court resolved
a jurisdictional question in concluding that the case or controversy
requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not require
that a patent licensee terminate or be in breach of its license
agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment that the licensed
patent is invalid, unenforceable or not infringed. The Court's
decision overruled the Federal Circuit's holding in Gen-Probe v.
Vysis 2 that had established a jurisdictional barrier to a patent validity
challenge by a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing with respect
to its license agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court's MedImmune
holding, however, raised questions as to the current status of the
common law doctrine of licensee estoppel. According to the doctrine,
a licensee operating under a patent license agreement and enjoying its
benefits is estopped from challenging the validity of the licensed
patent. In Lear v. Adkins,' the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the
doctrine of licensee estoppel in the context of a licensee that had
ceased paying royalties due under a patent license agreement on the
basis of the licensee's contention that the licensed patent application
could not issue as a valid patent. The question brought into sharp
focus by the Court's MedImmune holding was whether the Lear
Court's rejection of licensee estoppel extends to the nonrepudiating
licensee in good standing, an issue addressed but not resolved by the
Court in MedImmune.
The MedImmune Court's elimination of the jurisdictional barrier
to a patent validity challenge by a licensee in good standing has been
viewed by many as a pronounced shift in favor of the licensee in the
balance of rights between licensor and licensee in patent license
agreements. Moreover, the Court's ruling has given rise to a dilemma
for patent licensors, namely, how to redress the shift in the balance of
rights. Specifically, the questions to be answered are as follows: (1) Is
1. 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
2. 359 F.3d 1376 (2004).
3. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
245
246 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
there a vestige of the doctrine of licensee estoppel to protect a patent
licensor from a validity challenge by a licensee in good standing, and
(2) if one cannot rely on the doctrine, are explicit contract provisions
that prohibit, reduce the incentive for, and/or specify a consequence
of, a licensee's challenge of the validity of a licensed patent
enforceable?
This Article addresses the legal basis for resolving the licensor's
dilemma following MedImmune. Part II of this Article discusses the
Supreme Court's MedImmune holding and its implications for
interpreting the legality of a patent validity challenge by a licensee in
good standing. A review of the MedImmune's Court's decision
reveals a skepticism as to whether contract law can be relied on to
prevent a patent validity challenge by a nonrepudiating licensee. As
noted above, however, the MedImmune holding settled the
jurisdictional question before the Court, but did not resolve the
merits-based contract arguments against a patent validity challenge
by a licensee in good standing. In particular, the Court was clear in its
refusal to opine on the question of whether the Court's rejection of
the doctrine of licensee estoppel in Lear was so broad as to cover a
nonrepudiating licensee. In Part III of this Article we argue that the
answer to that question is to be found in an analysis of the Lear
decision itself. The holding in Lear and the Court's reasoning in
support of its holding provide an adequate basis for assessing the
scope of Lear's rejection of licensee estoppel. We begin our
argument with a brief history of the doctrine of licensee estoppel,
which is essential to an understanding of the impact of the Lear
holding. We then review the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decisions
addressing licensee estoppel through the last decision of the Court in
support of the doctrine, Automatic Radio v. Hazeltine Research. The
Lear Court cited certain of these prior decisions regarding licensee
estoppel as evidence that the doctrine had been sufficiently eroded
over time to justify its rejection. We next provide a detailed
discussion of the facts and the holding in Lear, and the public policy
rationale relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding the case.
We end our analysis of the scope of the Lear decision by reviewing
relevant post-Lear case law, including a Supreme Court case that
provided an interpretation of the holding, regional circuit and district
court decisions-the majority of which aggressively applied the Lear
public policy argument to encourage patent validity challenges by
4. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
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licensees-and the Federal Circuit's subsequent efforts to limit the
applicability of the Lear decision. We conclude that if and when the
issue is presented, the U.S. Supreme Court will interpret its prior
Lear holding as having rejected the doctrine of licensee estoppel
without limitations imposed by the particular facts in the case.
According to this view, and despite Federal Circuit dictum to the
contrary,' a patent licensee may challenge the validity of the licensed
patent even if it neither repudiates nor terminates its patent license
agreement and intends to continue to reap the benefits provided
pursuant to the agreement.
In Part IV of this Article, we argue that in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's elimination in MedImmune of the Federal Circuit's
procedural bar to a patent validity challenge by a licensee in good
standing and the broad scope of the Lear court's repudiation of the
doctrine of licensee estoppel, a patent licensor would be ill-advised to
rely on some vestige of the common law doctrine of licensee estoppel
to prevent such a challenge. Rather, the concerned licensor should
consider introducing explicit contractual provisions in the patent
license agreement to account for the increased likelihood of a patent
validity challenge by its licensee. The question then becomes which
provisions are enforceable and, if not clearly enforceable, which are
least likely to give rise to unintended consequences, including a
reasonable claim of patent misuse. Part IV, therefore, explores the
enforceability and effects of explicit contractual protections of the
licensor. Recognizing the diversity of pro-licensor contract provisions
that have been and will be introduced by creative patent licensors,
Part IV provides an analytical framework to be used in assessing the
potential benefits and risks of any such contract provision. A limited
number of frequently encountered contract provisions are then
analyzed through application of the proposed framework. Part IV
concludes that certain pro-licensor clauses (e.g., one that constitutes
an absolute bar to a patent validity challenge by a licensee in the
context of a typical license agreement) are unenforceable, with some
approaching patent misuse. Other provisions (e.g., one that results in
an adjustment of contract terms following a failed validity challenge
by a patent licensee) are likely to be enforceable. And some contract
provisions (e.g., one that permits a patent licensor to terminate the
license agreement in the event of a licensee patent validity challenge)
fall within a gray zone where a finding of patent misuse is unlikely,
5. Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Shell Oil, 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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but the question of enforceability will remain open until finally
resolved by a court. The licensor inclined to incorporate such a
provision will need to be advised of the risk of unenforceability, a risk
that increases to the extent that the provision appears to penalize a
licensee for a patent validity challenge in a manner and to a degree
that is likely to prevent a challenge in the first place and, thereby,
frustrates the important public interest expressed in Lear of
eliminating worthless patents.
II. MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH AND THE
NONREPUDIATING LICENSEE IN GOOD STANDING
In the minds of many, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
MedImmune v. Genentech is as significant for the questions that it
raised but did not answer as for its holding. The Court in
MedImmune resolved a jurisdictional issue, namely that a patent
licensee need not terminate nor be in breach of its license agreement
to meet the case or controversy requirements of Article III of the
U.S. Constitution to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging
the validity, enforceability or scope of the licensed patent. With its
holding, the MedImmune Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
procedural bar (established in Gen-Probe) to a patent validity
challenge by a patent licensee who remains in good standing under its
license agreement. In so doing, however, the Court brought to the
fore two substantive questions of law that had been largely irrelevant
in light of the Federal Circuit's procedural bar, but that now require
answers. First, are there contract-based arguments that a patent
licensor can make to block a patent validity challenge by a licensee in
good standing? And second, is an explicit contractual provision that
prohibits or discourages a validity challenge by such a licensee
enforceable, and will the inclusion of such a provision in a patent
license agreement have unintended consequences, such as giving rise
to a reasonable claim of patent misuse? Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court in MedImmune, discussed some of the substantive contract
arguments against a patent validity challenge by a licensee in good
standing raised by respondent Genentech, but did not rule on these
arguments. He did express doubts as to the merits of the arguments,
and his skepticism, coupled with his refusal to decide the contract
questions presented in the case, only added to the uncertainty
generated by the Court's MedImmune decision for prospective patent
licensors and licensees.
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In this Part II of the Article, we provide a brief review of the
facts in MedImmune and a summary of the Court's jurisdictional
holding. We then discuss the contract-based arguments raised in the
case, but not resolved by the Court. Finally, we conclude with a
statement of the dilemma faced by a patent licensor post-MedImmune
with respect to a potential patent validity challenge by a licensee in
good standing. As will be made clear in this Part II, resolution of the
licensor's dilemma, made all the more necessary by the MedImmune
holding, is not to be found through an analysis of MedImmune, but
requires a review (as provided in Part III of this Article) of the
history of the doctrine of licensee estoppel and of relevant pre-
MedImmune U.S. case law, in particular the Court's seminal holding
in Lear v. Adkins.
A. Holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in MedImmune
Petitioner MedImmune is a biotechnology company developing
antibody products' for use in the prevention or treatment of
infectious diseases. Its largest selling product, Synagis, is a
humanized antibody used to prevent respiratory tract disease in
infants and young children.! Sales of Synagis have accounted for more
than 80% of MedImmune's revenues since 1999.9
In the early 1980s, Genentech and its co-inventor City of Hope
did pioneering work on the production of therapeutic monoclonal
antibodies using recombinant DNA technology.0 In 1983, Genentech
and City of Hope applied for a patent which was issued in 1989."
This patent, known as the "Cabilly I patent" after its inventor,
6. An antibody is a protein produced by the immune system in response to a disease-
causing antigen. Antibody molecules are composed of heavy and light immunoglobulin
polypeptide chains. Antibodies are specific to a given antigen, and as a result, are an
essential part of the body's immune response system. Antibodies produced by genetically
altered cells using recombinant DNA technology represent a large percentage of the
products currently marketed by the biotechnology industry.
7. Most marketed antibodies are "humanized" antibodies. Humanized antibodies
are genetically engineered from nonhuman and human components. Utilizing non-human
components, particularly from mouse antibodies, enables rapid development of antibody
variants. Adding human components increases the eventual antibody's therapeutic
effectiveness and reduces the possibility the body will reject the antibody itself as a foreign
antigen.
8. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 121.
9. Id. at 122.
10. Brief for Respondent at *1-2 Medimmune, 549 U.S. 118 No. 05-608. [hereinafter
"City of Hope brief"].
11. Id. at *2.
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Shmuel Cabilly,12 covered basic techniques for producing chimeric
heavy and light immunoglobulin chains that make up a chimeric
antibody molecule." In 1988, Genentech filed a continuation of the
Cabilly I application on behalf of itself and City of Hope (the
Cabilly II application), which contained new claims that covered the
coexpression of heavy and light immunoglobulin chains in the same
cell to produce an assembled monoclonal antibody molecule. The
subject matter claimed in the Cabilly II application was the same as
that claimed in a patent application that had been filed by Celltech in
1984.14 As anticipated by Genentech, the filing of the Cabilly II
application triggered a patent interference proceeding against
Celltech before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)." After
a protracted administrative action before the PTO, and subsequent
litigation in federal court, Genentech and Celltech settled their
priority dispute and Genentech was issued the Cabilly II patent with
broad claims covering the coexpression technology for producing
assembled monoclonal antibodies. 6
While MedImmune was still developing its Synagis product, it
sought a license from Genentech for the Cabilly I patent, as well as
for any patent issuing from the then-pending Cabilly II application."
The license agreement between Genentech and MedImmune was
signed in 1997. In 2001, after the Cabilly II patent issued,
Genentech notified MedImmune of its conclusion that Cabilly II was
infringed by Synagis, and that royalties were due under the 1997
license agreement." MedImmune responded that it believed the
12. Brief for Petitioner at *3 Medimmune, 549 U.S. 118 No. 05-608. [hereinafter
"Medimmune's brief"].
13. Id. (Chimeric antibodies are genetically-engineered monoclonal antibodies
"containing a relatively high proportion of animal to human components.").
14. City of Hope brief at *2-3; Medlmmune's brief at *4.
15. City of Hope brief at *3; Medlmmune's brief at *5.
16. While not essential to the disposition of the case, the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly aware that the Cabilly II patent arguably covers foundational techniques
essential to a broad category of biotechnology products both on the market and under
development, and it confers a right to exclude to Genentech for 17 years from issue-until
2018-for inventive work by Genentech and City of Hope from the early 1980s, almost 40
years prior to the expiry of the patent grant. See Medimmune's brief at *5-6.
17. Id. at *3-4.
18. Id.
19. According to MedImmune, "[w]hen Synagiso became available in
September 1998, MedImmune concluded that respondents' Cabilly I patent-which dealt
with chimeric, rather than humanized, antibodies-did not cover Synagis®, so that
Synagis® was not a "Licensed Product" under the 1997 license . . . . Accordingly,
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Cabilly II patent was invalid, and that, in any event, Synagis did not
use the invention claimed in Cabilly II. MedImmune proceeded to
pay royalties, stating it was doing so under protest, and brought a
declaratory judgment suit asking for a judicial determination that the
Cabilly II patent was invalid, unenforceable or not infringed by the
Synagis product.
During the pendency of MedImmune's suit in the district court,
the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Gen-Probe v. Vysis.20 In Gen-
Probe, the Federal Circuit held that a nonrepudiating licensee in good
standing did not meet the case or controversy requirement of the U.S.
Constitution to bring a declaratory judgment suit for non-validity.2 1
The MedImmune district court, while questioning the Gen-Probe
rule, 22 nonetheless acknowledged that Gen-Probe was binding, and
granted Genentech's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.23 The Federal Circuit, also citing Gen-Probe, affirmed.24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of
whether a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing was barred by the
case or controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution from bringing a declaratory judgment suit challenging
the validity, enforceability or scope of the licensed patent.
The Supreme Court, in an eight to one decision, held that a
nonrepudiating licensee could allege a sufficient case or controversy
to bring such a declaratory judgment suit. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, crafted the following argument in support of the Court's
holding. He first cited Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,16 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "case of
actual controversy" in the federal Declaratory Judgment Act refers to
the type of "Cases" and "Controversies" that are justiciable under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution.27 He then addressed the standard
that a declaratory judgment action must meet to satisfy the Article III
case or controversy requirement. "Basically, the question ... is
Medlmmune never paid any royalties to Genentech under the 1997 license of the Cabilly I
patent for sales of Synagis .... The Cabilly I patent expired March 28, 2006." Id. at *4.
20. 329 F.3d 1376.
21. Id.
22. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 136 ("despite its 'serious misgivings' about the Federal
Circuit's rule, [the District Court] considered itself bound to dismiss by Gen-Probe.").
23. Id. at 122.
24. MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
25. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 120-21.
26. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
27. Med1mmune, 549 U.S. at 126-27.
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whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there
is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment." '
According to Justice Scalia, that requirement would certainly
have been satisfied in the instant case if MedImmune had ceased
making royalty payments under its 1997 license agreement. It was
MedImmune's decision to continue to meet its royalty obligations,
albeit under protest, and thereby deprive Genentech of a basis for
terminating the license agreement and for enjoining future sales of
MedImmune's Synagis product, that created the jurisdictional
question presented to the Court. "[T]he continuation of royalty
payments makes what would otherwise be an imminent threat at least
remote, if not nonexistent." 29
Justice Scalia then turned to the central question of whether a
dispute can qualify as a case or controversy within the meaning of
Article III if the risk of imminent threat of harm to a declaratory
judgment plaintiff is eliminated by the plaintiff's own acts, as in the
MedImmune case. Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, he noted
that in the context of a threatened action by the government, the
Court has not required a plaintiff to expose himself to liability prior
to bringing a legal action to challenge the basis for the threat. "In
each of... [the cited] cases..., the plaintiff had eliminated the
imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the
right to do .... That did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction
because the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced."30
Justice Scalia next addressed the situation in which the self-avoidance
of a declaratory judgment plaintiff is in response to the imminent
threat of harm from a private party, such as a patent licensor as in
MedImmune, and not the government. He cited Altvater v. Freemen,"
a U.S. Supreme Court case with significant parallels to Medlmmune
that involved a declaratory judgment claim of patent invalidity, for
the proposition that "a licensee's failure to cease its payment of
royalties did not render nonjusticiable a dispute over the validity of
the patent."32 Justice Scalia concluded that the source of the
imminent threat of harm (private party as opposed to government)
28. Id. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (1941)).
29. Id. at 128.
30. Id. at 129.
31. 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
32. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 130.
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does not alter the jurisdictional analysis and that, quoting the Altvater
Court, "the requirements of [a] case or controversy are met where
payment of a claim is demanded as of right and where payment is
made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature of the exaction
preserves the right to recover the sums paid or to challenge the
legality of the claim."33
The Federal Circuit in Gen-Probe had distinguished the Altvater
holding on the ground that in Altvater the royalty was paid by the
challenging licensee under compulsion of a court-imposed injunction
decree, rather than at the election of the licensee in order to preserve
its patent license, as in Gen-Probe (and in MedImmune). Justice
Scalia rejected this distinction, however, in stating that
contrary to the Federal Circuit's conclusion, Altvater did not say
that the coercion dispositive of the case was governmental, but
suggested just the opposite. The opinion acknowledged that the
licensees had the option of stopping payments in defiance of the
injunction, but explained that the consequence of doing so
would be to risk "actual [and] treble damages in infringement
suits" by the patentees. 319 U.S., at 365, 63 S.Ct. 1115. It
significantly did not mention the threat of prosecution for
contempt, or any other sort of governmental sanction.34' 3
Justice Scalia concluded his jurisdictional analysis in
MedImmune by stating that "[t]he rule that a plaintiff must... risk
treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before
seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no
support in Article III,"6 and, accordingly, "petitioner was not
33. Id. at 131 (quoting Altvater, 319 U.S. at 365).
34. Id. at 132.
35. In footnote 11 to his majority opinion in MedImmune, Justice Scalia commented
that even if Altvater could be distinguished from Gen-Probe (and MedImmune) on the
basis of the former being an "injunction" case, that would not provide support for the
Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe holding, which relied on that court's "reasonable
apprehension of suit" test for determining whether a declaratory judgment action meets
the Article III case or controversy requirement. "A licensee who pays royalties under
compulsion of an injunction has no more apprehension of imminent harm than a licensee
who pays royalties for fear of treble damages and an injunction fatal to his business."
Moreover, he criticized the Federal Circuit's reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test as in
conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U.S. at 273,
Aetna Life Insurance Co., 300 U.S. at 239 and Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993). Id. at 132.
36. Id. at 134.
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required, insofar as Article III is concerned, to break or terminate its
1997 license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment in
federal court that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or
not infringed."37
B. Issues Not Decided In MedImmune
The MedImmune holding settled the jurisdictional question
before the Court. It did not rule on the merits of Genentech's
contract-based arguments against a patent validity challenge by a
licensee in good standing. In particular, the Court was clear in its
refusal to opine on the question of whether the Court's repudiation of
the doctrine of licensee estoppel in Lear v. Adkins was so broad as to
cover a nonrepudiating licensee. Justice Scalia, however, did address
the contract-based arguments in his opinion for the Court, expressing
skepticism as to their merits. In this section we provide a summary of
the contract issues discussed but not resolved in the MedImmune
decision.
Justice Scalia structured his opinion in MedImmune by first
determining that there was a dispute between the parties in the case
and then addressing the question (discussed above) of whether a
federal court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. He
acknowledged that, having established the existence of a dispute,
defining the nature of the dispute was not essential to his
jurisdictional holding. Nonetheless, he proceeded to do so and it
was in that context that he first addressed a contract-related question.
Genentech had argued that the case only involved a patent invalidity
claim and not a contract-based claim that no royalties were due under
the license agreement because of patent invalidity and
noninfringement. Genentech had provided the following reasons in
support of its contention that the case did not involve a contract
claim: "(1) because there is no dispute that Synagis infringes the
Cabilly II patent, thereby making royalties payable; and (2) because
while there is a dispute over patent validity, the contract calls for
royalties on an infringing product whether or not the underlying
patent is valid."3 9
37. Id. at 137.
38. Id. at 123 ("At the onset, we address a disagreement concerning the nature of the
dispute at issue here . . . . That probably makes no difference to the ultimate issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction, but it is well to be clear about the nature of the case before
us.").
39. Id. at 123.
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On review of the record before the Court, Justice Scalia
concluded that MedImmune had indeed alleged a contract claim. He
dismissed the first reason offered by Genentech as inconsistent with
the allegation of the petitioner's complaint; MedImmune had stated
in unequivocal terms that the sale of its Synagis product did not
infringe the Cabilly II patent. With respect to Genentech's second
reason, Justice Scalia noted that MedImmune had made the
nonfrivolous contention that "it had no obligation under the license
to pay royalties on an invalid patent,"40 i.e., that, contrary to the
position taken by Genentech, the validity of the Cabilly II patent had
a direct and immediate bearing on MedImmune's obligation to pay
the royalties sought by Genentech under the license agreement. As
recognized by Justice Scalia, "the license requires petitioner to pay
royalties until a patent claim has been held invalid by a competent
body, and the Cabilly II patent has not. But the license at issue in
Lear, Inc. v. Atkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 ... (1969), similarly provided
that "royalties are to be paid until such time as the 'patent ... is held
invalid,"' and we rejected the argument that a repudiating licensee
must comply with its contract and pay royalties until its claim is
vindicated in court." 41
At this point in his opinion, Justice Scalia presented the
following disclaimer, reflecting his conclusion that the jurisdictional
issue before the Court did not require a ruling on the merits of the
contract-based arguments and that he did not intend to provide one:
We express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiating licensee is
similarly relieved of its contract obligation [i.e. its obligation to
pay royalties under the contract] during a successful challenge
to a patent's validity-that is, on the applicability of licensee
estoppel under these circumstances. Cf. Studiengesellschaft
Kohle, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568
(C.A.Fed.1997) ("[A] licensee... cannot invoke the protection
of the Lear doctrine until it (i) actually ceases payment of
royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor that the reason
for ceasing payment of royalties is because it has deemed the
relevant claims to be invalid"). All we need determine is
whether petitioner has alleged a contractual dispute. It has
done So.42
40. Id. at 124.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 124-25.
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We will revisit the above-quoted language later in this Article.43
For purposes of this section, suffice it to say that, while Justice Scalia
was not prepared to apply the Court's Lear holding to a
nonrepudiating licensee in good standing such as Medlmmune, he
rejected Genentech's claim that the expressed contractual intent of
the parties had already settled the alleged contract dispute in the case.
In the view of Justice Scalia and the majority of the Court, there
remained a question as to MedImmune's obligation to pay royalties
for use of a potentially invalid and challenged patent, despite an
explicit contractual provision requiring MedImmune to pay until the
licensed patent had been held invalid by a court or other competent
body.
Having established the existence of a contract dispute, Justice
Scalia returned to a discussion of Genentech's contract-based
arguments following his analysis of the jurisdictional issue before the
Court. Genentech had offered an "insurance-policy" justification in
support of its contention that a nonrepudiating licensee in good
standing does not have a right to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent. As restated by Justice Scalia, the Genentech argument was as
follows:
When a licensee enters ... [a patent license] agreement,... it
essentially purchases an insurance policy, immunizing it from
suits for infringement so long as it continues to pay royalties
and does not challenge the covered patents. Permitting it to
challenge the validity of the patent without terminating or
breaking the agreement alters the deal, allowing the licensee to
continue enjoying its immunity while bringing a suit, the
44
elimination of which was part of the patentee's quid pro quo.
While not ruling on Genentech's contract arguments, Justice
Scalia expressed doubts as to their merits. He first questioned the
contention that a prohibition against a patent validity challenge by a
licensee in good standing could be implied from the wording of the
license agreement itself. "Promising to pay royalties on patents that
have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise not to seek a
holding of their invalidity." 45 He then addressed Genentech's "appeal
43. See infra section III.C.4.c.iv.
44. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 134-35.
45. Id. at 135.
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to the common-law rule that a party to a contract cannot at one and
the same time challenge its validity and continue to reap its
benefits."46 According to Genentech, since the licensee in Lear had
repudiated its license agreement and, thereby, rejected the
agreement's benefits prior to its patent validity challenge, the Court's
decision in that case did not undermine the common law rule nor
apply to a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing such as
MedImmune. Justice Scalia expressed his doubts as to the merits of
this argument in the following comment:
Even if Lear's repudiation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel
was so limited (a point on which, as we have said earlier, we do
not opine), it is hard to see how the common-law rule has any
application here. Petitioner is not repudiating or impugning the
contract while continuing to reap its benefits. Rather, it is
asserting that the contract, properly interpreted, does not
prevent it from challenging the patents, and does not require
the payment of royalties because the patents ... are invalid."
In other words, MedImmune's challenge to the validity of the
Genentech patent, which was not prohibited under the license
agreement, was not a challenge to the agreement itself. Rather, the
patent validity challenge was a permitted action on the part of
MedImmune to demonstrate that no royalties were due Genentech
under the contract because the licensed patent was invalid.
Despite the skepticism reflected in Justice Scalia's assessment of
Genentech's contract-based arguments, he refrained from ruling on
their merits. In particular, he was explicit in his refusal to opine on
whether the holding in Lear, the U.S. Supreme Court's controlling
decision on licensee estoppel, applies to a nonrepudiating licensee in
good standing. Justice Scalia concluded his discussion of the contract
dispute in MedImmune by reiterating his view that a decision on the
merits of the contract arguments was not necessary to resolve the
jurisdictional issue before the Court. In acknowledging the possibility
that on further analysis Genentech's contract arguments may
ultimately prove valid, he noted that "even if... [Genentech] were
correct that the licensing agreement or the common-law rule
precludes this suit, the consequence would be that respondents win
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disappears, so that Article III jurisdiction is somehow defeated. In
short, Article III jurisdiction has nothing to do with this 'insurance-
policy' contention."4 8
C. The Licensor's Dilemma
The MedImmune Court's rejection of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdictional barrier to a patent validity challenge by a licensee in
good standing, coupled with its refusal to rule on whether Lear's
repudiation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel applied to such a
licensee, raised important questions for prospective patent licensors
and licensees. The uncertainty that would be generated by the
MedImmune decision and the need for ultimate resolution of the
questions left unanswered in the case were not lost on the members of
the Court. During the oral argument in MedImmune, Justice
Ginsburg noted that a decision regarding subject matter jurisdiction,
without more, may move the case "out of the jurisdiction box, but
you're left with the same underlying question,"49 i.e., can a licensee in
good standing challenge the validity of the licensed patent. If such a
licensee is barred on the merits from challenging the patent's validity,
the licensor simply wins a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
rather than under 12(b)(1) as it did in the district court in
MedImmune pursuant to the Federal Circuit's subject matter
jurisdictional bar."o Only in the absence of a valid merits-based
contract argument against such a challenge will the court have
authority to evaluate the licensee's patent invalidity claim. Not
surprisingly, Justice Scalia concluded his opinion in Medlmmune by
inviting the lower court to which the case was remanded to consider
any merits-based arguments for denial of declaratory relief, including




48. Id. at 135-36.
49. Transcript of Oral Argument at *8 Medlmmune 549 U.S. 118 (2006) No. 05-
608[hereinafter "MedImmune oral argument"].
50. Id. at *9 ("JUSTICE GINSBURG: But what good would it do? Suppose we said,
'Federal Circuit, you put the wrong label on it. It should be 12(b)(6), not 12(b)(1), or
perhaps even 8(c), affirmative defense'? Then you go back to the Federal Circuit, and
they'll come up with the same decision, that, as long as you are licensed and are paying
your royalties, you have -- and they just put a different label on it . . . -- . . . not stated a
claim.").
51. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 136-37 ("Similarly available for consideration on
remand are any merits-based arguments for denial of declaratory relief.").
52. On remand of the MedImmune case, the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California accepted Justice Scalia's invitation to evaluate the merits-based
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Contract-related questions that moved beyond the facts in
MedImmune were also considered by the Justices as they engaged in
their deliberations in the case, e.g., is an explicit contract provision
that prohibits or discourages a patent validity challenge by a
nonrepudiating licensee enforceable? In fact, the first question in the
MedImmune oral argument, posed by Chief Justice Roberts and
directed to the attorney for MedImmune, was whether MedImmune's
position regarding its right to challenge the validity of the licensed
Genentech patent would be different if the license agreement had
contained an explicit provision specifying that the licensee was not
permitted to challenge the patent?" The MedImmune attorney
responded by expressing doubt as to the enforceability of such a
provision under Lear but, in keeping with the overall thrust of his
argument to limit the Court's deliberation to the jurisdictional issue
before it, he stressed that such a question was not relevant to the issue
that the Court had been asked to address. Not willing to let the
contract question drop, Justice Kennedy commented that "as a matter
of policy, we, at some point, either in this case or some later case, may
have to address the question of whether or not such a provision is
enforceable. If it is, we may ... not be talking about much. It's just
going to be boiler plate in every license agreement, and that's the end
of it."54
The oral argument in MedImmune is remarkable for the
tendency of the Justices to deviate from a focused analysis of the
jurisdictional issue before the Court in order to discuss substantive
contract-based arguments regarding the right of a nonrepudiating
licensee in good standing to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent. The message reflected in the Justices' inquiries and
comments was clear: While the Court was not ready to opine on the
validity of the contract-based arguments against a patent validity
challenge by a nonrepudiating licensee, the important contract-
related questions highlighted by the case would need to be answered
and in the near future. The remainder of this Article is intended to
provide such answers. Specifically, we will offer our views on how the
most pressing of these questions will be decided, if and when
contract arguments raised in the case and held that the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of
the doctrine of licensee estoppel in Lear extended to a nonrepudiating licensee in good
standing. MedImmune v. Genentech, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2008). See infra
section III.C.4.c.iv. of this Article for a detailed discussion of the district court's opinion.
53. MedImmune oral argument at *4.
54. Id. at *5.
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presented to the U.S. Supreme Court. In addition, we will provide
guidance for prospective licensors and licensees in negotiating and
drafting patent license agreements while they await the Court's
decisions.
The MedImmune Court's elimination of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdictional barrier to a patent validity challenge by a licensee in
good standing has been viewed by many as a pronounced shift in
favor of the licensee in the balance of rights between a licensor and a
licensee in a patent license agreement. The failure of the Court to
resolve the contract-related issues in the case has presented a
dilemma for licensors as to how to redress the shift in the balance of
rights. Simply stated, the patent licensor must decide the following: Is
there a vestige of the doctrine of licensee estoppel to protect a patent
licensor from a validity challenge by a licensee in good standing and,
if one cannot rely on the doctrine, are explicit contract provision that
prohibit, reduce the incentive for, and/or specify a consequence of, a
licensee's challenge of the validity of a licensed patent enforceable?
In Part III of this Article we argue that the solution to the licensor's
dilemma is to be found in an analysis of the Court's Lear decision
and, accordingly, we provide a detailed analysis of that case as well as
a review of prior and subsequent case law necessary to fully
appreciate the meaning and scope of the Lear holding.
III. LICENSEE ESTOPPEL AND THE SCOPE OF LEAR'S
REPUDIATION OF THE DOCTRINE
In this Part III of the Article, we argue that the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Lear v. Adkins" and the Court's reasoning in
support of its holding provide an adequate basis for determining
whether Lear's rejection of the doctrine of licensee estoppel extends
to a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing. We begin our
argument with a brief history of licensee estoppel, which describes the
limits and the recognized versions of, and the exceptions to, the
doctrine and which is essential to an understanding of the Lear
holding. We then review the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Automatic Radio v. Hazeltine Research,56 the last decision of the
Court in support of the doctrine. The scope of the Lear Court's
repudiation of licensee estoppel is, in part, defined by the version of
the doctrine that was endorsed in Automatic Radio and was rejected
55. 395 U.S. 653.
56. 339 U.S. 827.
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by the Lear Court in overruling the estoppel portion of the Automatic
Radio decision. Finally, we provide a detailed discussion of the Lear
case, including the position taken by the Supreme Court of
California" in Lear. The facts in Lear and the holding of the
California Supreme Court in the case, subsequently vacated by the
U.S. Supreme Court, provide a basis for a narrow reading of the
scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear holding with respect to
licensee estoppel. In contrast, the public policy rationale relied on by
the U.S. Supreme Court in its Lear ruling and the actual wording of
the Court's decision support the broad view of the impact of the
holding. This is the position taken by the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on remand of the MedImmune case,
whose decision we review in detail." We conclude that if and when
the issue is presented, the U.S. Supreme Court will interpret its prior
Lear holding as having rejected the doctrine of licensee estoppel
without limitations imposed by the particular facts in the case.
According to this view, and despite Federal Circuit dictum to the
contrary, 59 a patent licensee may challenge the validity of the licensed
patent even if it neither repudiates nor terminates its patent license
agreement and intends to continue to reap the benefits provided
pursuant to the agreement.
A. The Doctrine Of Licensee Estoppel
The Supreme Court of California provided the following
description of licensee estoppel in the Lear case:
[O]ne of the oldest doctrines in the field of patent law
establishes that so long as a licensee is operating under a license
agreement he is estopped to deny the validity of his licensor's
patent in a suit for royalties under the agreement. The theory
underlying this doctrine is that a licensee should not be
permitted to enjoy the benefit afforded by the agreement while
simultaneously urging that the patent which forms the basis of
the agreement is void ... ..
57. Adkins v. Lear, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967).
58. 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000.
59. Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Shell Oil, 112 F.3d at 1568.
60. Adkins, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 549-50, citing ANTHONY W. DELLER, DELLER'S
WALKER ON PATENTS 607 § 403 Warranty of Validity of Patent and Estoppel of Licensee
to Deny Validity (2nd ed., vol. 4 1965).
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This concise description goes a considerable distance in
providing a working understanding of the doctrine. However, the
complex history of licensee estoppel, the different legal justifications
for the doctrine, the important limits that distinguish the recognized
versions of the doctrine and the numerous exceptions to licensee
estoppel belie the view that a brief description such as that offered by
the California Supreme Court in Lear can enable one to understand
the evolution of the doctrine through to its ultimate repudiation in
Lear.
In this section of the Article, we provide the background
necessary to understand this evolution of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel." We begin with a brief review of the 1846 Massachusetts
case 62 relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court in its first affirmation of
the estoppel doctrine. The opinion in that early case articulated the
most frequently cited legal justification for the doctrine, based on an
analogy to landlord tenant law. We then review subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that endorsed the doctrine. The limits of
licensee estoppel that distinguish the recognized versions of the
doctrine are then discussed. Finally, we review the exceptions to the
doctrine crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Lear Court
relied on to conclude that the doctrine had been sufficiently eroded
over time to justify its rejection.
1. Early U.S. Case Law
An early U.S. case provided the basis for the U.S. Supreme
Court's affirmation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel and offered
the most widely accepted legal justification for the doctrine. In
Wilder v. Adams,63 plaintiff Benjamin G. Wilder entered into an
61. A contract-based prohibition to the challenge of a patent's validity developed in
three distinct but related contexts: (1) a patent license agreement, where licensor sues
licensee for recovery of royalties owed on the use of the licensed patent and licensee
defends on the basis of a claim that the licensed patent is invalid (licensee estoppel), (2) an
agreement between the assignor and assignee of an assigned patent, where assignor sues
assignee for recovery of payment owed for the assignment and assignee defends on the
basis of a claim that the assigned patent is invalid (assignee estoppel), and (3) an
agreement between the assignor and assignee of an assigned patent, where assignee sues
assignor for patent infringement and assignor defends on the basis of a claim that the
assigned patent is invalid (assignor estoppel). While the justifications for the prohibition
in the three contractual contexts are not identical, the doctrine of licensee estoppel has
evolved through judicial decisions addressing each type of contractual arrangement.
Accordingly, each type of case is discussed in this section, although licensee estoppel, and
not assignee or assignor estoppel, remains the focus of this Article.
62. Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
63. Id.
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agreement with defendants William Adams and others ("Adams") in
which Wilder granted Adams a license under Wilder's patent that
authorized Adams to make and sell safes covered by the patent. In
consideration for the grant of the patent license, Adams agreed to pay
Wilder a percentage of Adams' sales, calculated on the basis of the
weight of the safes that were sold. Following Adams' failure to make
the agreed upon payments, Wilder sued Adams for the amounts due.
Adams defended by claiming that the Wilder patent was invalid. The
question before the court was whether such a defense could be made
in the case or was irrelevant to the claim made by the plaintiff for
payment. The defendants argued that "the invalidity of the patent, if
shown, would constitute a failure of consideration, on which the
covenant to ... pay rested, and hence would be a good bar to any
recovery."64 Citing English and Roman law, the court rejected this
argument on the following grounds:
[The defendants] ... have had the license to make and sell
which they agreed for; they have received proceeds from it, and
they are only asked to pay over the proportion of those
proceeds which they agreed to; they have lost nothing in all this,
if the patent was invalid; and why, then, should it be said that
the consideration for this contract has failed?66
The Wilder court supported its conclusion by reference to an
analogy in property law regarding the payment obligation of a tenant
to a landlord in a lease arrangement. As noted by the court, "[i]f a
leasee be not actually evicted by some better or higher title in the
third person, he is bound to pay rent as long as he continues to enjoy
quietly the premises leased to him, though by one whose title may be
invalid."6  For both a leasee granted the right to use the leased
property and a licensee granted a right under a patent, as long as the
recipient of the right continues to enjoy the benefit that it confers, the
recipient is obligated to make the agreed upon payment for the
granted right, irrespective of whether the basis for the right (title to
64. Id. at 1217.
65. Id. at 1218 ("[lIt has been held, that if benefits have been obtained by the patent,
the recovery back [of consideration already paid by the patent licensee] will not be
sustained. Taylor v. Hare, 1 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 260; [Court of Common Pleas 1805]")
("[B]y Roman law, a thief could regain articles of a borrower from him (Dom. Civil Law,
pt. 13, tit. 6).").
66. Id. at 1217.
67. Id. at 1217-18.
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the leased property or the statutory patent right to exclude) is valid.
Rooklidge, in his detailed analysis of licensee validity challenges,6
labeled this justification for the doctrine of licensee estoppel the
relevance rule, which holds that "the licensed patent's validity is
irrelevant to the licensee's obligation to pay royalties accrued under
the license"6 on the theory that "one cannot avoid the effect of an
agreement once he has accepted its benefits."7 In applying the rule,
the Wilder court held that the defendant licensees in the case could
not raise the "irrelevant" defense that the licensed patent was invalid
and, accordingly, they were obligated to make the payments due the
patent licensor under the license agreement.
In reaching its decision, the court in Wilder considered another
of the defendants' arguments: this one supporting their right to
challenge the validity of the plaintiff's patent. According to this
argument, the application of the doctrine of licensee estoppel requires
a technical estoppel by deed that results from the language of the
license agreement, and no such estoppel could be supported by the
agreement between Wilder and Adams. This interpretation of the
doctrine of licensee estoppel, attributed to the early English case
Hayne v. Maltby,7' holds "that a licensee is 'estopped by its deed' from
challenging validity if the license agreement stipulated that the patent
was valid"72 and is based on "the strict legal concept which prevents
one from disputing facts to which one has previously attested." 73
While the Wilder court accepted the defendants' contention that the
agreement between the parties in the case did not contain any
stipulation as to the validity of the licensed patent, it rejected the
argument that that fact justified a patent validity challenge by the
licensee. Relying on its prior conclusion that the licensed patent's
68. William C. Rooklidge, Licensee Validity Challenges and the Obligation to Pay
Accrued Royalties: Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1) 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 506 (1986), [hereinafter Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Partl)]; William C.
Rooklidge, Licensee Validity Challenges and the Obligation to Pay Accrued Royalties:
Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part II) 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5 (1987),
[hereinafter Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins (Part II)]; William C. Rooklidge, Licensee Validity
Challenges and the Obligation to Pay Accrued Royalties: Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part
III) 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 63 (1987), [hereinafter Rooklidge, Lear v.
Adkins Revisited (Part III)].
69. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 509.
70. Id. at 511.
71. 100 Eng. Rep. 665, 3 T.R. 438 (English High Court of Justice 1789).
72. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68 at 509 (quoting
Rooklidge's review of the relevant portion of Hayne 100 Eng. Rep. at 666, 3 T.R. at 441).
73. Id.
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validity was irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim for accrued payments
due under the license agreement, the court rejected the defendants'
patent validity challenge on the basis of the relevance rule despite the
absence of an estoppel by deed.74 This line of reasoning offered by
the Wilder court with respect to the proper justification for the
doctrine of licensee estoppel prompted Rooklidge to remark that the
term "licensee estoppel" is, in fact, a misnomer," in that "the rule
prohibiting a patent licensee from challenging validity had nothing
whatsoever to do with estoppel.""
2. The U.S. Supreme Court's Affirmation of Licensee Estoppel
Relying on the relevance rule articulated in Wilder v. Adams, the
U.S. Supreme Court first endorsed the doctrine of estoppel to
challenge the validity of a patent" in Kinsman v. Parkhurst in 1856.
The plaintiff, Parkhurst, owned a patent for improvements to a
machine for ginning cotton and wool. Pursuant to written agreements
with defendant, Kinsman, Parkhurst assigned a one-third ownership
of the patent to Kinsman and granted to Kinsman permission to
manufacture and sell machines covered by the patent. In
consideration of the grant of these rights, Kinsman agreed, inter alia,
to pay to Parkhurst a share of the profits generated on the sale of the
machines. When Kinsman failed to make the agreed upon payments,
Parkhurst sued to recover the amounts due and Kinsman defended on
74. 29 F. Cas.at 1218 ("But the illustrations I have put are not grounded on the idea,
that there is here any technical estoppel. They rest rather on the idea, that such a defence
is not consistent with the position and relation of the defendants to the plaintiff; and, in
this case itself, this defence not only contravenes the attitude in which the parties stand
towards each other by the terms of the covenant, but as before shown, is not calculated to
enforce justice towards either party.").
75. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 518 ("the
misnomer licensee estoppel").
76. Id. at 516.
77. We intentionally avoided the term "licensee estoppel" in this sentence because
the contractual arrangement between Parkhurst and Kinsman involved the assignment of
a patent as well as the grant of rights under the patent. Nonetheless, the case is frequently
cited as the U.S. Supreme Court's first endorsement of the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing
Co. ("Ninety years ago this Court unanimously announced the doctrine that a licensee
under a patent is estopped from challenging the validity of that patent. Kinsman v.
Parkhurst, 18 How. 289."). 329 U.S. 402, 408 (1947); see also Hal D. Cooper, Estoppel to
Challenge Patent Validity: The Case of Private Good Faith vs. Public Policy, 18 Western
Reserve Law Review 1122, 1125 (1967); Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1),
supra note 68, at 516-17; Lear, 395 U.S. at 663.
78. 59 U.S. 289 (1856).
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the basis of patent invalidity. In rejecting the invalidity defense and
holding in favor of Parkhurst, the Court provided the following
analysis:
The principal objection made by the appellant ... [Kinsman] to
the decree of the court below is, that Parkhurst was not the
original and first inventor of the thing patented. We are not
satisfied that this is made out. But we have not found it
necessary to come to a decided opinion upon this point, because
we are all of opinion that, under the agreement. . . the
invalidity of the patent would not afford a bar to the
complainant's [Parkhurst] right to an account. Having actually
received profits from sales of the patented machine, which
profits the defendants do not show have been or are in any way
liable to be affected by the invalidity of the patent, its validity is
-79immaterial.
The Court cited Wilder in concluding that "[h]ere... it is simply
a question of failure of title, and as that does not appear in any
manner to have affected the profits which the defendants received,
there can be no ground to allow it to be shown in defense." 0 '
The U.S. Supreme Court repeated its endorsement of the
estoppel doctrine in three subsequent cases, but in each instance
without significant analysis. In Dale Tile Manufacturing Co v. Hyatt,8
the Court was asked to determine whether a federal question (as to a
licensed patent's validity) needed to be answered for a patent holder
to obtain from a licensee the agreed-upon payments for the rights
granted under the patent. The Court concluded that the patent
validity question did not need to be answered to resolve the contract
dispute in the case. Relying on Kinsman v. Parkhurst, the Court
79. Id. at 292-93.
80. Id. at 293.
81. The Court in Kinsman provided an additional ground for its holding that was
expressed in terms of estoppel. In the words of the Court, "we think the defendants are
estopped from alleging that invalidity. They have made and sold these machines under the
complainant's title, and for his account; and they can no more be allowed to deny that title
and retain the profits to their own use, than an agent, who has collected a debt for his
principal, can insist on keeping the money, upon an allegation that the debt was not justly
due." Id. at 293. Rooklidge has suggested that had the Court not offered this second basis
for its holding, in addition to its reliance on the relevance rule, "the confusing term of
licensee estoppel may never have been adopted in the United States." Rooklidge, Lear v.
Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 517.
82. 125 U.S. 46 (1888).
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affirmed the lower court's ruling that "in this action to recover
royalties under the agreement, the defendant, while continuing to
enjoy the privileges of the license, was estopped to deny the validity
of the patent."83
In United States v. Harvey Steel Co.," a steel company sued the
U.S. government for royalties due under an agreement pursuant to
which the government was granted a license under the company's
process patent. The government defended on the basis of its
contention that the licensed patent was invalid and, therefore, no
royalties were due. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, held that
an invalidity defense was not available to the government in that "a
licensee, when sued for royalties, is estopped to deny the validity of
the patent which he has been using."8 '
In Automatic Radio v. Hazeltine Research," the U.S. Supreme
Court provided its final endorsement of licensee estoppel prior to the
repudiation of the doctrine in Lear. This case will be discussed in
detail in Section III.B. below. For the purposes of this section, we
need only note that the Court in Automatic Radio cited Harvey Steel
for "[t]he general rule.. . that the licensee under a patent license
agreement may not challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a
suit for royalties dues under the contract."" With little analysis, the
court concluded that the "general rule" applied in the instant case
and rejected the patent licensee's attempt to challenge the validity of
the licensed patent in a suit to recover royalties due.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Harvey Steel and
Automatic Radio were the controlling precedents with respect to
licensee estoppel at the time that the Supreme Court of California
heard the Lear case. The California court's description of licensee
estoppel, quoted in the first paragraph of this Section III.A., captured
the generally accepted understanding of the doctrine as it had evolved
in U.S. courts from Wilder to Automatic Radio." However, as will be
83. Id. at 54.
84. 196 U.S. 310 (1904).
85. Id. at 317.
86. 339 U.S. 827.
87. Id. at 836.
88. To support its description of the doctrine of licensee estoppel in the Lear case
(quoted in the first paragraph of Part IIl.A.), the California Supreme Court relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Harvey Steel Co. (in footnote 16) and on Deller, supra
note 60, § 403, § 420, the latter citing early lower court cases that relied on the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Kinsman (in § 403) and the First Circuit's decision in
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demonstrated in the next two sections of this Article which discuss
the limits of, and the exceptions to, the doctrine, the California
Supreme Court's description oversimplified the state of licensee
estoppel jurisprudence at the time of the Lear case. This fact was not
lost on the U.S. Supreme Court in its review of the state court's
decision in the case, and recognition of the conflicting estoppel case
law played a significant role in the Court's decision to reject the
doctrine.
3. Limits to the Doctrine of Licensee Estoppel
As will be demonstrated later in this section, different forms of
the doctrine of licensee estoppel have been endorsed by the U.S.
courts. Yet each form or version of the doctrine recognized some
limit to the prohibition against a patent validity challenge by a
licensee. In other words, no version held that once a licensee, a party
is forever restricted from challenging the licensed patent; for each
version of the doctrine, the occurrence of some event or events would
release the licensee from the restriction on patent challenges. In fact,
it was the difference in the accepted releasing events that
distinguished the major forms of licensee estoppel.
a) The Eviction Limitation
The eviction of a licensee from the enjoyment of the benefits
afforded by the grant of a patent license is an example of a releasing
event that could free a licensee from the prohibition against a patent
validity challenge."' This so-called "eviction limitation" to licensee
estoppel" was recognized in early descriptions of the doctrine,91 and
was justified through analogy to landlord-tenant law.92 As noted by
Automatic Radio (in § 420), which was later affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court (See infra
Part IIIB); Adkins, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545.
89. See Cooper, supra note 77, at 1140-44; Rooklidge Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part
I), supra note 68, at 513-15.
90. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 513.
91. See, e.g. Hayne, 100 Ung. Rep. 665, 3 T.R. 438; Taylor v. Hare, 127 Eng. Rep. 461,
1 Bos. & Pul. (N. R.) 260 (Court of Common Pleas 1805); Wilder, 29 F. Cas. 1216; White v.
Lee, 14. F. Cas. 789 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882); see also, supra section III.A.1.
92. See Rooklidge Lear v. Adkins (Part I), supra note 68, at 513 (citing Hayne, 100
Eng. Rep. at 666,3 T.R. at 441; Taylor, 127 Eng. Rep. at 461, 1 Bos. & Pul. (N.R.) at 2601;
Wilder, 29 F. Cas. 1216); Cooper, supra note 77, at 1140 (citing White, 14 F. Cas 789).
Each commentator points out flaws in the landlord/tenant analogy that are apparent on
closer examination. However, the arguments presented in this Article do not hinge on the
strength of that analogy, which remains useful in understanding concepts relating to
licensee estoppel.
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Rooklidge, "[w]hen courts in the early patent cases analogized to
landlord-tenant law to hold the licensed patent's validity irrelevant to
a suit to recover accrued royalties, the analogy included the concept
of eviction. The bar against a tenant's challenging its landlord's title
falls when the tenant is evicted from quiet enjoyment by one with
paramount title." 93 According to this line of reasoning, a patent
licensee who is deprived of the benefits of the patent license is
similarly evicted and, therefore, free to challenge the validity of the
licensed patent.
The eviction event most frequently encountered in the relevant
case law was the judicial invalidation of a licensed patent in an
infringement suit brought by the patentee against a third party.94 The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the eviction limitation in Dale Tile
Manufacturing Co. v. Hyatt when it affirmed the lower court's
conclusion that the defendant/licensee "could not, in this action to
recover the royalties agreed upon, deny the validity of the ...
patent..., so long as it had not been declared void by a court of
competent jurisdiction, and while the defendant retained and acted
under its license from the plaintiff."95
In Drackett Chemical Co. v. Chamberlain Co.," the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit discussed eviction based on the judicial
invalidation of a licensed patent and the impact of such an eviction
upon a licensee's right to challenge the patent. In that case, the
Drackett Chemical Co. was granted a license by the Chamberlain Co.
under the latter's patent covering a drainpipe solvent; the licensed
right to sell the covered product was exclusive for the grocery trade
and nonexclusive for the hardware and drug trades." Subsequently,
93. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 513 (footnotes
omitted).
94. Another example of eviction, recognized by the courts, is the unrestricted use of
the patented invention by a party without the authorization of the patent holder, resulting
from a failure of a patent holder to enforce his patent. See id. at 515("[E]viction was also
held to occur when the patent was defied by unlicensed persons so extensively as to
deprive the licensee of the benefits of the license. Thus, widespread infringement resulted
in eviction." (footnotes omitted)) and Cooper, supra note 77, at 1140 ("[C]ourts have
suggested that an eviction may occur where there has been unlicensed competition
rendering the license valueless.") (Citing White, 14 F. Cas. 789).
95. 125 U.S. 46,49 (1888) (emphasis added).
96. Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933).
97. Some courts, noting the distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses,
rejected eviction on the basis of judicial invalidation in the context of a nonexclusive
license. See Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 513-14
(footnotes omitted):
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the parties to the agreement joined as plaintiffs in a suit against a
third party for infringement of the patent. During the pendency of
the infringement suit, Drackett notified Chamberlain that it was
withholding royalty payments due under the agreement until the
decision regarding the validity of the Chamberlain patent was
reached in the third party suit, and would not pay the withheld
royalties if the patent was invalidated. After the patent was adjudged
to be invalid, Chamberlain sued Drackett for the royalties owed. The
Sixth Circuit held that Chamberlain was not entitled to recover
royalties from Drackett that had accrued after Drackett was evicted
from the enjoyment of its licensed patent rights as a result of the
judicial invalidation of the Chamberlain patent.
In its opinion, the Drackett court first addressed the impact of an
eviction based on judicial patent invalidation on a licensee's right to
challenge the licensed patent. The court adopted the position taken
by the Second Circuit in White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Son
Co.,98 as succinctly expressed by Judge Learned Hand: "It is quite true
that a licensee may not dispute the validity of the patent in a suit for
royalties. U.S. v. Harvey, 196 U.S. 310 .. .; though the contrary is the
A patent does not grant the patentee the right to make, use or sell the claimed
invention. Rather, the patent only gives the patentee the right to exclude others from
making, using or selling the claimed invention. A nonexclusive patent license gives the
licensee only an assurance of nonassertion of the licensor's rights to exclude. In effect, a
licensee is "using" immunity from suit while practicing the patented invention. Just as the
patent does not give the patent owner the right to practice the patented invention,
invalidation of the patent does not deprive the licensee of the right to practice the
invention. Thus, the basis for the eviction must be other than deprivation of the right to
practice the invention.
An exclusive license affords the licensee an exclusive right additional to the right
granted the nonexclusive licensee: a right, if not to bring suit in its own name, to compel
the patentee to join in an enforcement suit. The right from which an exclusive licensee is
evicted is readily apparent. Judicial invalidation of the licensed patent evicts the exclusive
licensee from its right to exclude.
On the other hand, the right from which a nonexclusive licensee is evicted is not as
readily apparent as that of the exclusive licensee. Some courts refused to extend the
eviction analogy to nonexclusive licensees for this reason. Most courts reasoned, however,
that judicial invalidation of the licensed patent deprives both the nonexclusive and
exclusive licensee of the patent's deterrent effect: the mere existence of the apparently
valid patent deters potential competitors. The royalty charged by the licensor is an
economic barrier to entry.
The general rule was that judicial invalidation of a licensed patent, whether exclusive
or nonexclusive, evicted the licensee, freeing it to challenge the validity of the patent.
See also Cooper, supra note 77, at 1140-44.
98. 20 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1927).
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case after decree of invalidity in another suit, Ross v. Fuller (C. C.)
105 F. 510; the theory being that this effects an 'eviction.'""
With respect to the concept of eviction as a result of judicial
invalidation of a licensed patent, the Drackett court provided the
following analysis:
[I]n United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 ... , it is
held that a defense of invalidity is not open to the defendant in
a suit for royalties in the absence of an outstanding decision
against the patent.... But it seems to us that a different
situation must of necessity arise where the monopoly,
apparently created by the grant of a patent, has been destroyed
by a decree of invalidity in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The subject-matter of such a contract is essentially "the
monopoly which the grant confers: the right of property which it
creates" (Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 493, 13 L. Ed. 504),
and, when this monopoly has been destroyed, and the exclusive
rights of manufacture, sale, and use, purported to have been
created by the patent, are judicially decreed to be no longer
exclusive, but are thrown open to the public at large, there has
been a complete failure of consideration-an eviction-which
should justify a termination of the contract. Prior to such
eviction, the mere invalidity of the patent is properly held not to
be a sufficient defense, because the licensee may still continue
to enjoy all the benefits of a valid patent. It may be respected,
and the licensee would then have just what he bargained
for .... It is only when, by judicial decree or otherwise, it is
published to the world that the monopoly is destroyed, that the
licensee can claim a corresponding release from his obligation
to pay royalties.'0
99. Id. at 313. The relevant language from the Ross holding is as follows:
[T]he court is convinced that there was a failure of consideration the moment the patent
was declared invalid. The defendant agreed to pay the stipulated royalty in consideration
of the monopoly. When deprived of this exclusive privilege by law the defendant occupied
no vantage ground over any other manufacturer. The defendant took nothing from the
plaintiff, for he had nothing to give. The estate which the parties supposed belonged to
the plaintiff was judicially determined to belong to the public. The defendant should not
be compelled to pay a large sum of money for exercising a right, which, after the patent
was destroyed, was no longer exclusive, but was free and common to all. Ross v. Fuller,
105 F.510, 513-14 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1900).
100. Drackett Chem Co., 63 F.2d at 854.
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The Drackett court concluded its assessment of the eviction
limitation to the doctrine of licensee estoppel by affirming the
relevance justification of the doctrine. The court held "that the
Drackett Chemical Company is estopped to deny the validity of the
patent in respect to royalties accruing prior to that which constitutes
an eviction, and . . . that all royalties accruing prior to that date [of
eviction] must be paid."'o' Such a conclusion was entirely consistent
with the relevance theory of licensee estoppel, which held that the
validity of a licensed patent is irrelevant to a claim for royalties due
under a patent license agreement during the period in which the
licensee had full "enjoyment of the monopolistic rights granted under
the license."'
b) Expiration, Termination, and the Repudiation Limitation
Each of the recognized versions of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel acknowledged that the estoppel applied only during the term
of the license.0 3 As stated by Rooklidge in his review of the topic,
"[i]n addition to eviction, the bar against validity challenges [by a
licensee] was held to cease upon expiration or termination of the
license agreement."'" In H. Tibbe & Son Manufacturing Co. v.
Heineken, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York
recognized the expiration limit of the doctrine of licensee estoppel in
holding that "there is no authority for the proposition that a former
licensee is estopped from questioning the validity of a patent, after
his license expires, in vindication of acts done subsequent to its
termination."' Regarding the termination of a patent license for
reasons other than the passage of time, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Eskimo Pie Corp. v. National Ice Cream Co. noted the
following, in the context of a license agreement that was terminated
by the patent holder/licensor as a result of the licensee's breach: "By
the familiar rule, the defendant [licensee], while operating under-or
probably while retaining and claiming the right to operate under-the
101. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Deller, supra note 60, at 622 (§ 405. No Estoppel After Termination of
License); Cooper, supra note 77, at 1146 (1967); Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part
I), supra note 68, at 515.
104. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 515.
105. 37 F. 686, 687 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889); see also Bucky v. Sebo, 208 F.2d 304, 305-06
(2d Cir. 1953) ("During the existence of a patent license, the licensee may be estopped to
contest validity. But even this estoppel usually vanishes when the license terminates ...
because of lapse of time. . . ." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
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license, cannot be heard to deny the validity of the patent; but we do
not understand it to be claimed that this estoppel by rule of law would
persist after the license and all the licensee's rights thereunder were
terminated."'"
While it was generally agreed that licensee estoppel applied only
during the term of a license agreement, the debate surrounding the
doctrine centered on the question of whether a patent licensee could
unilaterally repudiate the license agreement and thereafter challenge
the validity of the licensed patent.'? Rooklidge framed the issue as
follows, noting the analogy to landlord-tenant law:
[N]ot all patent licensees were willing to wait for eviction or
expiration of the license agreement and few had the right to
terminate the agreement at will. This situation caused a
problem for licensees who became convinced of the invalidity of
the patent during the term of the license. Once again the courts
returned to the roots of the doctrine-the analogy to the
landlord-tenant law.
The common law of landlord-tenant provided that if the tenant
surrendered possession of the premises and repudiated the
lease, it could then dispute the landlord's title in an action for
post-repudiation rents. This equitable rule gave rise to the
repudiation concept in patent law. The early patent cases
recognized that a licensee could avoid application of the bar
against validity challenges by repudiating the license agreement.
Despite repudiation, the licensee remained obligated to pay
royalties which had accrued prior to the repudiation. By
repudiating the license, the licensee chose to become an
infringer for the period after the repudiation.1as
106. 26 F.2d 901, 902 (6th Cir. 1928); See also Dueber Watch-Case Mfg. Co. v.
Robbins, 75 F. 17, 26 (6th Cir. 1896). ("The fact that for a time the defendant was a
licensee of the . . . [licensed] patent cannot, of course, estop the defendant from disputing
its validity in a suit for infringements charged to have taken place after the license was
withdrawn."); Bucky, 208 F.2d at 305-06 ("During the existence of a patent license, the
licensee may be estopped to contest validity. But even this estoppel usually vanishes when
the license terminates. . . by act of the licensor." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)).
107. Cooper, supra note 77, at 1146 ("Where the suit is brought seeking recovery of
royalties allegedly accruing ... after the contract has ended . . ., the doctrine of estoppel is
inapplicable, and validity of the patent may be challenged. The major division of authority
is whether a licensee may repudiate the license agreement and thereafter attack the
validity of the patent." (footnotes omitted)).
108. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, 515-16 (footnotes
omitted).
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As noted in the Rooklidge comment above, a "repudiation
limitation" to licensee estoppel had been recognized in early
English and U.S. case law. In Lawes v. Purser,"o an action for
payment due under a patent license agreement, Judge Erle stated the
following:
[I]t is clear to me that, if the defendants [licensees] go on under
this agreement, using the patent right by the plaintiff's
[patentee's] permission, they must pay him, whether the patent
was valid or not, until, at least, they give notice that they dispute
the validity of the patent, and will, in future, use the invention
in their own right, and not under the permission of the plaintiff.
Such a notice would change the position of the parties: after it
the patentee might sue the defendants for an infringement of
his patent ... and perhaps in an action on the agreement ... the
invalidity of the patent might be a defence."
In Brown v. Lapham,"2 the licensees had "repudiated the license
and continued their infringement in defiance of the patent.""1. In
rejecting the patentee's motion for a preliminary injunction to stop
the licensees' further use of the patented product, the court held "that
a licensee under a patent is estopped to deny its validity on any
question arising out of that relation between the parties. Kinsman v.
Parkhurst, 18 How. 289. [However,] [i]t does not follow that he will
be always estopped because he has stood in that relation. When he
stands out from under the license, and claims nothing from it, and
does nothing more under it, with full knowledge to the licensor of his
position, he would appear to be at as full liberty to contest the patent
as any one.""
109. Id.
110. 6 EL. & BL. 930 (Q.B.) (1856).
111. Id. at 936.
112. 27 F. 77 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1886).
113. Id.
114. Id; see also Martin v. New Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co., 255 F. 93 (C.C.D.N.J.
1919); Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F.2d 346 (N.D. Ohio 1922) for district court decisions
that support the repudiation limitation. In Martin, the District Court for the District of
New Jersey stated the following:
A licensee under a license agreement . . . , when sued for royalties payable under the
agreement, where the patent which is the subject-matter of the license, is apparently valid
and in force (where it has not been declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction or
revoked by the Patent Office before the royalties have accrued), may not set up the
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The repudiation limitation was rejected, however, in a number of
cases which held that a licensee could not unilaterally repudiate a
patent license agreement in order to avoid licensee estoppel and
thereby challenge the validity of the licensed patent.' 116 In St. Paul
Plow Works v. Starling,"' the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that a
supposed invalidity of the patent and the consequent failure of consideration of the
agreement, unless, prior to the period for which the royalties are sought to be recovered,
he has given to the licensor a distinct, definite, and unequivocal notice to the effect that he
no longer recognizes the binding force of the agreement, and that he will thereafter
manufacture or use the article covered by the patent under a claim of right, founded upon
the alleged invalidity of the patent, and in hostility to and defiance of the authority of the
patent and the license, so that the licensor can thereafter proceed against him for an
infringement of the patent, if he choose so to do.
255 F.93 at 94 (citations omitted). In Universal Rim, the District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, provided the following endorsement of, and
justification for, the repudiation limitation:
The contention is made, and some support therefor may be found in the books, that a
licensee cannot, in the absence of a provision permitting the license to be terminated,
contest the validity of patents covered by the agreement, even after renunciation and
notice. This contention originates in the common-law doctrine of estoppel by covenant ....
[However,] the true rule, in my opinion, now is that the licensee, whenever he ascertains
that the patents covered by the license agreement are invalid, may refuse to be further
bound thereby, and, upon repudiation and notice, may thereafter defend against an action
for royalties or an infringement suit as freely as may a stranger . . . . If the patents are in
fact invalid, then there is no continuing consideration for the agreement, and, as was said
by Mr. Justice Brown in Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 234, 12 S.Ct. 636, 36 L.Ed.
414: 'It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless
patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his
monopoly.' So long, however as the invalidity of a patent has not been judicially declared
and the licensee continues to operate thereunder without repudiation or notice such as
will place him in the attitude of an infringer, there is no such want or complete failure of
consideration as will permit the licenses to refuse to pay royalties which have been
previously earned.
21 F.2d. at 348-49.
115. See, e.g., Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 240 N.W. 93 (Mich.
1932); E. States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products, Co., 2 A.2d 138 (Del. Ch. 1938);
United Mfg. & Serv. Co. v. Holwin Corp. 187 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1951); Bowers Mfg. Co. v.
All-Steel Equip., Inc., 275 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1960); see also, L. B. Dodds, The Repudiation
of Patent License Agreements, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., 151, 158-61 & n.22 (1954); Cooper,
supra note 77, at 1146-47 & n.183; Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra
note 68, at 521 & n.80-82.
116. According to Rooklidge, this rejection of the repudiation limitation in patent
licensing paralleled its fate in landlord-tenant law. Citing the Restatement (Second) of
Property § 4.3 (1977), Rooklidge noted that the "[repudiation] limitation eventually
disappeared from landlord-tenant law. In that context, repudiation was viewed as opening
the door to fraudulent claims and needless litigation. Now, unless the lease is silent about
termination, the tenant may terminate the lease only pursuant to the provisions of the
lease." Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 519 (footnotes
omitted).
117. 140 U.S. 184 (1891).
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licensee's unilateral repudiation, without more, did not effect a
termination of the patent license agreement. In that case, plaintiff
Starling granted a license to defendant St. Paul Plow Works, pursuant
to which St. Paul was authorized to make and sell Starling's patented
plow. In consideration for the grant of the patent license, St. Paul
agreed to pay royalties to Starling based on its plow sales. St. Paul
subsequently renounced the license but continued to make and sell
the patented plows without paying the agreed upon royalties.
Starling sued St. Paul for the unpaid royalties and St. Paul defended
by challenging the validity of the licensed Startling patent. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that St. Paul's unilateral repudiation of the
license agreement was ineffective and, accordingly, Starling had a
right to sue for the royalties owed under the agreement. Regarding
unilateral repudiation, the Court stated that:
We are of opinion that the license, in the absence of a
stipulation providing for its revocation, was not revocable by
the defendant [St. Paul], except by mutual consent, or by the
fault of the other party. If the plaintiff [Starling], after receiving
the notice, had sued the defendant for infringement, he would
have been properly regarded as acquiescing in the renunciation;
but, instead of that, he elected to regard the license as still in
force, and brought an action to recover the royalties provided
for by it, which he was entitled to do.'18
It is noteworthy that while the Court in St. Paul rejected
unilateral repudiation as a means of terminating a license agreement,
it did not question St. Paul's patent invalidity defense in the case.
This fact has led Rooklidge to remark that "[s]ub silentio, the Court
in St. Paul approved of the principle that repudiation frees the
licensee to challenge validity.""'9 A subsequent case, however, cited
St. Paul in holding that a licensee's unilateral repudiation of its patent
license agreement is ineffective, not only in terminating the
agreement but also in avoiding licensee estoppel. In Eastern States
Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co.,120 the Delaware Court of
Chancery rejected a patent licensee's claim that it had unilaterally
repudiated its license agreement and, accordingly, could challenge the
licensed patent's validity in a suit brought by the patentee for
118. Id. at 196.
119. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 521.
120. 2 A.2d 138.
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royalties due under the agreement. The court provided the following
concise assessment of the licensee's repudiation claim: "But [licensee]
Eastern says it has repudiated the agreement and is therefore free to
contest the validity of the patents. The answer to this is, that it is
beyond the power of a licensee to revoke the agreement except by the
consent or fault of the other party, neither of which is shown. St. Paul
Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U.S. 184, 186.",121
The position taken by the court in Eastern is an expression of the
termination rule of licensee estoppel. According to Rooklidge, who
employed the term in his review on licensee validity challenges, the
termination rule holds "that because the licensee could not
unilaterally terminate the contract, and because the licensee is
estopped from challenging validity as long as the contract is in
existence, the licensee was not freed to challenge validity by his
repudiation."122 Under the termination rule, the accepted releasing
events were the expiration of the patent license agreement and the
termination of the agreement in accordance with its terms. 123 The
occurrence of any such event would release the patent licensee from
the bar against a patent validity challenge imposed by law under the
doctrine of licensee estoppel. A licensee's unilateral repudiation of
the agreement, however, had no such effect. 124
The repudiation limitation and the termination rule defined
irreconcilable interpretations of the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
The former limit accepted a licensee's unilateral repudiation of its
license agreement as a means of avoiding the application of licensee
estoppel; the latter required a termination of the agreement in
accordance with its terms. It would appear that the cases reflecting
the division of authority on the effectiveness of a unilateral
repudiation could be easily categorized as having adopted one or the
other of the limits to the doctrine of licensee estoppel. In practice,
however, such a categorization is not so straight forward. In a
121. Id. at 142.
122. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 521.
123. Id. at 522 ("The policy basis for the termination rule is contractual-the contract
estops the licensee. The premise of the rule is that the licensor's promise to forego an
infringement suit is the consideration for the licensee's payment of royalties, and therefore
impliedly is the consideration for the licensee's obligation to refrain from challenging
validity. Under this notion, the obligations to pay royalties and refrain from challenging
validity continue until termination or expiration of the license." (footnote omitted)); but,
see infra note 147 regarding an eviction that results from a judicial invalidation of the
licensed patent in a third party infringement suit by the court of last resort.
124. See supra note 115.
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number of cases, which we refer to in this Article as hybrid cases, the
court accepted the repudiation limitation in general but concluded
that, based on the particular facts in the case before the court,
unilateral repudiation could not effect a termination of the license
agreement freeing the licensee to challenge the validity of the
licensed patent. In essence, the court adopted a termination rule
exception to the repudiation limitation. As will be demonstrated in
the remaining sections of this Part III, an understanding of this
seemingly arcane exception is essential to an appreciation of the
debate regarding the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Lear.
The decision of the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court in Elgin National Watch Co. v. Bulova Watch Co. 125
provides an example of a hybrid case in which the court applied the
termination rule exception to the repudiation limitation. In Elgin, a
patentee brought an action against its licensee for the recovery of
minimum royalties payable under a nonexclusive patent license
agreement. The licensee, having never utilized the patented
invention, repudiated the license agreement and refused to pay any
post-repudiation royalties, claiming as a defense that the licensed
patent was invalid. The Elgin court acknowledged the effectiveness
of a unilateral repudiation in the majority of circumstances, but
rejected as ineffective the licensee's repudiation in the instant case,
and ruled that the licensee was liable for all royalties owed the
patentee under the agreement. The features that distinguished Elgin
from the majority of cases involving a licensee's unilateral
repudiation were that the suit was for recovery of minimum royalties
that accrued irrespective of the licensee's use of the patented
invention and that the licensee did not intend to utilize the patented
invention following repudiation. On the basis of these features, the
facts in Elgin met the essential requirement for application of the
termination rule exception to the repudiation limitation, namely that
the licensee can incur a royalty obligation following its unilateral
repudiation of the license agreement without engaging in any
activities that would infringe the licensed patent.
The court in Elgin framed the question before it on appeal as
follows: "[Is] invalidity of a patent ... a defense to an action for
minimum royalties where the licensee has not used and does not
intend to use the process or product of the claimed invention[?]"'2 6
125. 118 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
126. Id. at 199
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The court began its opinion by acknowledging the long established
rule that a licensee who has utilized the patented invention is
estopped from denying the validity of the licensed patent in an action
by the patentee to recover accrued royalties, citing inter alia
Kingsman v. Parkhurst. It then recognized the generally applicable
repudiation limitation in noting that "[i]t has become the law,
however, that as to future ... [use of the patented invention], a
licensee may repudiate his license upon a challenge to the validity of
the patent, posing a test of the patent and exposing himself to the claim
and consequences of infringement."l27 In restating the repudiation
limitation, the court highlighted the fact that in the typical
repudiation case, the royalty obligation incurred by the licensee
following its unilateral repudiation of the license agreement resulted
from the licensees' continued use of the patented invention, with the
licensee assuming the role of a potential infringer. It is in that
context, where the patentee can pursue an infringement claim against
the licensee, that the licensee's unilateral repudiation permits it to
challenge the validity of the licensed patent as a defense. In the case
before the court in Elgin, however, the licensee would incur an
obligation to pay minimum royalties under the license agreement
following its repudiation of the agreement even if it honored its stated
intent to avoid any further use of the patented invention. By
repudiating its license agreement, "the licensee has simply sought to
shed fixed obligations under the license, without ... [acting] against
the patent and incurring the risks of infringement."" According to
the Elgin court, in such a circumstance, the unilateral repudiation of
the license agreement is not effective in freeing the licensee from the
bar against a patent validity challenge in an action by the patentee for
royalties that accrued following the repudiation.
The Elgin court concluded its opinion by reviewing the rationale
for its rejection of unilateral repudiation in the case before it. As a
precursor to the balancing test employed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in its Lear holding, 29 the Elgin court weighed the competing interests
in respecting contracts and in the free use of inventions in the public
domain. According to the court, the doctrine of licensee estoppel was
justified under contract principles. "When the courts have held ...
that a licensee may not assert invalidity of the patent as a defense to a
claim for accrued royalties, they have necessarily held that validity of
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 200.
129. See infra section III.C.3.
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the patent is not the essence of consideration for a licensing
agreement and that freedom from an infringement claim, regardless
of the validity of the claim, is good consideration.""0 The repudiation
limitation, which frees the licensee to challenge the validity of the
licensed patent in defense of a claim for royalties incurred for actual
use of the patented invention following repudiation, was explained on
the basis of patent law policy.
There is, of course, no public interest in affording patent
protection to any art which is not novel and patentable.
Therefore, a patent does not prove itself. In the interest of
free ... [use of an invention in the public domain], a ... [user]
assuming the risks of an infringement suit is allowed to test a
patent. The interest in free ... [use] is such that even a licensee
is permitted to put himself in that position. Therefore, a
licensee may announce for the future that he repudiates his
license and will [use the invention] in opposition to the patent.
That position is allowed to him not as a matter of contract law
but as a matter of patent law and public policy.13
In the Elgin case, however, the court provided the following
reason for its holding that the licensee's unilateral repudiation of its
agreement was ineffective:
A licensee like the defendant here, however, does not put itself
in.. . [the] position [of acting in opposition of the licensed
patent] and is not serving any public interest by repudiating its
license agreement. It does not wish to. . . [use the claimed
invention] or promote the art. . . . This defendant has simply
decided that it does not wish to employ the process ... covered
by the patent, apparently regardless of the validity of the
patent. There is no public interest in allowing a licensee, merely
because it repents of its bargain, to repudiate its agreement and
shed its obligations.
Defendant has received and would receive the protection and
consideration of its agreement. Whether it wished to ... [use
the claimed invention] or not was its choice. It could have ...
[used the claimed invention] under the protection of its license
130. Elgin Nat'l Watch, Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
131. Id.
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and pay royalties accordingly or it could have repudiated the
license agreement and ... [used the claimed invention] as an
infringer. Having elected not to ... [use the claimed invention],
however, there is no reason why it should be freed of its
considered commitment to pay minimum royalties. The license
agreement, for practical purposes, was an option to defendant,
and the continuing option was good consideration for the
agreed minimum royalty payments.32
In Elgin, the court concluded that the consideration for the
obligation to pay minimum royalties was the grant of the privilege to
use the patented invention without the threat of an infringement
claim, whether or not the invention was actually used. Such
consideration was good irrespective of the patent's validity.
Accordingly, a claim by the licensee that the patent was invalid was
irrelevant to an action by the patentee for the minimum royalty due
under the license agreement and therefore barred under the doctrine
of licensee estoppel. The licensee's unilateral repudiation of the
agreement did not release the estoppel since, in light of the licensee's
stated intent to refrain from any use of the patented invention, the
repudiation would not result in furthering the public's interest in
testing the validity of a potentially worthless patent in an
infringement suit. Only the expiration of the license agreement or the
termination of the agreement in accordance with its terms (i.e., the
releasing events specified in the termination rule) could free the
licensee in Elgin from its minimum royalty obligation under the
agreement and from the bar of licensee estoppel.133, 134 We will revisit
132. Id. at 201-02.
133. Arguably, as a hybrid case that accepted the effectiveness of a unilateral
repudiation in the majority of circumstances, the Elgin court would recognize an eviction
as another releasing event that would free the licensee in Elgin from its minimum royalty
obligation and from the licensee estoppel bar. See also, infra note 147 regarding an
eviction that results from a judicial invalidation of the licensed patent in a third party
infringement suit by the court of last resort.
134. For a case in which an appellate court applied the traditional version of licensee
estoppel but rejected the termination rule exception to the repudiation limitation, see
Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co. of California, 277 P. 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929). In an action to
recover amounts allegedly due under a patent license agreement, Armstrong (the patent
holder) claimed that its licensee's attempted unilateral repudiation of the license was
ineffective and, accordingly, the licensee was liable for payments due under the agreement
and could not raise patent invalidity as a defense. Under the terms of the agreement, the
licensee was obligated to pay Armstrong a total of $100,000 for the privilege of using the
patented process, whether or not it actually used the process. Payments were to be made
either in the form of a running royalty over a ten-year period (5% of the net amount it
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the arguments made in Elgin in Section III.B. of this Article in our
analysis of another hybrid case, Automatic Radio.13 ' The First
Circuit's holding in that case, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court
and cited in Elgin, provides a key insight into the central question
under consideration in this Part III, i.e., what is the scope of the U.S.
Supreme Court's repudiation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel in
received from the sale of gasoline produced through the patented process) or, if the
licensee elected to terminate its royalty obligation, as a lump sum representing the
difference between $100,000 and the aggregate sum of the royalties already paid. The
licensee repudiated the license prior to paying $100,000 in royalties, based on its
determination that the licensed patent was invalid, and refused to provide Armstrong with
the remaining amount due under the contract. In repudiating the license, the licensee
indicated that it had no intention of continuing its use of the patented process. The facts
in the case met the essential requirements for the application of the termination rule
exception to the repudiation limitation of licensee estoppel, i.e., that the licensee's
payment obligation under the contract persisted following its repudiation of the license
despite the licensee's stated intent to refrain from further use of the patented invention.
Specifically, the licensee in Armstrong had agreed to pay $100,000 for the right to use the
patented process but the obligation was not contingent upon actual use of the process.
The licensee's repudiation of the license, based on alleged patent invalidity, was an
attempt to avoid its agreed-to post-repudiation payment obligation. Nonetheless, the
appellate court in Armstrong recognized the licensee's repudiation as valid, permitting the
latter to challenge the licensed patent. While the patent at issue would not be tested in the
context of a patent infringement suit, in light of the licensee's plan to refrain from future
use of the patented process, the court concluded that the patent's validity was relevant to a
determination of the licensee's post-repudiation payment obligation. In permitting the
patent challenge, the court would not only resolve the issue under consideration in the
case but would also further the public's interest in eliminating worthless patents. In the
end, the Armstrong appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the licensed patent
was invalid and that the licensee in the case had no further payment obligation. In
rejecting the termination rule exception to the repudiation limitation, the appellate court
stated the following:
We see no merit in plaintiff's [Armstrong's] contention that defendant [licensee]
cannot avail itself of the renunciation [i.e., repudiation] exception to the general
rule of estoppel because defendant has not notified plaintiff that it would
manufacture in hostility to or in defiance of the authority of the patent and
license so that the licensor could thereafter proceed against it for infringement of
the patent. It is true that many cases apply the renunciation exception in favor of
the licensee who abandons the license and thereafter infringes the patent.
Nevertheless, it is inconceivable that defendant would be liable under the
contract despite the alleged invalidity of the patent solely because it discontinued
the use of the process, whereas if it had continued the use of such process in
defiance of the patent it could now successfully defend itself against any liability
by showing the invalidity of such patent. The authorities do not permit the
invalidity of a patent to be asserted as a defense to any liability which accrued
before renunciation. The alleged obligation in the present case did not accrue
before the renunciation notice was given on April 19, 1923, and defendant
thereby brings itself within the exception to the rule of estoppel.
Armstrong, 277 P. at 892.
135. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 176 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.
1949), aff'd, 399 U.S. 827 (1950).
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Lear? As noted above, the scope of the Lear holding is, in part,
defined by the version of licensee estoppel that was rejected by the
Lear Court in overruling the estoppel portion of its Automatic Radio
decision.
4. Two recognized versions of the doctrine of licensee estoppel
Having reviewed the case law addressing the limits of licensee
estoppel, we can now describe the two generally recognized versions
of the doctrine. The two versions constitute irreconcilable
interpretations of licensee estoppel and can be distinguished by their
respective limits and justifications. As will be demonstrated in
subsequent sections of this Part III, an understanding of these
different versions of the doctrine is essential to an appreciation of the
debate regarding the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear
decision.
The majority of courts that have endorsed licensee estoppel have
adopted a version of the common law doctrine that is based on the
relevance rule.'36 The rule holds that the actual validity of a licensed
patent is irrelevant to the obligation of a patent licensee to pay
royalties that accrued over the period during which the licensee
enjoyed the benefits of the patent pursuant to the license agreement
and, accordingly, a licensee is barred from challenging the patent's
validity as a defense to an action by the licensor to recover the
royalties. 3 7 The licensee's benefits derive from (1) the grant of a
license under a presumptively valid patent that frees the licensee from
the threat of an infringement challenge and (2) the deterrent effect of
the patent right which discourages nonlicensed potential competitors
from utilizing the claimed invention. The estoppel bar ceases,
however, upon expiration or termination of the license agreement,
eviction of the licensee as a result of the invalidation of the licensed
patent in a third party infringement suit (the eviction limitation) or
the unilateral repudiation of the license by the licensee (the
repudiation limitation). Each of these releasing events ends the
licensee's enjoyment of the benefits of the patent license, thereby
136. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 519 ("The majority
of courts . . . appl[ied] the repudiation rule and allowed the licensees to challenge the
licensed patent's validity after repudiating the license." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at
537.
137. Id. at 516 ("In sum, the rule prohibiting a patent licensee from challenging validity
. . . can be stated as follows: the validity of the licensed patent is irrelevant to the
licensee's obligation to pay royalties accrued before eviction or repudiation."); see also id.
at 527, 535, 537.
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permitting a licensee who continues to utilize the claimed invention in
the role of a potential infringer to challenge the patent's validity in
defense of a claim by the patent holder for royalties owed under the
agreement. Under each of these altered circumstances, the validity of
the patent becomes relevant to the patent holder's claim for future
payments.
The justification for this traditional version of licensee estoppel,
based on the relevance rule, was found in the application of contract
principles. The licensee's continued enjoyment of the benefits of the
patent license under the agreement, and not the actual validity of the
licensed patent, was the consideration for the obligation of the
licensee to pay royalties."" It was not until the occurrence of a
releasing event that resulted in an end of the consideration (e.g., an
agreement expiration or termination), a failure of the consideration
(e.g., an eviction) or a rejection of the consideration (e.g., a unilateral
repudiation) that the licensee was free to challenge the licensed
patent's validity in defense of a claim for future royalties. However,
the traditional version of licensee estoppel was grounded in more
than contract principles. The version's acceptance of the repudiation
limitation, which permitted a licensee to unilaterally repudiate the
license agreement in order to challenge the licensed patent, evinced a
recognition of the important public policy in eliminating invalid
patents that claim inventions that are properly in the public domain.'
Rooklidge summarized the justifications for the traditional version of
licensee estoppel in the following comment:
Under licensee estoppel as originally applied,... the licensee
was only prevented from challenging validity as long as he
accepted the benefits of the license. Once the licensee
repudiated the license, he not only gave up any exclusive or
deterrent effect, but also exposed himself to an infringement
138. See Elgin Nat'l Watch Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d at 201 ("When the courts have held ...
that a licensee may not assert invalidity of the patent as a defense to a claim for accrued
royalties, they have necessarily held that validity of the patent is not the essence of
consideration for a licensing agreement and that freedom from an infringement claim,
regardless of the validity of the claim, is good consideration."); see also Rooklidge, Lear v.
Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 519-20 ("[L]icensee estoppel is based on
conduct, and by ceasing that conduct the licensee ends the 'estoppel.' No longer 'taking
the fruits of the land,'-immunity from an infringement suit and any deterrent effect of
the patent-the licensee was freed to contest validity." (footnote omitted)).
139. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 520 ("[Tihe public
interest favors challenging illegitimate patents. The repudiation rule facilitates validity
challenges by licensees." (footnote omitted)).
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suit. The repudiation limitation was consistent with the policy
basis for licensee estoppel [i.e. that the continued enjoyment of
the benefits of the license under the agreement estops the
licensee] and further fostered the policy of allowing validity
challenges to illegitimate patents .... .
A minority of courts, however, rejected the traditional version of
licensee estoppel in favor of a version of the doctrine that endorsed
the termination rule.14' This version, labeled the "termination" 4 2 or
"strong form" 43 version of licensee estoppel, required that a license
agreement either expire or terminate in accordance with its terms for
the licensee estoppel bar to end. A unilateral repudiation of the
agreement by the licensee was not an effective means of freeing the
licensee to challenge the validity of the licensed patent as a defense in
a suit brought by the licensor to recover royalties due under the
agreement. *4
Unlike the traditional version of the licensee estoppel, the
"strong form" version is a rigid doctrine based on the law of contracts
that holds that the agreement estops the licensee from challenging a
licensed patent and that the estoppel persists for the life of the
agreement.145  As stated by Rooklidge, "the licensor's promise to
forego an infringement suit is the consideration for the licensee's
payment of royalties, and therefore impliedly is the consideration for
the licensee's obligation to refrain from challenging validity. Under
this notion, the obligations to pay royalties and refrain from
challenging validity continue until termination or expiration of the
140. Id. at 522.
141. See supra note 115; Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at
521 ("Despite the Supreme Court's implied sanction of repudiation [in St. Paul Plow
Works v. Starling], ... St. Paul led to a small line of cases rejecting repudiation. Those
cases .. . focused on termination of the license agreement rather than repudiation."); see
also id. at 537.
142. Id. at 535-36.
143. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 10-11, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118.
144. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 521 ("The
reasoning of those cases [that endorsed the strong form version of licensee estoppel which
incorporated the termination rule] was that because the licensee could not unilaterally
terminate the contract, and because the licensee is estopped from challenging validity as
long as the contract is in existence, the licensee was not freed to challenge validity by his
repudiation.").
145. Id. at 522. ("The policy basis for the termination rule [that defines the strong
form version of licensee estoppel] is contractual-the contract estops the licensee.").
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license."'46 Neither an eviction of the licensee 47 nor a repudiation of
the license by the licensee,48 unless a recognized termination event
under the agreement that ends the parties' contractual obligations, is
effective in releasing the estoppel under the "strong form" version of
the doctrine.
The essential distinction between the two versions of licensee
estoppel is aptly expressed in Rooklidge's characterization of the
"strong form" version as a rule of estoppel and the traditional version
as a rule of relevance.149 According to that commentator, "[t]he policy
basis for the termination rule [that defines the "strong form" version
of licensee estoppel] is contractual-the contract estops the
licensee."so In contrast, the relevance rule that defines the traditional
version of licensee estoppel holds that "the validity of the licensed
patent is irrelevant to the licensee's obligation to pay royalties
accrued before ... [cessation of the licensee's enjoyment of the
benefits of the license]."'5 ' The Amicus Brief of the American Bar
Association in support of licensor Genentech in MedImmune
provided the following comparison of the two versions of the licensee
estoppel:
The traditional doctrine of licensee estoppel, as opposed to the
"strong form" version ... was equitable and well-supported.
Traditional licensee estoppel imposes no irrevocable waiver of
licensee challenges. Instead, the traditional doctrine simply
requires licensees to choose between enjoying the benefits of
146. Id. (footnote omitted).
147. Id. at 518-19 ("An eviction exception is anathema to what some courts perceived
to be a rigid doctrine estopping the licensee from challenging the licensed patent's
validity."). It should be noted, however, that at least one court that had endorsed the
strong form version of licensee estoppel had also recognized an eviction limitation to the
termination rule (which bars a licensee's patent validity challenge until the license
agreement expires or is terminated in accordance with its terms), where the eviction
results from a judicial invalidation of the licensed patent in a third party infringement suit
by the court of last resort. In Thomson Spot Welder Co., the Supreme Court of Michigan
concluded that, despite its application of the "strong form" version of licensee estoppel in
the case before it, a licensee whose agreement had not yet expired or terminated in
accordance with its terms could still raise patent invalidity as a defense to a claim for
royalties owed under the agreement if the patent at issue had been invalidated by a court
of last resort, thereby voiding the agreement for failure of consideration. 240 N.W. at 94.
148. See supra note 144.
149. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 509, 511, 516, 521-
22, 527, 535-36.
150. Id. at 522. See supra note 145.
151. Id. at 516. See supra note 137.
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the license and asserting the invalidity of the licensed patent.
Under the doctrine, a licensee may choose either but not
both ... a licensee may assert the invalidity of the licensor's
patent, but only after forgoing the benefits that the patent
license provides.152
An understanding of the two versions of licensee estoppel is
useful in addressing the question, raised in MedImmune and discussed
below, of whether any vestige of the doctrine remains in effect today.
In Part II.B. of this Article we review the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Automatic Radio' in which the Court provided its final
endorsement of the doctrine of licensee estoppel. In Part II.C. we
analyze the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear holding'" in which the Court
overruled the estoppel portion of its Automatic Radio decision in
rejecting the doctrine. What is clear in Lear is that the Court
abrogated a version of licensee estoppel that had been eroded over
the years through the recognition by the Court of a number of non-
contract-based policy-driven exceptions to the doctrine that will be
discussed in the next section of this Article. What is unclear is the
scope of the Court's repudiation of licensee estoppel, i.e., was the
Court's holding in Lear limited to only one version of the doctrine?
While the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of license estoppel in
Automatic Radio was without meaningful analysis, the First Circuit's
ruling in the case' reflected considerable thought and suggests that
the circuit court had endorsed a version of the doctrine that had
incorporated the termination rule exception to the repudiation
116limitation described in our discussion of the Elgin case , i.e., an
atypical version that endorsed elements of the "strong form" version
of licensee estoppel. Moreover, a compelling case can be made for
the view that the California Supreme Court in its Lear decision'
adopted the termination version of licensee estoppel. Accordingly,
the possibility remains open that the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection
of licensee estoppel in Lear, in which the Court overruled Automatic
Radio and vacated the California Supreme Court's holding in the
152. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 11, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118.
153. 339 U.S. 827.
154. 395 U.S. 653.
155. 176 F.2d 799.
156. Elgin Nat'l Watch Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d 197; see supra Part III.A.3.b.
157. Adkins, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545.
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case, was nothing more than a rejection of the "strong form" version
of licensee estoppel. According to that interpretation, the Lear Court
did not undermine the vitality of the traditional form of the doctrine
that would estop, on substantive contract grounds, a licensee in good
standing (i.e., a licensee who is in full compliance with the terms of,
and enjoying all of the benefits afforded by, a patent license
agreement that had neither expired nor terminated, and who had
neither been evicted nor had repudiated the license) from challenging
the validity of the licensed patent. The question as to the scope of the
Lear Court's rejection of licensee estoppel, raised but not resolved in
MedImmune, will be addressed in the remaining sections of this
Part III.
5. Exceptions to the estoppel doctrine
In the years between the U.S. Supreme Court's application of
licensee estoppel in Harvey Steel and its final affirmation of the
doctrine in Automatic Radio, the Court crafted a number of
exceptions to the doctrine. These exceptions appear to differ from
the limits to the doctrine that were discussed above in section III.A.3.
The limits defined the scope of licensee estoppel, were generally
justified on the basis of contract principles (e.g., a failure of
consideration or the end of a bargained-for exchange), and did not by
their acceptance tend to undermine the vitality of the doctrine, which
itself was rooted in contract principles. In contrast, as will be
discussed below, the exceptions crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court
were justified under non-contract policy considerations that trumped
contract principles (e.g., patent law or antitrust public policy
concerns) and, accordingly, challenged the underpinnings of the
estoppel doctrine. On closer analysis, however, the distinction
between the limits and the exceptions to licensee estoppel tended to
blur, especially with respect to the repudiation limitation. Recall that
in Elgin, the repudiation limitation was justified on the basis of patent
public policy and not contract principles. For purposes of this section,
however, resolution of a debate regarding the distinction between
limits and exceptions is unnecessary. What is significant is the fact
that in the years preceding the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lear,
the Court saw fit to identify exceptions to licensee estoppel and relied
on these exceptions in Lear as evidence of a significant erosion of the
doctrine that justified its repudiation.
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a) Patent policy exceptions
In Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica
Insulation Co.,"8 the U.S. Supreme Court initiated its assault on the
doctrine of licensee estoppel by endorsing what is most accurately
described as a qualification of the estoppel doctrine. The case
involved the scope of assignor estoppel, a contract-based prohibition
to the challenge of a patent's validity that is considered closely related
to the doctrine of licensee estoppel.5 9 In assignor estoppel, the
assignor of a patent is estopped from challenging the validity of the
assigned patent as a defense to a claim of patent infringement
brought by the assignee. The Court in Westinghouse acknowledged
that the assignor was barred from challenging the validity of the
assigned patent but qualified the estoppel doctrine by permitting the
assignor to reference the prior art to narrow the patent claims to the
scope that the government intended in granting the patent right.'" In
the words of the Court, "the state of the art can not be used to
destroy the patent and defeat the grant, because the assignor is
estopped to do this. But the state of the art may be used to construe
and narrow the claims of the patent, conceding their validity. The
distinction may be a nice one but seems to be workable.""'
158. 266 U.S. 342 (1924).
159. See supra note 61.
160. The Court in Westinghouse supported its holding by comparing the conveyance of
land with the assignment of a patent:
The analogy between estoppel in conveyances of land and estoppel in
assignments of a patent right is clear. If one lawfully conveys to another a
patented right to exclude the public from the making, using and vending of an
invention, fair dealing should prevent him from derogating from the title he has
assigned, just as it estops a grantor of a deed of land from impeaching the effect
of his solemn act as against his grantee. The grantor purports to convey the right
to exclude others, in the one instance, from a defined tract of land, and in the
other, from a described and limited field of the useful arts. The difference
between the two cases is only the practical one of fixing exactly what is the
subject-matter conveyed. A tract of land is easily determined by survey. Not so
the scope of a patent right for an invention.
As between the owner of a patent and the public, the scope of the right of
exclusion granted is to be determined in the light of the state of the art at the
time of the invention. Can the state of the art be shown in a suit by the assignee
of a patent against the assignor for infringement to narrow or qualify the
construction of the claims and relieve the assignor from the charge? . . . We
think, ... [yes, since] the better rule, in view of the peculiar character of patent
property, is that the state of the art may be considered. Otherwise the most
satisfactory means of measuring the extent of the grant the Government
intended and which the assignor assigned would be denied to the court in
reaching a just conclusion. 266 U.S. at 350-51.
161. Id. at 351.
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In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.,162 another case
involving assignor estoppel, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed a more
direct attack on the estoppel doctrine. Relying on patent law and
public policy, the Scott Court allowed the assignor of a patent to
defend an infringement suit by the assignee on the ground that the
allegedly infringing device was an invention claimed in an expired
patent and, accordingly, was in the prior art and available for
unrestricted public use. In the words of the Court, "any attempted
reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under
him of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the
legal device employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the
patent laws.""' The Court concluded that:
the patent laws preclude the patentee of an expired patent and
all others including petitioner [assignee] from recapturing any
part of the former patent monopoly; for those laws dedicate to
all the public the ideas and inventions embodied in an expired
patent. They do not contemplate that anyone by contract or
any form of private arrangement may withhold from the public
the use of an invention for which the public has paid by its grant
of a monopoly and which has been appropriated to the use of
all. The rights in the invention are then no longer subject to
private barter, sale, or waiver .... It follows that the patent
laws preclude the petitioner assignee from invoking the
doctrine of estoppel, as a means of continuing as against
respondent, his assignor, the benefit of an expired monopoly,
and they preclude the assignor from estopping himself from
enjoying rights which it is the policy of the patent laws to free
from all restrictions. For no more than private contract can
estoppel be the means of successfully avoiding the requirements
of legislation enacted for the protection of a public interest ....
The patent laws preclude us from saying that the patent
assignment, which they authorize, operates to estop the assignor
from asserting that which the patent laws prescribe, namely,
that the invention of an expired patent is dedicated to the
public, of which the assignor is a member.
162. 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
163. Id. at 256.
164. Id. at 256-57 (citations omitted).
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b) Antitrust-related exceptions
In the series of three cases, starting with Sola Electric Co. v.
Jefferson Electric Co.,165 the U.S. Supreme Court developed an
expanding exception to licensee estoppel based on the public interest
in support of the antitrust laws.'" In Sola, the Court concluded that a
patent licensee is not estopped "by virtue of his license agreement,...
to challenge a price-fixing clause in the agreement by showing that
the patent is invalid, and that the price restriction is accordingly
unlawful because not protected by the patent monopoly."1 7
According to the Court,
[t]he contract provided that the license was granted on
condition that the "prices, terms, and conditions of sale, for use
or sale" throughout the licensed territory should not be more
favorable to petitioner's [licensee's] customers than those
prescribed from time to time by respondent [patent
holder/licensor] for its own sales and those of its other licensees.
Respondent sought recovery of unpaid royalties and also an
injunction restraining further sales except in conformity to the
terms of the license agreement. 68
In allowing the licensee's validity challenge, the Court stated that
"[1]ocal rules of estoppel which would fasten upon the public as well
as the petitioner the burden of an agreement in violation of the
Sherman Act must yield to the Act's declaration that such agreements
are unlawful, and to the public policy of the Act which in the public
interest precludes the enforcement of such unlawful agreements. ,161
In Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing
Co.,' 70 the U.S. Supreme Court relied on its decisions in Scott Paper
and Sola in holding that "the defendant [licensee], in a suit to recover
royalties only [i.e., no attempt to also enforce the price-fixing
provisions] under a terminated patent license agreement containing
price-fixing provisions, can challenge the validity of the patent despite
165. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
166. Id.; Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947);
MacGregor, 329 U.S. 402.
167. 317 U.S. at 173.
168. Id. at 174.
169. Id. at 177.
170. 329 U.S. 394.
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a covenant in the license contract that he would not do so.""' The
Court concluded that:
[t]he royalties here claimed accrued, if they accrued at all, prior
to the time the license agreement terminated. Consequently,
the fact of subsequent termination does not free the promise to
pay royalties from the taint of the price-fixing provision. Nor
does the fact, if it be a fact, that [licensee] Metallic itself
suggested the price-fixing provision, bar Metallic's challenge to
the patent's validity. For the contract was still illegal, whoever
suggested it, so that there is no less reason for leaving the way
open to challenge the patent as a service to the public interest
than if [patent owner/licensor] Katzinger had suggested price-
fixing. Finally, Metallic's specific contract not to challenge the
validity of Katzinger's patent can no more override
congressional policy than can an implied estoppel.'72
As in Katzinger, decided on the same day, the Court held in
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co."'7 that a
patent licensee can defend on the ground of patent invalidity "a suit
for royalties only under a licensing agreement which contains a price-
fixing provision. "74 In MacGregor, Justice Frankfurter provided his
dissent from the decisions of the Court in both MacGregor and
Katzinger.17 He offered a compelling defense of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel and particularly objected to the expansion of the
antitrust exception that occurred in Katzinger and MacGregor. He
emphasized that in Sola, the Court permitted a licensee to challenge
the validity of a licensed patent as a defense in an action brought by
the licensor to enforce a price-fixing provision that was a violation of
the antitrust laws in the absence of a valid patent. As Justice
Frankfurter explained:
the Sola case, like ... [Katzinger and MacGregor], arose out of
a claim for royalties under a patent license. But that there was
a claim for royalties was hardly mentioned in the Court's
opinion in the Sola case. The sole issue to which our attention
171. Id. at 395.
172. Id. at 401-02.
173. 329 U.S. 402.
174. Id. at 404.
175. Id. at 408-16.
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was directed was a prayer that the licensee be enjoined from
breach of his promise to abide by the prices fixed by the
licensor for the sale of articles manufactured under the
patent....
The precise issue which we decided in the Sola case is not a
matter for inference or conjecture. It was explicitly defined and
delimited .... It was not whether a licensee may challenge the
validity of a patent when sued for royalties. It was not whether
a provision for price-fixing undermined rights under estoppel
against a licensee. It was whether the licensor could show the
special dispensation pertaining to the holder of a valid patent,
which entitles him to fix the price of a commodity manufactured
under his patent, although such a pricing agreement would be
unenforceable in the generality of cases. 7 6
According to Justice Frankfurter, "[a]ll that the Sola case held,
and the only thing it held, was that a valid patent is indispensable
to . . . [the] right to fix prices."l7
In Katzinger and MacGregor, however, the Court endorsed a
licensee's patent validity challenge in a suit by the patent
holder/licensor only to recover royalties; while each of the relevant
license agreements contained a price-fixing provision, no effort was
made on the part of the licensor to enforce that provision. This
"distinction with a difference"'78 served as the basis for Justice
Frankfurter's dissent.
In ... [Katzinger and MacGregor] price-fixing is not an issue.
We are not asked to allow the licensor to have the benefit of a
practice available only under a valid patent. To grant relief
here will not, unlike the Sola case, approve a practice prima
facie in restraint of trade. What we here have to decide is
whether we shall allow the licensee to repudiate an agreement
for the payment of money made in an arm's length transaction.
For nearly a hundred years this Court has uniformly answered
that question by using the legal shorthand of estoppel. 9
176. Id. at 411.
177. Id. at 413.
178. Id. at 415.
179. Id. at 412-13.
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In his defense of the historic doctrine of licensee estoppel, Justice
Frankfurter emphasized that the doctrine was unanimously endorsed
in Kingsman v. Parkhurst ninety years before and was unanimously
applied in United States v. Harvey Steel Co. fifty years later. He then
noted that before and after those cases "a weighty body of cases
affirmed and applied that doctrine with rare unanimity"" in all
English-speaking jurisdictions. He also noted that, despite four major
patent statutes and numerous amendatory enactments, Congress
never saw fit to abolish or limit the estoppel doctrine. He concluded
his endorsement of the doctrine by stating that:
[i]f ever a doctrine has established itself as part of our law to be
respected by the judiciary, this is it. If it is to be changed,
Congress is there to change it. . . . We cannot do that. We can
only adhere to the doctrine or overrule it. Until Congress does
undo a principle so embedded in our law, we should leave it
where we find it.
... But, in any event, if we are to wipe out so settled a phase of
our law it should be done explicitly, not cryptically. In my
judgment the Sola decision does not give adequate support for
the Court's opinion. The cases before us necessarily involve the
estoppel doctrine and cannot be disposed of without appearing
to overrule a settled course of decision.s1
Justice Frankfurter ended his dissent in MacGregor and
Katzinger with the following words that have particular relevance in
light of the uncertainty generated by the U.S. Supreme Court's
subsequent decisions regarding licensee estoppel: "If a doctrine that
was vital law for more than ninety years will be found to have now
been deprived of life, we ought at least to give it decent public
burial." 18 2 As we will see in the next section, the doctrine survived,
albeit in a somewhat eroded condition, to be endorsed again by the
Court in Automatic Radio. It was not until the Court's decision in
Lear that a "decent public burial" of licensee estoppel was held, and
even with that decision the question remained as to whether any
vestige of the doctrine survived. Answering that question is the goal
of the remaining portion of this Part III.
180. Id. at 409.
181. Id. at 410.
182. Id. at 416.
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B. Automatic Radio Manufacturing v. Hazeltine Research
In Automatic Radio Manufacturing v. Hazeltine Research,"' the
U.S. Supreme Court provided its final endorsement of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel. The Court subsequently overruled the estoppel
portion of its Automatic Radio holding in Lear v. Adkins.s
Nonethelss, the Automatic Radio decision remains relevant in that the
scope of the Lear Court's repudiation of licensee estoppel is, in part,
defined by the version of the doctrine that was endorsed in Automatic
Radio and rejected in Lear.
1. Facts of the case and holding of the U.S. Supreme Court
In Automatic Radio, the plaintiff Hazeltine Research (Hazeltine)
brought an action against Automatic Radio Manufacturing (ARM) to
recover royalties allegedly owed under a patent license agreement.
Under the agreement, which had resulted from the settlement of a
prior dispute between the parties,' ARM was granted a nonexclusive
right to practice inventions relating to the manufacture of radio
broadcasting apparatus, covered by a group of 570 patents and 200
patent applications. In consideration for the license grant, ARM
agreed to pay a minimum annual royalty, as well as a running royalty
calculated as a percentage of the total sales of its radio broadcasting
receivers, whether or not ARM practiced any of the Hazeltine
inventions covered by the licensed patents or applications in the
manufacture of its receivers. Hazeltine's suit followed ARM's refusal
to pay the agreed upon royalties, and ARM defended on the grounds
that the royalty arrangement set forth in the license agreement
constituted patent misuse, rendering the licensed patents
unenforceable, that certain of the licensed patents were invalid, and
that ARM had been evicted from its obligation under the license
agreement based on the results of prior infringement litigation
involving third parties. Five months after the initiation of the
Hazeltine suit, ARM purportedly terminated its license agreement
183. 339 U.S. 827.
184. 395 U.S. 653.
185. Prior to the execution of the license agreement under consideration in Automatic
Radio, Hazeltine had sued ARM for royalties allegedly owed under a prior license
agreement between the parties relating to the Hazeltine radio receiver manufacturing
technology. The suit was ultimately settled and a consent decree was entered by which
ARM admitted its use of the Hazeltine technology and the validity of numerous Hazeltine
patents. The license agreement under consideration in Automatic Radio was entered into
as part of the settlement. Hazeltine Research v. Automatic Radio Mfg., 77 F. Supp. 493,
495 (D. Mass. 1948).
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with Hazeltine by providing the latter with written notice of its
repudiation of the agreement.
The district court in the case held for the plaintiff in granting
Hazeltine's motion for summary judgment,'" and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."" The U.S. Supreme Court
"granted certiorari ... in order to consider important questions
concerning patent misuse and estoppel to challenge the validity of
licensed patents."'m The Court, in affirming the decisions of the lower
courts in favor of Hazeltine, first addressed ARM's claim that the
license agreement could not be enforced because the royalty
provisions, which required a payment even if none of the licensed
patents were used by ARM, was an impermissible extension of the
patent monopoly constituting patent misuse. The Court agreed with
the district court's characterization of the license agreement "as
essentially a grant by Hazeltine to petitioner [ARM] of a privilege to
use any patent or future development of Hazeltine in consideration of
a payment of royalties . .. [where] [p]ayment for the privilege is
required regardless of use of the patents."" 9 However, the Court
adopted the view of each of the lower courts that the royalty
arrangement was "a convenient mode of operation designed by the
parties to avoid the necessity of determining whether each type of
petitioner's product embodies any of the numerous Hazeltine
patents."'9" The Court concluded its patent misuse analysis with the
following assessment:
We cannot say that payment of royalties according to an agreed
percentage of the licensee's sales is unreasonable. Sound
business judgment could indicate that such payment represents
the most convenient method of fixing the business value of the
privileges granted by the licensing agreement. We are not
unmindful that convenience cannot justify an extension of the
monopoly of the patent.... But as we have already indicated,
there is in this royalty provision no inherent extension of the
monopoly of the patent. Petitioner cannot complain because it
must pay royalties whether it uses Hazeltine patents or not.
What it acquired by the agreement into which it entered was the
186. Id.at 493.
187. Automatic Radio Mfg., 176 F.2d at 799.
188. 339 U.S. at 830.
189. Id. at 833.
190. Id.
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privilege to use any or all of the patents and developments as it
desired to use them. If it chooses to use none of them, it has
nevertheless contracted to pay for the privilege of using existing
patents plus any developments resulting from respondent's
continuous research.19 ' 192
The estoppel portion of the U.S. Supreme Court's Automatic
Radio opinion was brief. The Court accepted without analysis that
"[t]he general rule is that the licensee under a patent licensee
agreement may not challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a
suit for royalties due under the contact,"193 citing Harvey Steel. It then
rejected the argument that the antitrust-related exception to licensee
estoppel articulated in Katzinger and MacGregor should apply in the
instant case. In the words of the Court, "[t]here is no showing that
the licensing agreement here or the practices under it were a misuse
of patents or contrary to public policy .... The Katzinger and
MacGregor cases are inapplicable. The general rule applies, and
191. Id. at 834 (citations deleted). The U.S. Supreme Court in Automatic Radio briefly
addressed another contention of ARM in support of ARM's claim that the
Hazeltine/ARM license agreement was unenforceable on the grounds that Hazeltine had
misused its patents in granting a license to ARM. The license agreement contained a
restricted use notice that required ARM to mark all licensed apparatus with the following
statement: "Licensed by Hazeltine Corporation only for use in homes, for educational
purpose, and for private, non-commercial use, under one or more of the following patents
and under pending applications:" Id. at 835. According to ARM, the restriction on use
was an impermissible extension of the patent monopoly and, therefore, patent misuse.
Both the district court in the case and the First Circuit rejected this argument, holding that
such a restriction on a patent licensee was enforceable under General Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). The U.S. Supreme Court likewise
rejected ARM's contention, but on the basis of its conclusion that any issue with respect to
the restrictive notice provision in the agreement was moot in that Hazeltine had never
sought to enforce the provision and had notified each of its licensees that it had authorized
the deletion of the provision. In light of its conclusion, the Court did not address the
legality of such a provision.
192. The holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Automatic Radio with respect to the
enforceability of the royalty arrangement set forth in the Hazeltine/ARM license
agreement remains good law. The conclusion of the Automatic Radio Court that such an
arrangement does not constitute patent misuse is frequently cited in support of the
argument that a noncoerced extension of the physical scope of a patent in a patent license
agreement (e.g., as in a total sales royalty or in a reach-through royalty arrangement) is
permissible. See Alfred C. Server, Nader Mousavi and Jane M. Love, Reach-Through
Rights and the Patentability, Enforcement, and Licensing of Patents on Drug Discovery
Tools, I Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 21, 75-92 (2009).
193. 339 U.S. at 836.
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petitioner may not, in this suit, challenge the validity of the licensed
patents." 94
2. Uncertainty regarding the U.S. Supreme Court's licensee estoppel
holding in Automatic Radio and insights from the First Circuit's
opinion in the case
The brevity of the estoppel portion of the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Automatic Radio is in stark contrast to the complexity of
the relevant facts in the case, raising a question as to the actual basis
for the Court's disallowance of ARM's patent validity challenge. Was
the Court simply applying the traditional version of licensee estoppel,
having rejected ARM's argument that the validity challenge should
proceed under the antitrust-related exception to the doctrine
articulated in Katzinger and MacGregor? Or did the Court in
Automatic Radio block the validity challenge because ARM's
attempted unilateral repudiation was ineffective in terminating its
license agreement with Hazeltine, i.e., did the Court apply the "strong
form" version of licensee estoppel that required the termination of a
patent license agreement in accordance with its terms prior to a
licensee patent validity challenge? Or, based on the particular facts in
the case, did the Court rely on the termination rule exception to the
repudiation limitation described above in Part III.A.3.b. of this
Article? And of what relevance to the Court's estoppel holding was
the fact that the license agreement in Automatic Radio had resulted
from the settlement of a prior dispute between the parties involving
the validity of certain of the licensed Hazeltine patents? As will be
discussed later in this section, the First Circuit in Automatic Radio
acknowledged the important public interest in respecting the
settlement of litigation in its assessment of whether ARM should be
permitted to challenge the Hazeltine patents and thereby reopen the
issue of patent validity.'95
The uncertainty regarding the U.S. Supreme Court's licensee
estoppel holding in Automatic Radio is evident in the conflicting
interpretations of the case by commentators and in court briefs.
According to Rooklidge, "Automatic Radio applied licensee estoppel
as the rule had existed for over 100 years. Because the licensee had
neither terminated nor repudiated the license agreement, the validity
194. Id.
195. See infra section III.C.4.c.iii. (Res Judicata and Contractual Estoppel) for a
discussion of Federal Circuit post-Lear case law endorsing estoppel following the
settlement of patent litigation.
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of the licensed patents was irrelevant."'9 In contrast, the authors of
the ABA brief in MedImmune concluded that "the Court in
[Automatic Radio v.] Hazeltine applied estoppel to the licensee
without regard to whether the licensee had repudiated the benefit of
the license. Thus, Hazeltine was an application of the 'strong form'
licensee estoppel. . . ."'9 In fact, neither the Rooklidge nor ABA
view captures the complexity of the Automatic Radio holding. While
the U.S. Supreme Court provided its approval of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel with little analysis, the First Circuit in Automatic
Radio (whose holding was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court)
presented a more thoughtful discussion of the doctrine and ARM's
defenses to Hazeltine's claim for royalties under the contract.
Accordingly, we now turn to the First Circuit's opinion in the case for
additional insights into the meaning of the U.S. Supreme Court's
estoppel holding in Automatic Radio.
After rejecting ARM's patent misuse argument, which included
an allegation of antitrust violations,'"9 the First Circuit in Automatic
Radio turned to the question of whether ARM should be permitted
to challenge the validity of the Hazeltine patents. The court cited
Harvey Steel for the proposition that in a suit for patent royalties
under a license agreement the licensee is barred from challenging the
licensor's patent, but noted that "this proposition can no longer be
received without qualification"" in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
holdings in Katzinger and MacGregor. Each of the latter cases,
however, involved a license agreement that contained a price-fixing
provision, and the First Circuit refused to apply the antitrust-related
exception to licensee estoppel to the facts in Automatic Radio, a case
that did not implicate a price-fixing provision. In the words of the
court, "[u]ntil we receive further light and leading from the Supreme
196. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 527.
197. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 10, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118.
198. In defense of Hazeltine's claim for royalties owed under the license agreement,
ARM argued that Hazeltine had violated US antitrust law in its accumulation of large
numbers of patents that would eliminate competition and create an unlawful monopoly.
In rejecting ARM's defense, the First Circuit in Automatic Radio concluded the following:
"[Ilt appears that the defense of monopolistic practices is merely the assembling under a
different heading of matters we have already considered. The district court correctly ruled
that, even assuming arguendo that Hazeltine was engaged in an unlawful scheme to
maintain a monopoly, the license contract in suit was not an integral part of it; that the
license agreement, being itself a valid contract, will not be rendered unenforceable by
collateral activities of the plaintiff in violation of the antitrust laws." 176 F.2d at 805.
199. Id. at 806.
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Court, we are disinclined to extend the holdings in the Katzinger and
MacGregor cases so as to throw into the discard altogether the long
line of earlier cases disallowing a licensee to challenge the validity of
the licensor's patent."a'
The court then provided an additional justification for barring
ARM's patent validity challenge, based on the fact that the patent
license agreement under consideration resulted from the settlement
of a prior litigation between the parties involving the validity of
certain of the licensed Hazeltine patents. The court argued that:
[i]t is not uncommon for the parties to a patent infringement
suit, in which there is a genuine issue as to the validity of the
patent, to make a settlement of the litigation by an agreement
under which the patentee gives a license to the alleged infringer
in consideration of the payment of a stipulated royalty. Indeed,
the license agreement in suit seems to have been by way of
settlement of earlier litigation between the parties. It is not
apparent to us that the public interest would be served by
rendering such common-sense business settlements nugatory,
which would be the result of a ruling that the licensee could
reopen the issue of validity when sued for the stipulated
royalty.20'
As will be discussed below in our review of the U.S. Supreme
Court's Lear decision, this line of reasoning was not considered by the
Lear Court in overruling the estoppel portion of the Automatic Radio
holding.
The First Circuit concluded its assessment of whether ARM's
patent validity challenge should be permitted by addressing the
practical difficulties presented in the case. The court had determined
that under the license agreement, ARM had agreed to pay royalties
for the privilege of using any or all of the Hazeltine patents, which
numbered well over 500, irrespective of whether ARM actually
practiced any of the claimed Hazeltine inventions in the manufacture
of its radio receivers. In considering this arrangement, the court
acknowledged its uncertainty as to whether each of the licensed
patents, only one of them or, if they could be identified, the most
important of them would need to be invalidated for ARM to prevail
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"[i]f we are wrong in our conclusion that the licensee here cannot
challenge the validity of the patents, then we confess we would be at a
loss to know how to instruct the district court to precede with the case
upon remand." 202 While the First Circuit's practical argument against
ARM's patent validity challenge is less than compelling from a
jurisprudential standpoint, it undoubtedly factored into the court's
endorsement of licensee estoppel in the Automatic Radio case.
Elsewhere in the First Circuit's Automatic Radio opinion, the
court discussed two of the recognized limits to licensee estoppel,
eviction and unilateral repudiation, which distinguished the
traditional version of the doctrine from the "strong form" version.203
Significantly, the alleged occurrence of each of these events was
raised by ARM as a defense to Hazeltine's claim for royalties owed
under the license agreement and not as a justification for ARM's
patent validity challenge.2 0 Nonetheless, the First Circuit's
consideration of, and ultimate rejection of, the ARM defenses
provides some insight into the version of licensee estoppel that the
court endorsed in its Automatic Radio holding.
202. Id. at 806-07. ("In the case at bar, where a large number of patents were covered
by a single license agreement containing no price-fixing stipulation, the result would be
particularly awkward if it were held that the licensee may defend by putting in issue the
validity of all these patents. Although Automatic's motion for summary judgment and its
supporting affidavit make the general statement that none of Hazeltine's patents covered
by the license are valid, no concrete attempt was made to buttress these assertions, and the
district court concluded: 'Furthermore, the defendant does not purport to contest the
validity of all plaintiff's patents.' D.C., 77 F. Supp. at page 497. We ourselves have been
unable to find from the record that Automatic seriously attempted to raise a 'genuine
issue' as to the validity of all the licensed patents. If the holding of the Katzinger and
MacGregor cases were extended to the present situation, because of the restrictive use
provision or otherwise, would the licensee, in order to make out its defense, have to
establish that each and every one of the licensed patents is invalid? Or could the licensee
maintain, in view of the fact that the stipulated royalties are payable whether or not any
particular apparatus manufactured and sold by the licensee embodies any of the
inventions covered by the patents, that the royalty agreement as an inseparable entirety
becomes unenforceable if it can be shown that any one of the 500 licensed patents is
invalid? Or, as a third alternative, would the licensee have to show that a substantial
number of patents, or the more important patents constituting the 'substance' of the
agreement, were invalid? If we are wrong in our conclusion that the licensee here cannot
challenge the validity of the patents, then we confess we would be at a loss to know how to
instruct the district court to proceed with the case upon remand. Whichever of the three
alternatives above suggested were followed, it seems to us the resulting situation would be
a mess, and the district court would likely be subjected to a well-nigh intolerable burden.")
(citing Hazeltine Research., 77 F. Supp. at 497).
203. See supra section III.A.4.
204. The First Circuit in Automatic Radio began its discussion of the eviction defense
as follows "Questions of direct attack upon validity aside, Automatic relies on the defense
of eviction... ." Automatic Radio Mfg., 176 F.2d at 807.
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With respect to ARM's eviction defense, which the First Circuit
understood to be a claim of failure of consideration, the court
presented a number of arguments in support of its rejection of the
defense. The basis of ARM's claim of eviction was the fact that ten of
the licensed Hazeltine patents had been "litigated adversely to
Hazeltine"205 (all but one in lower courts only), and that these ten
were considered by ARM to be the most important of the patents
licensed under the agreement. The court dismissed this argument by
noting that:
[t]he mere fact that Automatic may have regarded ten
particular patents, out of the more than 700 patents and patent
applications covered by the license agreement, as the most
important ones licensed, in no sense means that both parties
regarded those patents as the "substance" of the agreement and
contracted accordingly. The record offers no significant
suggestion that such was the case, and the district court
concluded that Automatic "has not made any serious effort to
show eviction here and could not show it", and that Automatic
got "by the contract, what it bargained for, namely, the right to
use whatever patents are available for use in plaintiff's large
collection." D.C., 77 F. Supp. at 497.206
The court then held that, even if ARM's eviction defense had
been properly presented, an eviction claim could not be supported in
the context of a nonexclusive license. In the words of the court,
we may assume for present purposes that, where an exclusive
license is granted and the patent is held invalid, even by a lower
court, in a suit between the patentee-licensor and a third party,
the licensee may successfully claim an eviction. An exclusive
license agreement may be said to presuppose a grant to the
licensee of a complete monopoly; if the patent is not upheld in
even one suit against an infringer, the desired monopoly is pro
tanto destroyed, and there may be said to be a failure of
consideration .... But where the license, as here, is non-
exclusive, this argument is inapplicable.2 0
205. Id. at 807.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 808.
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The First Circuit concluded its analysis of ARM's eviction
defense by holding that such a defense by a nonexclusive licensee
based on prior lower court judgments of patent invalidity in suits
brought by the patentee/licensor against third parties was inconsistent
with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Triplett v. Lowell.2 M The
court cited Triplett for the proposition "that, even though in an earlier
infringement suit against a third party some claims of a patent had
been held invalid and the patentee had failed to disclaim them, the
patentee might still maintain a suit against another alleged infringer
for infringement of those same claims as well as other claims."209
Based on the Triplett holding, the First Circuit argued that "it would
be anomalous to give greater effect to a lower court's judgment of
invalidity in an infringement suit against a third party [in the instant
case where ARM was a licensee] than would be given to such a
judgment if ... [ARM] had not been a licensee and had been sued as
an infringer." 210 According to the court, "a holding by one lower
court that a patent is invalid is hardly a conclusive determination of
that patent's invalidity and hence the 'worthlessness' of a non-
exclusive license of that patent."211
In retrospect, a number of the First Circuit's arguments in
opposition to ARM's eviction defense can be questioned. The
contention that a licensee cannot be evicted from the enjoyment of
the rights granted under a patent in the context of a nonexclusive
license has been rejected by the majority of courts that have
212
addressed the issue. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court's Triplett
decision, relied on by the First Circuit in Automatic Radio, was
subsequently overruled in Blonder-Tongue Lab v. University of
Illinois Found.213 For purposes of this discussion, however, the
strength of the First Circuit's arguments regarding eviction is less
significant than the suggestion in the court's analysis that under
appropriate circumstances an eviction defense could be supportable.
Had ARM properly presented its eviction defense and had the license
under which it had been granted rights to the Hazeltine patents been
exclusive, the First Circuit may well have concluded that the
208. 297 U.S. 638 (1936), overruled by Blonder-Tongue Lab v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971).
209. 176 F.2d at 808.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra note 97.
213. 402 U.S. 313.
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invalidation of the licensed patents in infringement actions brought
against third parties in lower courts effected an eviction, relieving
ARM of its obligations to Hazeltine under its license agreement.
Relieved of its obligations and, presumably, its patent rights under
the license agreement, any subsequent use by ARM of the Hazeltine
patents would be as an alleged third party infringer and not a
licensee. In that capacity, ARM would be able to defend an action
brought by Hazeltine for compensation by claiming that the
Hazeltine patents were invalid, i.e., the eviction would work to free
ARM from the licensee estoppel bar. In that eviction through judicial
invalidation by lower courts is a recognized releasing event under the
traditional, but not the "strong form," version of licensee estoppel
(the eviction limitation),214 any suggestion by the First Circuit in
Automatic Radio of its acceptance of the eviction limitation under any
circumstance would indicate that the court had endorsed the
traditional version of licensee estoppel in its opinion.
The First Circuit's analysis of ARM's attempted unilateral
repudiation of its licensee agreement with Hazeltine provided further
insight into the version of licensee estoppel under consideration by
the court. As in the case of eviction, ARM's unilateral repudiation
argument was raised as a defense to Hazeltine's claim for royalties
owed under the license agreement and not as a justification for
ARM's patent validity challenge. The First Circuit began its
assessment by noting that ARM's repudiation defense had not been
properly presented and that, even if the defense were successful, it
would shield ARM from only a limited portion of its alleged liability
for royalties owed, i.e., those that had accrued after ARM's
repudiation of its contract with Hazeltine, which occurred months
after Hazeltine had initiated its suit. The court then addressed the
question of whether ARM's attempted repudiation was effective in
terminating its license agreement with Hazeltine and concluded that a
unilateral repudiation defense could not be supported in the instant
case under either federal law or, "assuming that local law governs the
matter,"215 the law of the state of New York.
With respect to federal law, the court cited St. Paul Plow Works
v. Starling216 for the proposition that "in the absence of a cancellation
option in the agreement, or of a substantial default by the licensor,
the licensee cannot by any ... unilateral notice of repudiation
214. See supra section III.A.4.
215. 176 F.2d at 809.
216. 140 U.S. 184.
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terminate its contract obligation under a license agreement having
several years yet to run."217 As noted above in section III.A.3.(b), the
U.S. Supreme Court in St. Paul rejected unilateral repudiation as a
means of terminating a license agreement but did not question the
licensee's patent validity challenge in the case. Accordingly, the First
Circuit's reliance on St. Paul in Automatic Radio adds little to our
understanding of the court's views on the doctrine of licensee
estoppel. However, the First Circuit's analysis of unilateral
repudiation under New York law in the context of the particular
circumstance of the Automatic Radio case was more nuanced and has
relevance for interpreting the court's licensee estoppel holding. The
court began by noting that "even if repudiation by the licensee is, in
some circumstance, a defense in New York to a suit for royalties,
Automatic's letter ... [of repudiation] does not meet the stringent
requirements set forth in ... [the applicable New York case law]."2 18
In other words, while the First Circuit acknowledged that a properly
performed unilateral repudiation of a contract had been recognized
as effective in the New York courts, ARM's "letter to Hazeltine
formally advising the latter, without more, that ... [it] 'has repudiated
and terminated the License Agreement"' 2 19 failed to meet the
applicable requirements for effectiveness. According to the First
Circuit,
[t]he cases which have suggested the existence of some such
doctrine of unilateral repudiation have explained that the
licensee may announce unequivocally "that he no longer
recognizes the binding force of the agreement, and that he will
thereafter manufacture or use the article covered by the patent
under a claim of right, founded upon the alleged invalidity of
the patent, and in hostility to and defiance of the authority of
the patent and the license, so that the licensor can thereafter
proceed against him for an infringement of the patent, if he
choose so to do." Martin v. New Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co.,
supra, D.C.N.J., 1919, 255 F. at page 94. See Skidmore v. Fahys
Watch-Case Co., 1898, 28 App.Div. 94, 101, 50 N.Y.S. 1016,
1021-1022; L. Heller & Son, Inc. v. Lassner Co., 1925, 214
App.Div. 315, 318, 212 N.Y.S. 175, 180.220
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Of particular significance in the last excerpt is the requirement
under New York law that for an effective unilateral repudiation of a
patent license agreement, the licensee must go on record as having
renounced the contract on the basis of the patent's alleged invalidity,
with the intent to continue to practice the claimed invention in the
capacity of a potential infringer. This is a restatement of the
repudiation limitation, recognized under the traditional (but not the
"strong form") version of licensee estoppel, that releases a licensee to
challenge the validity of a licensed patent in an action brought by a
patentee for royalties owed.221 The fact that the First Circuit in
Automatic Radio acknowledged the state of New York's repudiation
requirement, which itself incorporated a licensee's allegation of
patent invalidity, suggests that under the appropriate circumstances
the First Circuit would have sanctioned the release of a repudiating
licensee from the estoppel bar that the court had endorsed in its
opinion, an outcome permitted only under the traditional version of
the doctrine.
The First Circuit ultimately rejected ARM's attempted unilateral
repudiation, however, and would have done so even if ARM had met
the procedural requirements for repudiation under New York law.
According to the court, the nature of the license granted to ARM
under the agreement did not allow for a unilateral repudiation by the
licensee. The court presented the following analysis in support of its
conclusion:
[U]nder the license agreement in suit Automatic's liability for
royalties does not depend upon its actual use of any of the
licensed patents in the particular apparatus made and sold by it
[because it had agreed to pay for the privilege of using the
patented inventions regardless of its actual use]. If Automatic
were permitted to repudiate the license agreement and in fact
did not utilize any of the inventions covered by Hazeltine's
patents, Hazeltine could not prevail in an infringement suit
even if all its patents were valid; and Automatic would thus
achieve immunity from liability by non-use of Hazeltine's
patents, despite its contract undertaking to pay royalties,
regardless of such use, for the right to make use of them.
Hence, even assuming that a doctrine of unilateral repudiation
might in some cases be recognized, such a defense certainly
221. See supra section II.A.4.
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would not be available under the circumstance of the case at
bar.222
The line of reasoning expressed in the First Circuit's analysis is
the same as that offered by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court in Elgin National Watch Co. v. Bulova Watch Co.,223 a
case that we described in section III.A.3.b as a "hybrid" in that the
Elgin court had accepted as generally applicable the traditional
version of licensee estoppel with its repudiation limitation but
concluded that, based on the particular facts before it, unilateral
repudiation could not effect the termination of the license agreement
freeing the licensee from the estoppel bar, i.e., the court had adopted
a termination rule exception to the repudiation limitation. In fact, the
Elgin court relied on the First Circuit's holding in Automatic Radio
since both cases met the essential requirement for the application of
the termination rule exception to the repudiation limitation, namely
that the licensee can incur a royalty obligation following its unilateral
repudiation of the license agreement without engaging in any
activities that would infringe the licensed patent. The fact that
Automatic Radio can be characterized as a hybrid case is additional
evidence that the First Circuit had endorsed the traditional version of
licensee estoppel in its opinion in the case, but with the above-noted
exception to the doctrine.
3. The Automatic Radio holding interpreted
What then can be learned about the U.S. Supreme Court's
licensee estoppel holding in Automatic Radio from a review of the
First Circuit's opinion in the case? It is undisputed that the First
Circuit applied licensee estoppel to block ARM's patent validity
challenge in Automatic Radio and rejected ARM's claims of eviction
and unilateral repudiation, recognized limits to the traditional version
of the doctrine that defined circumstances under which a licensee was
permitted to challenge the validity of a licensed patent. The First
Circuit's conclusion that ARM could not unilaterally repudiate its
contract with Hazeltine, even if it had followed the procedure
dictated by applicable state law, was of particular import in that it
suggested that the court had adopted the "strong form" version of
licensee estoppel which required that a license agreement either
expire or terminate in accordance with its terms for the licensee
222. 176 F.2d at 809-10.
223. 118 N.Y.S.2d 197.
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estoppel bar to end. However, as noted above, ARM's claims of
eviction and unilateral repudiation were raised as a defense to
Hazeltine's pursuit of royalties owed, and not as a justification for
ARM's patent validity challenge. Moreover, the First Circuit's
estoppel ruling in Automatic Radio was significantly influenced by the
particular facts in the case, i.e., that (i) the license agreement between
ARM and Hazeltine was entered into as part of a settlement of
litigation between the parties, (ii) the license granted by Hazeltine
was nonexclusive, (iii) the license granted by Hazeltine was to a
"package" of over 700 patents and patent applications, and (iv) the
royalties to be paid to Hazeltine were consideration for the privilege
to use the licensed patents, irrespective of whether ARM actually
practiced the claimed inventions. Whether the court would have
come to the same conclusion in the estoppel portion of its holding had
some of the facts in the case been different is open to speculation.
But, as discussed in the preceding section, the First Circuit's opinion
in Automatic Radio can be interpreted as recognizing the applicability
of the traditional version of licensee estoppel under the majority of
circumstances, even if the facts in the case required a more nuanced
approach.
Considering the complexity of the case, it is not surprising that
knowledgeable commentators such as Rooklidge and the authors of
the ABA brief in MedImmune have fundamentally different opinions
regarding the meaning of the Automatic Radio holding. Recall that
Rooklidge interpreted the Automatic Radio holding as applying the
traditional version of licensee estoppel, while the authors of the ABA
brief in MedImmune described the holding as an application of the
"strong form" version of the doctrine.224 In fact, there is a measure of
support for each of these views and our analysis in the preceding
section suggests the following interpretation of the estoppel holding
in Automatic Radio that would reconcile the seemingly inconsistent
views of Rooklidge and the ABA authors: The First Circuit in the
case endorsed the general applicability of the traditional version of
licensee estoppel in the majority of circumstances, with its eviction
and unilateral repudiation limitations and the antitrust-related
exception previously crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court. The facts in
the Automatic Radio case, however, did not justify the application of
the antitrust-related exception nor support an eviction. Moreover,
the nature of the license grant did not allow for a repudiation by the
224. See supra section III.B.2.
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licensee, causing the court to invoke the termination rule exception to
the unilateral repudiation limitation in concluding that ARM was
estopped to challenge the validity of the Hazeltine patents. The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit's estoppel holding in the
case with limited analysis. Having agreed with the First Circuit that
the antitrust-related exception to licensee estoppel did not apply, the
Court found no need to even address ARM's eviction and
repudiation defenses. The "general rule" of licensee estoppel that the
U.S. Supreme Court endorsed in its holding, citing Harvey Steel in its
sweeping affirmation, was the traditional version of the doctrine "as
the rule had existed for over 100 years." 25
In the end, however, it must be acknowledged that there is
uncertainty as to the version of licensee estoppel that was endorsed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Automatic Radio. The significance of
this uncertainty and its current relevance stems from the U.S.
Supreme Court's rejection of the estoppel portion of the Automatic
Radio holding in Lear v. Adkins, which remains the Court's
controlling precedent on the doctrine of licensee estoppel and is
reviewed in the next section of this Article. Uncertainty regarding
the meaning of Automatic Radio results in uncertainty regarding the
meaning of Lear.
C. Lear v. Adkins
In Lear v. Adkins, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
California Supreme Court's decision in the case and overruled the
estoppel portion of its prior Automatic Radio holding. As noted
above, the Court's Lear decision remains the controlling precedent
regarding the doctrine of licensee estoppel. An understanding of
Lear is essential in determining whether any vestige of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel survives that would bar a nonrepudiating licensee in
good standing from challenging the validity of a licensed patent, and
whether an explicit contract provision that prohibits, reduces the
incentive for, and/or specifies a consequence of, a licensee's patent
validity challenge is enforceable. In the section, we review the facts in
Lear and the decisions of the California Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case. We then consider the scope of the Lear
decision by assessing the direct effects of the holding, evaluating the
language and reasoning of the Supreme Court's opinion in the case
and reviewing relevant post-Lear case law. The latter review includes
225. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 527.
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a discussion of a subsequent Supreme Court case that provided an
interpretation of the Lear holding, regional circuit and district court
decisions, the majority of which aggressively applied the Lear public
policy argument to encourage patent validity challenges by licensees,
and the Federal Circuit's efforts to limit the applicability of the Lear
decision. We conclude this section with an analysis of the decision of
the California district court that heard the MedImmune case on
remand from the Supreme Court, a decision that relied on Lear in
addressing the merits of the contract-based arguments against a
patent validity challenge by a nonrepudiating licensee in good
standing.
1. The facts in Lear
John Adkins was an inventor of improvements for gyroscopes.
Lear, Incorporated, manufactured gyroscopes. In February 1954,
Adkins filed a U.S. patent application covering his inventions. In
September 1955 Adkins "entered into a written agreement with Lear
under the terms of which he granted Lear a license to use these
inventions in products manufactured by it, in exchange for which
Lear was to pay a stated percentage of the net sales price to Adkins as
royalties on all products incorporating his inventions."2 26 The license
agreement included two provisions pursuant to which Lear could
terminate the agreement.
One was contained in paragraph 2(a) and provided: 'Lear shall
have the right on ninety days' prior written notice to Adkins, to
terminate any one or more of the licenses herein granted.' The
other, set forth in paragraph 6 of the agreement, stated, 'In the
event that *** the U.S. Patent Office refuses to issue a patent
on the substantial claims of the application attached as Exhibit
'B', or if such a patent so issued is subsequently held invalid
*** Lear at its option shall have the right forthwith to
terminate the specific license so affected or this entire
Agreement and no further royalties shall thereupon be payable
226. Adkins, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545. Note that the initial license grant was exclusive, but
became nonexclusive upon termination of Adkins' employment by Lear in January 1958,
prior to the filing of suit in the case, see Adkins v. Lear, 52 Cal.Rptr. 795, 806 (Cal.App.
1966). For an argument that the Lear holding should be limited to nonexclusive licenses
and the rejection of that argument by the Seventh Circuit, see Beckman Instruments, Inc.
v. Technical Development Co., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970), discussed in note 337 infra.
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under the license so terminated or under this Agreement if Lear
shall have elected to terminate this Agreement in its entirety.' 227
In March 1957, the U.S. Patent Office rejected certain of Adkins'
claims. Lear ceased paying royalties to Adkins on one type of its
manufactured gyroscopes (the steel or Michigan gyros) in
September 1957 and on another type (the 2156 or California gyros) in
April 1959. As summarized by the California Supreme Court in the
case,
Lear wrote him [i.e., Adkins] on September 10, 1957, that it had
reviewed his patent application and concluded it did not
disclose any inventions utilized in any Lear equipment except
the 2156 gyro and certain components thereof, that the steel
gyros manufactured by it did not come within the scope of the
application, and that Lear had made a search of the Patent
Office fils [sic] and believed the method of bearing alignment
used in assembling the steel gyros was not patentable. Lear also
informed Adkins that it would no longer pay royalties on the
steel gyros but would continue to do so on the 2156 gyro ....
[A]fter another amendment of the application but before any
action by the Patent Office on the amendment, Lear wrote
Adkins on April 8, 1959, that it was exercising its right to
terminate the license agreement under paragraphs 2(a) and 6.
Royalty payments on the 2156 gyro were also discontinued.22
Despite its cessation of royalty payments and its letter of
termination, Lear continued to manufacture and sell both types of
gyroscopes.
In January 1960, the Patent Office granted a patent on Adkins'
inventions. On the same day that the Adkins patent issued, Adkins
sued Lear for failure to pay royalties, beginning in September 1957,
due under the license agreement. Lear defended by claiming that it
owed no royalties. Specifically, Lear argued that it had ceased paying
royalties on the steel gyros because they did not embody inventions
claimed in the Adkins patent, which nonetheless was invalid, and that
it had ceased paying royalties on the 2156 gyros because it had
terminated its license agreement with Adkins. The jury found in
favor of Adkins, concluding that Lear had breached its license
227. Adkins, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
228. Id. at 553-54.
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agreement and was liable for the royalties owed under the contract.
Nonetheless, the trial court granted Lear's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the Adkins patent was
invalid.22 9 The case was appealed to the California Supreme Court.230
2. The holding of the Supreme Court of California - Application of the
"strong form" version of licensee estoppel
In Adkins v. Lear,231 the Supreme Court of California focused its
analysis on the fundamental question of whether or not Lear had
validly terminated its license agreement with Adkins. The trial court
in the case had granted Lear's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the basis of its agreement with Lear's assertion that the
Adkins patent was invalid. And yet, as recognized by the California
Supreme Court, the trial court's opinion as to the validity of the
Adkins patent had a bearing on the disposition of the case only if
patent invalidity could be raised by Lear as a defense to Adkins'
claim for royalties owed under the license agreement. In other words,
if licensee estoppel barred Lear from challenging the validity of the
Adkins patent, the trial court had no basis for its judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. And the question of whether the
estoppel bar prevented Lear's patent challenge hinged on whether
Lear's purported termination of the license agreement, which it relied
on to justify its challenge, was in fact ineffective.
In addressing the questions before it, the California Supreme
Court began with a discussion of its interpretation of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel. In the words of the court, "one of the oldest
doctrines in the field of patent law establishes that so long as a
licensee is operating under a license agreement he is estopped to deny
the validity of his licensor's patent in a suit for royalties under the
229. The judgment notwithstanding the verdict applied only to the steel (and not the
2156) gyro, based on the argument made by Lear and accepted by the trial court that
(unlike the 2156 gyro) the steel gyro manufactured by Lear following its purported
termination of the Adkins/Lear license agreement did not incorporate the Adkins
invention. The California Supreme Court rejected this argument in concluding that both
the steel and 2156 gyros incorporated the Adkins invention and, accordingly, Lear's
purported termination of the license agreement was not valid and it was prevented from
challenging the validity of the Adkins patent under the "strong form" version of the
doctrine of licensee estoppel endorsed by the court. This issue regarding the different
gyros is not relevant to the discussion of the California Supreme Court's interpretation in
Lear of licensee estoppel that is provided in section IllI.C.2. of this Article and is not
addressed in that section.
230. Adkins, 64 Cal.Rptr. 545.
231. Id.
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agreement. The theory underlying this doctrine is that a licensee
should not be permitted to enjoy the benefit afforded by the
agreement while simultaneously urging that the patent which forms
the basis of the agreement is void .... This doctrine does not prevent
one who is not a licensee from challenging the patent's validity."232
The court then provided its endorsement of the "strong form" or
"termination" version of licensee estoppel.
Under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, Lear would be
prohibited from challenging the validity of Adkins' patent if the
agreement had not been validly terminated. Where a license
agreement specifies the conditions under which termination
may occur, those conditions must be satisfied in order to effect
a valid termination. (Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Oldberg
Mfg. Co. (1932) 256 Mich. 447, 240 N.W. 93, 94; see Ellis, Patent
Licenses (3d ed. 1958) pp. 365-366 ... .) Here, the contract
provided that it would continue in force until the patent relating
to the subject matter of the agreement expired, unless sooner
terminated pursuant to its provisions. We must, therefore turn
our attention to the question whether Lear effected a
233,234termination of the license agreement.
In a footnote to its opinion, the California Supreme Court
rejected Lear's argument in favor of the traditional version of licensee
estoppel, with its repudiation limitation. "Lear relies on authorities
holding that a licensee may terminate a license agreement upon
notice to his licensor even though, prior to termination, there has
been no adjudication of invalidity of the patent which is the subject of
the agreement and that thereafter the licensee may challenge the
validity of the patent. (See, e.g., Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co. of Cal.
(1929) 98 Cal. App. 769, 778-779, 277 P. 887.) This rule has no
application if the agreement sets forth the particular circumstances
under which termination must occur. As stated above [in this
232. Id. at 549-50.
233. Id. at 555.
234. See Thomson Spot Welder Co., 240 N.W. at 94 ("If defendant [licensee] desired to
terminate under the contract, it was required to fulfill the contract conditions thereof.");
ANTHONY W. DELLER, ELLIS, PATENT LICENSEs 365-366 § 329(3d ed. 1958). "Types of
Contract Provisions Which Bar Repudiation of License for Failure of Consideration Prior
to Court Decision of Invalidity in Third Party Proceedings. . . . (4) Those by which the
licensee has the right to terminate a specified interval of time after giving licensor notice
to that effect. Where the parties specify the conditions under which termination can be
made, it must ordinarily be presumed that the contract cannot be terminated otherwise."
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opinion], such provisions must be complied with in order to effect a
valid cancellation." 235, 236 In essence, the court held that under the
circumstances in the instant case, where the license agreement at issue
included two provisions that specified the requirements for early
termination of the agreement, Lear was not able to unilaterally
repudiate its contract with Adkins without complying with one of
those requirements.
Having adopted the "strong form" version of licensee estoppel,
the California Supreme Court presented its arguments in support of
its conclusion that Lear had not validly terminated its license
agreement with Adkins and, accordingly, was estopped from
challenging the validity of the Adkins patent. Paragraph 2(a) of the
license agreement stated that Lear had the right to terminate the
agreement on ninety days' prior written notice. The court concluded,
however, that it was the intention of the parties that following such
notice Lear would cease using the inventions claimed in the Adkins
patent. In view of Lear's continued use of the claimed inventions, the
court held that Lear's purported termination of the license agreement
under paragraph 2(a) was not valid.
Under paragraph 6 of the license agreement, Lear had the right
to terminate the agreement if either the U.S. Patent Office refused to
issue a patent on the substantial claims of the patent application
attached to the agreement or, if a patent issued, it was later
invalidated. The court interpreted this provision as requiring a final
rejection of the patent application, rather than the rejection of
selected claims, and Adkins received no such final rejection.
Moreover, the court held that the claims in the issued patent qualified
as the substantial claims of the attached patent application. With
respect to Lear's right to terminate the agreement in the event that
the Adkins patent was invalidated, the court noted that Lear could
not exercise its right under this provision until after the patent issued.
Lear's notice of termination, however, preceded the issuance of the
Adkins patent. The court cited Harvey Steel, a case that involved a
similar contractual right to terminate on the invalidation of the
licensed patent, for the proposition that "the licensee itself could not
235. Adkins, 64 Cal.Rptr. at 555, n 15.
236. For a discussion of Armstrong as an example of a case that applies the traditional
version of licensee estoppel, but rejects the termination rule exception to the repudiation
limitation, see supra note 134.
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challenge the validity of the patent in a suit for royalties under the
agreement. "27
The California Supreme Court concluded its analysis in the case
by ruling that Lear's purported termination of its license agreement
with Adkins was ineffective. Lear had failed to meet the
requirements for early termination specified in the contract.
Moreover, under the "strong form" version of licensee estoppel
adopted by the court, Lear was unable to unilaterally repudiate the
contract. Accordingly, Lear remained a licensee under the agreement
and was unable to challenge the licensed patent as a defense to
Adkins' claim for royalties owed under the contract. In that the
validity of the Adkins patent was not open to question in the case,
there was no basis for the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and that judgment was reversed by the California Supreme
Court, leaving Lear liable for the royalties owed.238
3. The U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Lear case for
the sole purpose of reconsidering the "general rule," last endorsed by
the Court in Automatic Radio and relied on by the California
Supreme Court in Lear, that a licensee is estopped from challenging
the validity of a licensed patent in a suit brought by the patent holder
for royalties owed under a patent license agreement. As stated by the
Court, "[s]ince the California Supreme Court's construction of the
1955 licensing agreement is solely a matter of state law, the only issue
open to us is raised by the court's reliance upon the doctrine of
estoppel to bar Lear from proving that Adkins' ideas were dedicated
to the common welfare by federal law."23 9
The Court began its analysis by noting that since its Automatic
Radio holding, the Court had decided two then-recent cases
"emphasizing the strong federal policy favoring free competition in
ideas which do not merit patent protection."240 In Sears, Roebuck &
237. Adkins, 435 P.2d at 331-32 (citing Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. at 316).
238. See Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 530
("Application [by the California Supreme Court in Lear] of the termination rule, coupled
with the requirement that the licensee cease manufacturing to effect a valid termination,
effectively bound the licensee to pay royalties for the life of the agreement. The licensee
was stuck despite the apparently liberal termination provisions in the license contract, its
firm belief in the illegitimacy of the licensed patent, and its unequivocal repudiation of the
agreement." (footnote omitted)).
239. Lear, 395 U.S. at 661-62.
240. Id. at 656.
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Co. v. Stiffel, Co.241 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,2 42
cases decided on the same day, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a party that manufactured and sold a copy of an unpatented
and uncopyrighted article could be enjoined from future sales and
held liable for money damages as a result of unfair competition. In
ruling against such an outcome, the Court had reasoned "that when
an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not
forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere
with the federal policy, found in Art. I, s 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution
and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free access to
copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the
public domain." 243
The Court then addressed the validity of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel, acknowledging its long and complex history in the U.S.
courts.
In considering the propriety of the State Court's decision [in
Lear], we are well aware that we are not writing upon a clean
slate. The doctrine of estoppel has been considered by this
Court in a line of cases reaching back into the middle of the
19th century. Before deciding what the role of estoppel should
be in the present case and in the future, it is, then, desirable to
244
consider the role it has played in the past.
The Court cited Kinsman v. Parkhurst245 as the first U.S. Supreme
Court case "that invoked estoppel in a considered manner,"246 but
pointed out that it "was decided before the Sherman Act made it
clear that the grant of monopoly power to a patent owner constituted
a limited exception to the general federal policy favoring free
competition."2 47 The Court then noted that its decision in St. Paul
Plow Works v. Starling,248 often cited as supporting the doctrine of
licensee estoppel, in fact pointed in the opposite direction, in that the
licensee's challenge of the licensed patent was allowed without
241. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
242. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
243. Id. at 237 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. 225).
244. Lear, 395 U.S. at 662-63.
245. 59 U.S. 289.
246. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663.
247. Id.
248. 140 U.S. 184.
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question. The Court next turned to its ruling in Pope Manufacturing
Co. v. Gormully,2 49 in which the Court refused to enforce an explicit
provision in the license agreement under consideration that
prohibited the licensee from challenging the validity of the licensed
patent. The Lear Court cited with approval the reasoning relied on in
support of the holding in Pope. "It is as important to the public that
competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his
monopoly."250
The Court concluded its review of Supreme Court licensee
estoppel jurisprudence by discussing its decisions in Harvey Steel251
and Automatic Radio.252, 253 The former case, which had applied the
estoppel doctrine, was criticized for neither citing nor considering the
arguments set forth in Pope. The later case, which had provided the
Court's most recent endorsement of the "general rule" of licensee
estoppel with limited analysis, was described as having ignored the
teachings of a series of related decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the forty-five years since Harvey Steel. The cases referred to by the
Lear Court-Westinghouse Electric,254 Scott Paper,255 Sola Electric,256
Katzinger,2 and MacGregor,28 -were each reviewed in the opinion
and were discussed above in section III.A.5. of this Article. The
point, according to the Court, was that each of these cases
represented an exception to the estoppel doctrine that limited its
249. 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
250. Lear, 395 U .S. at 663-64 (quoting Pope Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. at 234).
251. 196 U.S. 310.
252. 339 U.S. 827.
253. In a footnote, the Lear Court discussed two other early U.S. Supreme Court cases
that touched on the right of the licensee to challenge a licensed patent ("There are two
other early cases which enforced patent licenses without a thorough consideration of the
estoppel issues that were presented. In Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 11 Wall. 488 ... (1871),
the Court held that a licensee was obliged to overcome a 'very strong presumption' of
patent validity in order to avoid his royalty obligations, without indicating how much more
compelling a showing was required than was considered necessary in an ordinary
infringement action. In Dale Tile Manufacturing Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46 . . . (1888), this
Court affirmed the decision of the New York state courts invoking the doctrine of licensee
estoppel, on the ground that the estoppel question presented was one which involved only
state law."). 395 U.S. 653 n.11.
254. 266 U.S. 342.
255. 326 U.S. 249.
256. 317 U.S. 173.
257. 329 U.S. 394.
258. 329 U.S. 402.
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scope and significantly diminished its vitality. The Court summarized
the impact of these cases in the following excerpt:
During this [forty-five] period, each time a patentee sought to
rely upon his estoppel privilege before this Court, the majority
created a new exception to permit judicial scrutiny into the
validity of the Patent Office's grant. Long before [Automatic
Radio v.] Hazeltine was decided, the estoppel doctrine had been
so eroded that it could no longer be considered the 'general
rule,' but was only to be invoked in an evernarrowing set of
circumstances.259
Following the review of its own relevant precedents, the Court in
Lear looked to prior decisions of lower state and federal courts to
further support its conclusion that the doctrine of licensee estoppel
had been substantially eroded. Described as exceptions to the
doctrine that "indicated a recognition of the broader policies pointing
to a contrary approach,"2 60 the Court cited cases in which a licensee
was permitted to challenge the validity of a licensed patent following
an eviction from, or the unilateral repudiation of, the license
agreement.
It is generally the rule that licensees may avoid further royalty
payments, regardless of the provisions of their contract, once a
third party proves that the patent is invalid. See, e.g., Drackett
Chemical Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6 Cir., 1933).
Some courts have gone further to hold that a licensee may
notify the patent owner that he is repudiating his agreement,
regardless of its terms, and may subsequently defend any action
for royalties by proving patent invalidity. Note, The Doctrine
of Licensee Repudiation in Patent Law, 63 Yale L.J. 125 (1953);
R. Ellis, Patent Licenses § 328 (3d ed., A. Deller 1958).261, 262
259. Lear, 395 U.S. at 664.
260. Id. at 667.
261. Id.
262. The Lear Court cited a third exception to the doctrine of licensee estoppel
recognized by lower courts: "And even in the 19th century, state courts had held that if the
licensee had not actually sold products incorporating the patent's ideas, he could challenge
the validity of the patent. See Forkosch, Licensee Estoppel in Patent Law, 20 Temp.L.Q.
515, 529, n.45 (1947)." Lear, 395 U.S. at 668.
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The Court's reliance on examples of eviction and unilateral
repudiation to undermine the doctrine of licensee estoppel is of
particular note. These so-called exceptions to the doctrine in fact
established the limits of the traditional version of licensee estoppel,
i.e., the relevance rule that incorporated the eviction and repudiation
limitations. Rather than evidence of erosion of the "general rule" of
licensee estoppel, the "exceptions" defined the "general rule."2 63
In summarizing its review of the relevant case law, the Lear
Court set the stage for the balancing test of competing interests that
formed the basis for its holding in the case.
The uncertain status of licensee estoppel in the case law is a
product of judicial efforts to accommodate the competing
demands of the common law of contracts and the federal law of
patents. On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a
purchaser to repudiate his promises simply because he later
becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has made. On the
other hand, federal law requires, that all ideas in general
circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are
protected by a valid patent. Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co .... ,
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.... . When faced
with this basic conflict in policy, both this Court and courts
throughout the land have naturally sought to develop an
intermediate position which somehow would remain responsive
to the radically different concerns of the two different worlds of
contract and patent. The result has been a failure. Rather than
creative compromise, there has been a chaos of conflicting case
*264law, proceeding on inconsistent premises.
The Lear Court was now prepared to take a definitive stand on
the estoppel question and began by considering the typical patent
263. See Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 534 ("The
[Lear] Court cited eviction, repudiation, and the notion that a licensee could challenge the
validity of the patent before it practiced the invention as further exceptions to licensee
estoppel. These exceptions are fundamentally at odds with technical and equitable
estoppel. However, these concepts were part and parcel of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel. As the Court confused the policy behind licensee estoppel and inseparably
twisted licensee estoppel with technical and equitable estoppel, these fundamental
limitations were forgotten. Lear's vilificaton of licensee estoppel as being fraught with
exceptions was unwarranted. Rather, the Court should have separated the individual
policies and rules making up licensee estoppel, technical estoppel, and equitable estoppel.
Complexity and a history of poor application temporarily doomed all of these rules."
(footnote omitted)).
264. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668. (footnote omitted).
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license agreement in which, in contrast to the instant case, a party
obtains a license after the patent has issued. The Court identified the
benefits afforded a licensee of an issued patent whose contents have
already been made publicly available, namely, the freedom from the
threat of an infringement suit and a reduction in competition from
non-licensed third parties. The Court acknowledged that "[u]nder
ordinary contract principles the mere fact that some benefit is
received is enough to require the enforcement of the contract,
regardless of the validity of the underlying patent."2 65 According to
the Court, however, this contract argument must be weighed against
the important public interest in invalidating issued patents that claim
subject matter that is, in fact, in the public domain. The Court
explained that the typical patent results from a legal conclusion of the
Patent Office which is reached in the context of an ex parte
proceeding and is based on factors with respect to which reasonable
persons can disagree. "Consequently, [the Court argued,] it does not
seem to us to be unfair to require a patentee to defend the Patent
Office's judgment when his licensee places the question in issue,
especially since the licensor's case is buttressed by the presumption of
validity which attaches to his patent."266
The Court concluded this portion of its analysis with the most
frequently cited statement from its opinion.
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily
when they are balanced against the important public interest in
permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which
are in reality a part of the public domain. Licensees may often
be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to
challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they
are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay
tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.
We think it plain that the technical requirements of contract
doctrine must give way before the demands of the public
interest in the typical situation involving the negotiation of a
267license after a patent has issued.
On the basis of this reasoning and its review of the relevant case
law, the Lear Court rejected the estoppel portion of its prior
265. Id. at 669.
266. Id. at 670.
267. Id. at 670-71.
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Automatic Radio decision with its statement that "[w]e are satisfied
that Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc. . . ., itself the product of a clouded history, should no longer be
regarded as sound law with respect to its 'estoppel' holding, and that
holding is now overruled."2 6
Having addressed the typical patent license scenario, the Court
turned to the factors that distinguished the Lear case. As noted
above, paragraph 6 of the Adkins/Lear license agreement provided
that Lear's royalty obligation was to continue during the term of the
Adkins patent unless and until the patent was held invalid. Adkins
argued that since the validity of his patent had not been finally
determined in the case, Lear was required to pay the post-patent
issuance royalties that Adkins sought, regardless of the licensed
patent's validity. The Lear Court rejected this view, arguing that
enforcement of this explicit contract provision would significantly
frustrate the important federal policy of eliminating specious patents,
even if the licensee were permitted to challenge the validity of the
licensed patent. In the words of the Court,
The parties' contract ... is no more controlling on this issue
than is the State's doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in
contract principles. The decisive question is whether overriding
federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees
could be required to continue to pay royalties during the time
they are challenging patent validity in the courts .... It seems
to us that such a requirement would be inconsistent with the
aims of federal patent policy. Enforcing this contractual
provision would give the licensor an additional economic
incentive to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort
to postpone the day of final judicial reckoning. We can
perceive no reason to encourage dilatory court tactics in this
way. Moreover, the cost of prosecuting slow-moving trial
proceedings and defending an inevitable appeal might well
deter many licensees from attempting to prove patent invalidity
in the courts. The deterrent effect would be particularly severe
in the many scientific fields in which invention is proceeding at
a rapid rate. In these areas, a patent may well become obsolete
long before its 17-year term has expired. If a licensee has
reason to believe that he will replace a patented idea with a new
one in the near future, he will have little incentive to initiate
268. Id. at 671.
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lengthy court proceedings, unless he is freed from liability at
least from the time he refuses to pay the contractual royalties.
Lastly, enforcing this contractual provision would undermine
the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas
in the public domain. For all these reasons, we hold that Lear
must be permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties accruing
after Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent
invalidity.269
The Court concluded its analysis by noting that Lear had been
granted access to, and a license to exploit, trade secrets disclosed in
Adkins' confidential patent application more than four years before
the patent that claimed those secrets had issued. Accordingly, a
portion of the royalties sought by Adkins i.e., the pre-patent issuance
royalties, were in consideration for early access to those trade secrets.
As stated by the Court, "[a]t the core of this case, then, is the difficult
question whether federal patent policy bars a State from enforcing a
contract regulating access to an unpatented secret idea." 27 0 The Court
rejected the "extreme position" taken by Adkins that, because of the
special benefits provided Lear as a result of the early and privileged
access to Adkins' invention, Lear was obligated to pay all of the
royalties owed under the contract, i.e., those that had accrued prior to
the patent's issuance, as well as those that had accrued and would
continue to accrue during the term of the patent, regardless of the
patent's validity. As noted above, the Court had also concluded that
Lear could avoid paying the post-patent issuance royalties if Lear
could prove that the Adkins patent was invalid. The Court declined,
however, to determine whether Lear was liable for the royalties that
had accrued prior to the issuance of the Adkins patent. As the Court
explained:
we have concluded, after much consideration, that even though
an important question of federal law underlies this phase of the
controversy, we should not now attempt to define in even a
limited way the extent, if any, to which the States may properly
act to enforce the contractual rights of inventors of unpatented
secret ideas. Given the difficulty and importance of this task, it
should be undertaken only after the state courts have, after fully
focused inquiry, determined the extent to which they will
269. Id. at 673-74 (paragraphing omitted).
270. Id. at 672.
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respect the contractual rights of such inventors in the
future.21 272
For all of the reasons stated above, the Lear Court vacated the
judgment of the California Supreme Court and remanded the case to
that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.
4. The scope of the Lear decision
A thorough understanding of the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear
decision is essential in addressing the central questions posed in this
Article, namely, can a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing
challenge the validity of a licensed patent and is an explicit contract
provision that prohibits or discourages a licensee patent validity
challenge enforceable? While the Court's recent MedImmune
decision, eliminating the jurisdictional barrier to a patent validity
challenge by a licensee in good standing, may be the impetus for
asking these questions, informed answers to the questions are to be
found in an analysis of the Court's Lear decision. Insight into the
meaning and scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lear can
be obtained through (1) an assessment of the direct effects of the
Court's Lear holding i.e., the vacation of the California Supreme
Court's decision in the case and the overruling of the estoppel portion
of the Court's prior Automatic Radio holding, (2) an analysis of the
Court's language and reasoning in Lear, and (3) a review of post-Lear
case law, interpreting, endorsing and/or distinguishing the Lear
holding. In the sections that follow, we pursue each of these
approaches.
a) The direct effects of the Lear holding
Despite the uncertainty that the Court's Lear decision generated,
it can be stated without equivocation that the Court in Lear vacated
the California Supreme Court's holding in the case and overruled the
estoppel portion of its prior Automatic Radio holding. Accordingly, a
determination of the version of licensee estoppel that was endorsed in
each of these earlier holdings provides valuable insight into the scope
271. Id. at 675.
272. The Court also declined to determine whether the Adkins patent was invalid,
arguing that " . . . the California Supreme Court has yet to pass on the question of patent
validity in that clear and unequivocal manner which is so necessary for proper
adjudication in this Court" and, accordingly, "Lear must be required to address its
arguments attacking the validity of the underlying patent to the California courts in the
first instance." Id. at 675-76.
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of the Lear Court's repudiation of the doctrine. Specifically, if both
the Automatic Radio Court and the California Supreme Court in Lear
had endorsed the "termination" or "strong form" version of license
estoppel, then it can be reasonably argued that the Lear Court's
abrogation of the doctrine was limited to that version of licensee
estoppel, leaving unaltered the viability of the traditional version of
the doctrine. According to that view, a licensee in good standing (i.e.,
a licensee who is in full compliance with the terms of a patent license
agreement that had neither expired nor terminated in accordance
with its terms, and who had neither been evicted nor had repudiated
the license) is estopped under the doctrine from challenging the
validity of the licensed patent. On the other hand, if the "general
rule" of licensee estoppel that was endorsed in Automatic Radio was
the traditional version of the doctrine, then the Lear Court's rejection
of the doctrine would necessarily extend beyond the "strong form"
version applied by the California Supreme Court in the case to
include the traditional version, thereby eliminating any vestige of
licensee estoppel that would otherwise bar a licensee in good standing
from challenging the validity of a licensed patent.
Earlier in this Part III, we presented arguments in support of a
limited reading of the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision. 273 That
the California Supreme Court in Lear applied the "strong form"
version of licensee estoppel is clearly demonstrated by a review of
that court's opinion in the case and is generally accepted by
commentators.27 4 In section III.B., we discussed the debate regarding
the version of licensee estoppel that was endorsed in Automatic Radio
and analyzed the view, expressed by some, that Automatic Radio was
also an application of the "strong form" version of the doctrine. In
adopting the above-stated interpretations of Automatic Radio and the
California Supreme Court's decision in Adkins v. Lear-the cases
most directly impacted by the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear holding-
273. See the introductory paragraph of this Part III and sections III.B.3. and III.C.2.
274. See supra section III.C.2.; see also Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I),
supra note 68, at 530 ("In its discussion of licensee estoppel, the California Supreme Court
[in Lear] adopted the termination rule. Rather than recognize the repudiation rule, the
court harmonized the cases establishing repudiation as being without termination
provisions." (footnotes omitted)); Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118 ("[T]he 'strong form'
version of licensee estoppel [was] endorsed by the California Supreme Court [in
Lear] .
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the authors of the ABA Brief in MedImmune27 reached the following
conclusion: "Although the Court [in Lear] broadly articulated its
holding, appearing to reject the doctrine of licensee estoppel in toto,
what the Court necessarily rejected in Lear was only the version of
the doctrine applied by the California Supreme Court on the facts of
the case. Accordingly, the true holding of Lear does not foreclose
application of the doctrine to markedly different facts, including those
here."276 Even Rooklidge, who acknowledged that the Automatic
Radio Court had endorsed the traditional version of licensee estoppel
"as the rule had existed for over 100 years,"2 77 argued in favor of a
limited reading of the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear holding, largely on
the basis of his conclusion that the Court's Lear decision lacked
precision and disregarded important aspects of the history of licensee
estoppel. 278 According to Rooklidge,
[i1n Lear, the [U.S. Supreme] Court correctly rejected a rule
applied in a minority of courts-the termination variation of
licensee estoppel. In doing so, however, the Court did not
address the continued viability of the doctrine as it had been
applied by the vast majority of courts since 1789 ....
The history of licensee estoppel that preceded Lear has been
universally ignored in analyses of that case's holding.
Nevertheless, in view of the history and true nature of the
doctrine of licensee estoppel, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins should be
narrowly limited to its holding, which is nothing more than a
rejection of the termination version of licensee estoppel. Those
with an appreciation of the history behind Lear will recognize
that the case did not strike down the longstanding case law that
validity of the licensed patent is irrelevant to the licensee's
obligation to pay royalties accrued before eviction or
repudiation.27 9
275. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118.
276. Id. at 5.
277. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 527.
278. Id. at 527-28. ("In 1969, in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the United States Supreme Court
rejected what it perceived to be the doctrine of licensee estoppel. However, Lear
examined neither the doctrine, nor its history, with precision.").
279. Id. at 537. (footnote omitted); see also Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part
II), supra note 68, at 5 ("In the celebrated case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the United States
Supreme Court struck down the patent law doctrine of licensee estoppel as applied by the
California Supreme Court. The first part of this article concluded that the United States
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While there is some support for the view that the Lear Court's
abrogation of licensee estoppel was limited to the "strong form"
version of the doctrine, our analysis leads to the conclusion that the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lear rejected licensee estoppel in its entirety
and not merely a variant of the doctrine accepted by a minority of
courts. In section III.B. of this Article, we argued that Automatic
Radio was a hybrid case in which the Court had accepted as generally
applicable the traditional version of licensee estoppel with its
repudiation limitation but concluded that, based on the particular
facts before it, unilateral repudiation could not effect the termination
of the license agreement freeing the licensee from the estoppel bar.
According to this interpretation, the "general rule" of licensee
estoppel that the Automatic Radio Court had endorsed, and the Lear
Court had found to have been eroded by a series of Court-created
exceptions, was the traditional and not the "strong form" version of
the doctrine. The Lear Court's rejection of this "general rule"
constituted a broad repudiation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel
and eliminated any remaining bar to a patent validity challenge by a
licensee, even if that licensee neither repudiates nor terminates its
patent license agreement and intends to continue to reap the benefits
provided under the agreement during the pendency of the challenge.
The U.S. Government adopted this view in its amicus brief in favor of
the petitioner in MedImmune,2 as indicated in the following excerpt:
The Lear Court carefully weighed the underlying justifications
for the traditional contractual doctrine of licensee estoppel
against the "important public interest" in encouraging
challenges to potentially invalid patents, and concluded that
"the technical requirements of contract doctrine must give way
before the demands of the public interest in the typical situation
involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has issued."
395 U.S. at 670-671. That determination forecloses any
suggestion that vestigial notions of licensee estoppel can be
Supreme Court did not, in Lear, strike down another rule governing patent licensee
validity challenges, one formulated in 1789 and long applied by the vast majority of courts.
That rule states that the validity of the licensed patent is irrelevant to the licensee's
obligation to pay royalties accrued before eviction or repudiation. In simple terms, the
general rule was that a patent licensee could not avoid its obligation to pay royalties on a
license under a patent on the ground that the patent was held to be invalid." (footnotes
omitted)).
280. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medlmmune,
549 U.S. 118.
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employed to justify the creation of new obstacles to the
adjudication of such challenges51
b) The language and reasoning of the Lear decision
The conclusion that the Lear Court rejected the doctrine of
licensee estoppel in its entirety, based on the direct effects of the
holding in the case, is bolstered by an analysis of the language and
reasoning of the Lear opinion. The facts in the Lear case, however,
did not require such a broad repudiation of licensee estoppel and this
is the source of much of the uncertainty regarding the scope of the
Court's holding. Unlike the licensee in MedImmune, which
continued to honor its contractual obligations, including its
commitment to pay royalties, during the pendency of its challenge of
the licensed patent's validity, Lear had repudiated its license
agreement with Adkins long before the Adkins patent had issued,
alleging that the Adkins patent application claimed subject matter
that was not patentable. The Lear Court's rejection of licensee
estoppel in the context of a repudiating licensee has led some to
conclude that the Court's holding does not extend to a licensee in
good standing.m The authors of the ABA's amicus brief in
MedImmune expressed this view in stating that "[o]n its facts, Lear
properly stands for the proposition that a patent licensee may, upon
repudiation of the license, contest the validity of the licensed
patent .... Lear should not be read to permit a nonrepudiating
licensee ... to contest the patent's validity."m3
The absence of any discussion in the body of the U.S. Supreme
Court's Lear opinion regarding the impact of Lear's purported
unilateral repudiation of its license agreement on the Court's licensee
estoppel holding added to the uncertainty regarding the reach of its
decision. However, in a frequently neglected footnote to the
opinions ("Lear Footnote 10"), the Court reviewed Lear's
repudiation argument and, in the course of its discussion, provided a
critical insight into the scope of its licensee estoppel holding. Lear
281. Id. at 29-30.
282. See Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part I), supra note 68, at 537;Brief for
the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, pp. 2,5,
MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118; see also, supra section III.C.4.a.
283. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2, Medlmmune, 549 U.S. 118.
284. Lear, 395 U.S. at 662 n.10.
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Footnote 10, offered by the Court in support of its jurisdiction to
decide whether the California Supreme Court was correct in its
reliance upon the doctrine of licensee estoppel to bar Lear's patent
validity challenge, reads as follows:
Adkins claims that we have no jurisdiction to decide the federal
question presented because the company did not adequately
preserve it in its argument before the State Supreme Court. We
do not agree. While it is true that Lear did not ask the Supreme
Court to repudiate estoppel entirely, it did seek to persuade the
court to carve out an exception to the estoppel principle which
was so sweeping as to undermine the doctrine's vitality
completely. The company argued, on the basis of federal as
well as state cases, that a licensee may escape the impact of
estoppel simply by announcing that it has repudiated the
licensing agreement, regardless of the contract's terms. See,
e.g., Respondent's and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief in
Cases Nos. 28624 and 30089, at 110-111.
The California Supreme Court rejected this argument on its
merits [based on its adoption of the "strong form" version of
licensee estoppel, which did not recognize the repudiation
limitation] ....
We clearly have jurisdiction to consider whether this decision is
wrong. In doing so, we have the duty to consider the broader
implications of Lear's contention, and vindicate, if appropriate,
its claim to relief on somewhat different grounds than it chose
to advance below, especially when the California court
recognized ... that matters of basic principle are at stake."8
In essence, the Court made the following points in Lear
Footnote 10: (1) Lear had asked the Court to accept its argument,
rejected by the California Supreme Court in the case, that its
unilateral repudiation of the Adkins license agreement freed it from
the estoppel bar; (2) such a request by Lear, which the Court viewed
as "an exception to the estoppel principle which was so sweeping as to
undermine the doctrine's vitality completely," justified the Court's
decision to address the important federal question of whether
licensee estoppel prevented Lear's patent challenge, and (3) the
285. Id.
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Court, in considering Lear's claim for relief, was not restricted to
deciding the question presented by Lear regarding unilateral
repudiation, but could provide the requested relief "on somewhat
different grounds than it [i.e., Lear] chose to advance below," such as
"to repudiate estoppel entirely" for public policy reasons (which in
the opinion of the authors of this Article, considering all of the
available evidence, the U.S. Supreme Court, in fact, did).6,287
A broad reading of the Lear Court's abrogation of the doctrine
of licensee estoppel is also supported by the reasoning underlying the
Court's holding in the case. As will be discussed in the following
paragraphs, the public policy argument relied on by the Lear Court in
its rejection of licensee estoppel applies irrespective of whether a
licensee who intends to challenge the validity of a licensed patent has
repudiated, and thereby has forfeited the benefits of, its license
agreement prior to the challenge.
The basis for the Lear Court's abrogation of licensee estoppel is
"the important public interest in permitting full and free competition
in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain."288
As indicated above in section III.C.3., the Court in Lear structured its
opinion around this fundamental policy consideration. It cited with
approval the U.S. Supreme Court's early articulation in Pope v.
Gormully of the important federal policy favoring the elimination of
worthless patents that repress competition!" It criticized the decision
in Harvey Steel, endorsing the doctrine of licensee estoppel, for
ignoring "Pope's powerful argument." 29 It characterized the Court-
created exceptions to the estoppel doctrine in the years following
Harvey Steel as repeated examples of the Court finding a way around
the doctrine to permit judicial scrutiny into the validity of an issued
patent, and faulted the Automatic Radio Court for disregarding the
impact of those exceptions. In fact, the reason provided by the Lear
286. Quoted language taken from Lear, 395 U.S. at 662 n.10.
287. The content of Lear Footnote 10 provides further support for Rooklidge's
contention that the U.S. Supreme Court in Lear neglected important aspects of the history
of licensee estoppel. See supra note 263; supra section III.C.4.a.; supra note 278.
Specifically, the Court viewed the recognition by some lower courts of unilateral
repudiation as a basis for permitting a licensee to challenge the validity of a licensed
patent as a "sweeping" exception to the doctrine of licensee estoppel as opposed to a limit
that defined the traditional version of the doctrine. See also, supra section III.C.3.
288. 395 U.S. at 670.
289. Id. at 663-64 (quoting Pope, 144 U.S. at 234 ("It is as important to the public that
competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really
valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly. . .
290. Lear, 395 U.S. at 664.
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Court for its granting of certiorari in the first place was to reconsider
the Automatic Radio rule of licensee estoppel "in the light of our
recent decisions [in Sears and Compco] emphasizing the strong
federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit
patent protection." 291
The balancing test employed by the Lear Court in determining
the fate of the doctrine of licensee estoppel pitted the above-
mentioned public policy interest in eliminating specious patents
against the "radically different concerns" 292 of contract law and, as we
have already indicated, the policy encouraging patent challenges
prevailed. The specifics of the Court's argument are described above
in section III.C.3. What is important for purposes of this discussion is
that the line of reasoning relied on by the Lear Court to deprive a
licensor of the protections of the common law doctrine of licensee
estoppel applies even in the context of a patent validity challenge by a
licensee in good standing.
The licensee in Lear did not seek the benefits of its license
agreement following its cessation of royalty payments based on its
conclusion that the Adkins' invention could not be the subject of a
valid patent. That fact, however, was not critical to the outcome of
the Lear balancing test rejecting licensee estoppel. Nowhere in the
Court's discourse is there a suggestion that the outcome of its analysis
would have come out differently and the equities favoring a
patentee/licensor would have trumped the important public policy at
stake if only the licensee had intended to continue to benefit under its
license agreement while it pursued its challenge of the licensed
patent. As noted in the preceding section, the Lear Court had
introduced its balancing test in considering "the typical situation [in
contrast to the situation in Lear] in which patent licenses are
,2 here the licensee obtains its license after thenegotiated , i.e., wheetelcne ban t ies fe h
patent has issued. In this circumstance, the licensee invariably
receives some benefit from the issued patent under the license
agreement, even if the licensee subsequently repudiates its agreement
and assumes the role of a potential infringer. The Lear Court
acknowledged as much when it stated that "[u]nder ordinary contract
principles the mere fact that some benefit is received is enough to
require the enforcement of the contract, regardless of the validity of
291. Id. at 656.
292. Id. at 668.
293. Id. at 669.
[Vol. 3:2
SUMMER 2011] PATENT LICENSING FOLLOWING MEDIMMUNE
the underlying patent,"29 essentially restating the relevance rule of
the traditional version of licensee estoppel. Yet the Court went on to
reject this contract argument in concluding that receipt of a benefit
under a contract did not justify depriving a licensee of the right to
challenge the validity of the licensed patent (and thereby further the
public interest in eliminating worthless patents) when pursued by the
licensor for agreed-to payments due in consideration for the benefits
received. 295
The same logic applies even if the licensee is one in good
standing who intends to continue to reap the benefits of the patent
license during the pendency of its patent challenge. Such a licensee is
furthering the same public interest by challenging the validity of the
licensed patent that he is obligated by contract to continue to make
payments to exploit. After all, a licensee in good standing "may ..
be the only individual ... with enough economic incentive to
challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery" 296 and "it does
not seem ... to be unfair to require a patentee to defend the Patent
Office's judgment when his licensee places the question in issue,
especially since the licensor's case is buttressed by the presumption of
validity which attaches to his patent." 29 As the Lear Court
concluded, "the technical requirements of contract doctrine must give
way before the demands of the public interest in the typical situation
involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has issued,"9  and
294. Id. (emphasis added).
295. The Lear Court's conclusion can be stated more precisely as follows: In the case
of a typical patent license agreement that is ultimately repudiated by the licensee, neither
the receipt by the licensee of benefits under the contract prior to the repudiation nor the
prospect of ongoing benefits during the pendency of litigation for breach of contract (e.g.,
reduced competition based on the deterrent effect of a presumptively valid patent) is
adequate justification for preventing the licensee from raising patent invalidity as a
defense against the licensor's contract claim. The basis for the Court's conclusion was that
a patent validity challenge by a licensee furthers the important public interest in
eliminating worthless patents, and that that consideration trumps a licensor's contract
argument. The fact that a patent licensor may never receive compensation for pendente
lite benefits received by a licensee (e.g., where the licensee withholds royalty payments
during the litigation, as permitted under Lear, and is ultimately relieved of its obligation to
make those payments because the licensed patent is found at trial to be invalid) did not
alter the Lear Court's conclusion. In essence, the Court in Lear ruled that the important
public interest in eliminating worthless patents made the validity of a licensed patent
"relevant" in an action brought by a patent licensor to recover royalties owed under a
patent license agreement, irrespective of any benefits received by the licensee.
296. Id. at 670.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 670-71.
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there is nothing in the Court's opinion to suggest that this conclusion
is contingent upon a licensee's repudiation of its negotiated patent
license agreement.
The Lear Court's balancing test has been criticized, largely on
the basis of the Court's neglect of certain relevant factors that favored
the patentee/licensor. For example, Rooklidge noted that the Lear
Court failed to consider in its balancing of interests the important
patent policy goals of fostering and rewarding inventions and
promoting the public disclosure of those inventions.2" According to
that commentator,
the Supreme Court in Lear considered only one of three
policies underlying the patent system: the policy favoring
invalidation of illegitimate patents. That lopsided policy
balance was a product of the times, reflecting the then-
prevalent hostility toward patent rights and the over-zealous
application of antitrust principles to patent licensing. In fact,
Lear v. Adkins marked the zenith of the ascendancy of antitrust
law over patent law.30
Moreover, the Lear Court failed to consider the fact that the
Automatic Radio license agreement had resulted from a settlement of
litigation and that the Court in that case viewed the public policy
interest in respecting settlements as relevant to its decision to bar the
licensee's patent validity challenge. As will be demonstrated in the
following section, the Federal Circuit relied on this policy
consideration in barring certain licensee patent validity challenges in
the context of a settlement. These criticisms of the Lear Court's
balancing test, however, do not alter the fact that Lear remains the
binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent with respect to licensee
estoppel, nor do they undermine our conclusion that the Lear Court's
299. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part 1), supra note 68, at 534; Rooklidge,
Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part II), supra note 68, at 15-16; Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins
Revisited (Part III), supra note 68, at 69, 78. Rooklidge cited Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974) and Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) for an
articulation of the three purposes of the federal patent system. ("First, patent law seeks to
foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate
further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in
the public domain remain there for the free use of the public." Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262
(citing, Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480-81).
300. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part III), supra note 68, at 78. (footnotes
omitted).
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abrogation of licensee estoppel was complete, leaving no vestige of
the doctrine to protect a licensor from a challenge by a licensee in
good standing. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that were
the current Court to conduct the Lear balancing test that the outcome
would be different, considering Justice Scalia's opinion for the
majority in MedImmune expressing skepticism with respect to the
merits-based contract arguments in support of the licensee estoppel
bar0 and the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions limiting the
rights of patent holders.Y'2 One might say that the characterization of
the U.S. Supreme Court, offered by Rooklidge in his critique of the
Lear holding, as hostile toward patent rights is still appropriate today.
c) Post-Lear case law
A final perspective on the meaning and scope of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Lear decision comes from post-Lear cases that
interpreted, applied, and/or distinguished the Lear holding. As will
be demonstrated in this section, the majority of these cases viewed
the Court's Lear decision as a broad repudiation of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel, although the Federal Circuit crafted a body of post-
Lear case law that limited the Lear holding to its facts and set the
stage for the dispute ultimately resolved by the Court in MedImmune.
301. See supra section II.B.
302. See Server, Mousavi & Love, supra note 192, at 21 n.143 ("See Merck v. Integra,
545 U.S. 193 (2005) (reversing the Federal Circuit's restrictive interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), which exempts from infringement liability the unauthorized use of patented
inventions in the drug development process) . . . ; Ebay v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388
(2006) (overturning the Federal Circuit's special rules regarding the granting of
injunctions in patent infringement cases; rather, requiring the court to apply traditional
principles of equity to the determination of whether to grant or deny injunctive relief) [see
infra Part IV.B.2.]; MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (overturning the
Federal Circuit's holding that a patent licensee must breach the license contract before
there would be a constitutionally sufficient case or controversy to establish standing for a
declaratory judgment action seeking a finding that the licensed patent is invalid) [see supra
Part II of this Article]; Microsoft v. AT&T, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (reversing the Federal
Circuit's holding that selling a copy of a master software disk outside the U.S. as a
component in a computer, which master disk had originally been produced in and sent
abroad from the U.S., gave rise to infringement liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)); Quanta
Computer v. LG Electronics, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (overturning the Federal Circuit's rule
that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply to method patents, and interpreting
the scope of the doctrine more broadly than did the Federal Circuit).").
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i. The U.S. Supreme Court
In the years following the Lear decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
has on occasion discussed the holding in the case' 3 In no instance,
however, has the Court provided an answer to the question of
whether the Lear Court's abrogation of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel was so broad as to cover a nonrepudiating licensee in good
standing. As indicated in Part II of this Article, the Court in
MedInmune refused to opine on this question, although Justice Scalia
in writing for the majority expressed skepticism as to the strength of
the proffered merits-based contract arguments in support of the
applicability of licensee estoppel to a licensee in good standing.
Perhaps the most thoughtful analysis of the Lear holding was
articulated by the Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation.30' In that case, decided two years
after the Lear decision, the Court ruled that a defendant in a patent
infringement suit could estop the patent holder from pursuing his
claim if the patent at issue had previously been held to be invalid in a
suit involving a different alleged infringer. The reasoning of the
Court, reflecting a recognition of the important public interest in
eliminating invalid patents, was that requiring an alleged infringer to
relitigate the issue of patent validity was wasteful and would likely
result in the alleged infringer electing to pay royalties for the use of a
worthless patent. According to the Court, the economic consequence
of such an outcome is not only that "any royalties actually paid are an
unjust increment to the alleged infringer's costs,"3 06 but that "any
royalty payments passed on to consumers are as a practical matter
unrecoverable by those who in fact paid them."0
In support of its conclusion that the holders of invalid patents
should not be permitted to exact licensing agreements or other
settlements from alleged infringers, the Court in Blonder-Tongue
referenced its prior Lear decision. According to the Blonder-Tongue
Court, the Lear holding was based on two lines of authority, each
303. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 334-45; U.S. v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S.
52, 58 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 475, 481, 492; Aronson, 440 U.S. at 261, 264;
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 658 (1983) (Stevens, J., Concurring);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154, 160 (1989);
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 124.
304. See supra section II.B.
305. 402 U.S. 313.
306. Id. at 346.
307. Id.
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reflecting the Court's view that a patent, which is a government-
sanctioned stimulus to invention, is nonetheless a monopoly with
social and economic consequences and, accordingly, must cover only
subject matter that meets the statutory requirements for patentability.
The first line of authority was manifested in a "series of decision in
which the Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or
temporal scope of the patent monopoly."'" These decisions,'" which
characterized and condemned the illicit practice of patent misuse,
demonstrated the Court's commitment to ensure that patent
monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.1 0 This first line of
cases, relied on in the Sears and Compco decisions cited in Lear,"'
provided support for the Lear Court's conclusion that "federal law
requires, that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the
common good unless they are protected by a valid patent."312
308. Id. at 343.
309. In the body of its opinion, the Blonder-Tongue Court provided the following
excerpt from a representative decision, Mercoid v. MidContinent Investment Co., 320 U.S.
661 (1944), in which the Court condemned an attempt to broaden the scope of the patent
monopoly: "The necessities or convenience of the patentee do not justify any use of the
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly. The fact that the patentee has the
power to refuse a license does not enable him to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by
the expedient of attaching conditions to its use. United States v. Masonite Corp., [316 U.S.
265,] 277 [(1942)]. The method by which the monopoly is sought to be extended is
immaterial. United States v. Univis Lens Co., [316 U.S. 241,] 251-252 [(1942)]. The patent
is a privilege. But it is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose. It results from
invention and is limited to the invention which it defines." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc., 402 U.S. at 343-44 (quoting Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 666). In a footnote at the
conclusion of the above quoted excerpt, the Blonder-Tongue Court cited the following
additional decisions: Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Int'l Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 389 (1948); Scott
Paper Co., 326 U.S. 249; Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942);
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 455-59 (1940); IBM Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Blonder-Tongue
Lab., Inc., 402 U.S. at 344 n 40.
310. In support of this statement, the Blonder-Tongue Court provided the following
excerpt from Precision Instrument Manufacturing. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945): "A patent by its very nature is affected with a public
interest .... [It] is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a
patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies
spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that such
monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.,
402 U.S. at 343 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816).
311. See supra section IIl.C.3.
312. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668.
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The second line of cases that informed the Lear decision
encouraged authoritative testing of patent validity. The Blonder-
Tongue Court cited the decision in Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-
0-Two Fire Equipment Co.,313 permitting a potential infringer to test
the validity of a competitor's patent by bringing an action under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, without awaiting the filing of an
infringement suit by the patent holder. The Court then referred to its
prior decisions that "involved removal of restrictions on those who
would challenge the validity of patents [citing MacGregor, Katzinger,
Scott Paper, Sola, Westinghouse, and Pope],"3 14 and noted that, as
recognized in Lear, licensees often had the greatest economic
incentive to bring a patent challenge. According to the Blonder-
Tongue Court, "[tihe holding [in Lear] that licensee estoppel was no
longer tenable was rooted in the second line of cases eliminating
obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the validity of a
patent."3 " The Court in Blonder-Tongue concluded its analysis by
indicating that its ruling in the case before it was based on "our
consistent view-last presented in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins-that the
holder of a patent should not be insulated from the assertion of
defenses and thus allowed to exact royalties for the use of an idea that
is not in fact patentable or that is beyond the scope of the patent
monopoly granted."316
The Blonder-Tongue Court's interpretation of the Lear decision
is noteworthy in that in restating the basis for the Lear holding, the
Court referred to cases that were not cited in Lear.3 17 In particular,
the Blonder-Tongue Court emphasized prior U.S. Supreme Court
cases that addressed the issue of patent misuse, but these cases were
only indirectly referenced in Lear.31 8 While U.S. Supreme Court
313. 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
314. 402 U.S. at 345, n 42 ("See MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329
U.S. 402, 407 (1947); Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Mfg. Co., 329 U.S., at 398-401; Scott Paper
Co. v. Marcalus Co., . . . [326 U.S. 249 (1945)]; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U.S. 173 (1942); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S.
342 (1924); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).").
315. Id. at 345.
316. Id. at 349-50.
317. The Lear Court did not cite the Kerotest decision nor any of the patent misuse
cases relied on in Blonder-Tongue (see supra notes 309 & 310), with the exception of Scott
Paper (which was presented in Lear as an exception to the estoppel doctrine) and Brulotte
(which was cited in a footnote in Justice White's concurring opinion in reference to Lear's
royalty payment obligation).
318. The Sears decision, cited in Lear for the proposition that federal policy favors free
competition in ideas that do not merit patent protection, cited certain of the U.S. Supreme
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patent misuse jurisprudence is relevant to a discussion of the
enforceability of pro-licensor contract provisions that prohibit or
discourage patent validity challenges (as will become apparent in
Part IV of this Article), the Lear Court did not consider prior
Supreme Court patent misuse cases of sufficient relevance to even
cite them in its opinion. The reason for the Blonder- Tongue Court's
shift in emphasis in its description of the Lear holding is difficult to
know. With seven of nine Supreme Court Justices contributing to
both decisions,31 9 the Justices who decided Blonder-Tongue were
certainly well versed in the details of the Lear case. One possible
explanation for the somewhat different perspective on Lear presented
in Blonder- Tongue was that the Blonder-Tongue Court relied on Lear
to support its holding in the case before it and described the Lear
decision in a manner that was most persuasive for the task at hand.
For purposes of this discussion, however, what matters is that, as in
our assessment of the Court's opinion in Lear, the Blonder-Tongue
Court's interpretation of the Lear holding is consistent with our
conclusion that the arguments presented in Lear for abrogation of the
doctrine of licensee estoppel are applicable irrespective of whether
the licensee has repudiated its licensee agreement. Ideas that are in
the public domain should be available for use for the common good
without restriction. Patents that inappropriately claim those ideas
should be eliminated and those with the greatest incentive for doing
so, including current licensees, should be encouraged in that effort.
ii. Regional Circuits and District Courts
In the interval between the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision
in 1969 and the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1982, the most active dialogue regarding the meaning and
scope of the Lear decision was conducted by the federal district
courts and regional courts of appeal." The majority of these courts
adopted a broad interpretation of the Lear decision, relying on the
Court's prior patent misuse cases (Masonite, Morton Salt, Univis Lens and International
Business Machines). The Compco decision, also cited in Lear for the same proposition,
relied on Sears. See also, supra note 317.
319. Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall
participated in both the Lear and Blonder- Tongue decisions.
320. One pair of commentators, writing during this interval, noted that "[d]ecisions
giving different interpretations of Lear have evolved every year since 1969. It seems that
any paper which attempts to define the state of the law under Lear is obsolete within one
year." Tipton D. Jennings IV & Carrol L. Bryan II, The Ever Expansive Scope of Lear v.
Adkins: Does it Have Limits?, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 679, 703 (1977) (footnotes
omitted).
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U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in the case to permit licensee patent
validity challenges under circumstances not addressed in Lear. A
comprehensive review of these post-Lear, pre-Federal Circuit cases is
beyond the scope of this Article and can be found in various reviews
written in the years following the Lear decision.32 In this section, we
discuss only those cases that remain relevant to the central questions
presented in this Article, namely, is there a vestige of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel following Lear that protects a patent licensor from a
patent validity challenge by a licensee in good standing and if one
cannot rely on the doctrine, are explicit contract provisions that
prohibit, reduce the incentive for, and/or specify a consequence of, a
licensee's validity challenge enforceable?
Prior to a review of post-Lear case law, it should be noted that
the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear holding addressed more than the right
of a patent licensee to challenge the validity of the licensed patent. A
second issue in the case involved Lear's liability for royalties owed
Atkins under the patent license agreement, and that issue was
separable from, albeit related to, the patent challenge question. The
Lear Court acknowledged as much in stating that "it may be
suggested that although Lear must be allowed to raise the question of
patent validity in the present lawsuit, it must also be required to
comply with its contract and continue to pay royalties until its claim is
finally vindicated in the courts."32 2 As indicated in section III.C.3.
above, the Court rejected that "suggestion" and held that requiring
Lear to comply with the royalty provision of its contract "might well
deter many licensees from attempting to prove patent invalidity in the
courts"3 23 and, accordingly, "undermine the strong federal policy
favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain." 324 For
purposes of the discussion in this section, the significance of the Lear
Court's royalty obligation ruling is that it constituted the second
321. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive
to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677 (1986); Jennings IV & Bryan II, supra note 320, at 679; J.
Thomas McCarthy, "Unmuzzling" The Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of Lear v.
Adkins, (Part 1) 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 475 (1977) [hereinafter "McCarthy, (Part I)"]; J.
Thomas McCarthy, "Unmuzzling" The Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of Lear v.
Adkins, (Part II-Conclusion) 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 544 (1977) [hereinafter "McCarthy,
(Part II)"]; Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part i), supra note 68, at 5; Christian
Chadd Taylor, No-Challenge Termination Clauses: Incorporating Innovation Policy and
Risk Allocation into Patent Licensing Law, 69 IND. L.J. 215 (1993).
322. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 674.
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prong of what has been referred to as the Lear doctrine.325 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit summarized the doctrine as
follows:
The two holdings of Lear are as follows: (1) a licensee is not
estopped to interpose the invalidity of the licensed patent as a
defense to an action brought by the licensor to enforce the
license agreement, 395 U.S. at 656, 671, 89 S.Ct. 1902; and (2) a
licensee cannot be required to continue to pay royalties during
the time he is challenging patent validity in the courts, 395 U.S.
at 673, 89 S.Ct. 1902. The policy underlying these holdings was
to "'unmuzzle' licensees so that an early adjudication of
invalidity could inure to the public interest." Atlas Chemical,
509 F.2d at 6; Troxel I, 465 F.2d at 1257; see Lear, 395 U.S. at
670, 673, 89 S.Ct. 1902.326
A recognition of the two prongs of the so-called Lear doctrine is
essential in interpreting post-Lear case law, not only because it helps
to define the scope of the actual holding in Lear but because it aids in
identifying those cases that address only one of the two prongs of the
doctrine.327
The challenge for the lower federal courts in the aftermath of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision, however, was not in restating
the two-part Lear holding but in applying the Court's ruling in the
case to facts not present in Lear. That latter exercise required that a
court move beyond the holding in Lear to interpret and apply the
"spirit of Lear."" In the words of one commentator, citing the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation in Blonder-Tongue of its Lear
decision, "[t]he 'spirit of Lear' appears to be one of providing some
incentive to licensees to encourage them to challenge patent validity
325. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 112 F.3d at 1568.
326. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 1976).
327. For example, there are a number of cases that only consider a licensee's royalty
payment obligation, where the licensee's right to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent is undisputed. See, e.g., Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d 1 (6th
Cir. 1974); PPG Indus., Inc., 530 F.2d 700; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
567 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1977); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Royal Indus., 552 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.
1977); Am. Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp., 614 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1980); Precision Shooting
Equip. Co. v. Allen, 646 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1981); Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc.,
677 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933
(9th Cir. 1983); see infra section III.C.4.c.iii. (Licensee Patent Validity Challenges;
Prerequisites and Jurisdictional Barriers).
328. McCarthy, (Part 1), supra note 321, at 476.
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and to eliminate obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the
validity of a patent."3 29  As will be demonstrated in the case
descriptions that follow, the ultimate question frequently faced by a
court in addressing a Lear-related issue was whether "the 'spirit of
Lear' can . .. logically demand that any and all rules of contract law,
patent law, and civil procedure be ignored to give licensees every
possible incentive to challenge patent validity . . . [?]"33o It is in the gap
between "some incentive" and "every possible incentive" that the
debate regarding the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision
has been waged.
As indicated above, prior to the establishment of the Federal
Circuit, the majority of federal courts aggressively applied the "spirit
of Lear" to permit licensee patent validity challenges in a variety of
circumstances not present in Lear. In the words of one commentator,
"[w]hen the Supreme Court in Lear expressed the public policy of
encouraging licensees to challenge patents, the lower courts saddled
up and went charging off in several different directions. The 'spirit of
Lear' became the battle cry of all patent licensees every time any rule
of law came between a licensee and its desire to challenge a patent.""'
Specifically, federal district and appellate courts of the Second, Third,
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits ruled that an explicit
contract provision that expressly prohibited a patent validity
challenge by a party licensed under the patent (a licensee "no-
challenge" clause) was unenforceable under Lear, despite the fact
that the Adkins/Lear license agreement contained no such
132provision. Courts in the Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits
329. Id. (emphasis added).
330. McCarthy, (Part II), supra note 321 (emphasis added). McCarthy answered the
question in the negative. His full comment is as follows: "The Lear decision was based
upon a policy of 'eliminating obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the validity of
a patent,' [Blonder-Tongue Labs, 402 U.S. at 345 ] but the 'spirit of Lear' cannot logically
demand that any and all rules of contract law, patent law, and civil procedure be ignored
to give licensees every possible incentive to challenge patent validity."
331. McCarthy, (Part [), supra note 321, at 477; see also Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins
Revisited (Part II), supra note 68, at 14("The post-Lear decisions of the regional circuits
have extended the rationale of Lear so as to conflict with long-established law and, indeed,
common sense.").
332. Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. W.R.S. Contact Lens Labs., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 441
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Wallace Clark & Co., Inc. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (aff'd 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1975)); Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace
Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Md. 1972) (rev'd on other grounds, 489 F.2d 231 (4th Cir.
1973)); Kraly v. Nat'l Distillers and Chem. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill., 1970) (aff'd,
502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974)); Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d
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permitted a patent validity challenge by a licensee that, unlike Lear,
had entered into the patent license agreement as part of a settlement
to end threatened legal action or litigation involving the licensed
patent.333 Anticipating the jurisdictional holding of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Med1mmune, courts of the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits permitted a patent licensee that had not repudiated its
license agreement to challenge the licensed patent in a declaratory
judgment action, rather than (as in Lear) to raise patent invalidity as
a defense to a claim by a patent licensor for royalties owed under the
license agreement. Courts of the Seventh Circuit took the
aggressive stance that a patent licensor was not permitted to
terminate its license agreement despite a breach of the agreement by
a licensee that was challenging the licensed patent.33' Finally, courts
of the Second, Sixth and Seventh Circuits ruled that any payments
made by a licensee during the pendency of a patent challenge would
need to be refunded by the licensor in the event that the licensee's
225 (7th Cir. 1972); Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1972); Massillion-
Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co., 444 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1971);
Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 817 (D.C. 1978).
333. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 567 F.2d 184; Kraly,319 F. Supp. at 1349, 1366; Crane Co.
v. Aeroquip Corp., 356 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Il., E.D. 1973); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
364 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. II., E.D. 1973); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 504 F.2d 1086 (7th
Cir. 1974); Massillion-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co., 444 F.2d 425; but see, Broadview Chem.
Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391 (2d Cir. 1973); Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson
Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846 (2.d Cir. 1976); Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93
(3d Cir. 1981); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1975); Aro Corp. v.
Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir 1976); Ransberg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller
and Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973); American Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg. Co.,
630 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1980); U.S. ex. rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998 (8th
Cir. 1970). It should be noted that while the Adkins/Lear license agreement was not
entered into to settle litigation involving the licensed patent, the license agreement at issue
in Automatic Radio (a decision that was in part overruled by Lear) did involve a
settlement agreement. See supra section III.B.1.; supra section III.B.2.; supra section
III.C.4.b.; supra section III.C.4.c.iii.
334. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 567 F.2d 184; American Sterilizer Co., 526 F.2d 542; Atlas
Chem. Indus., Inc., 509 F.2d 1; Precision Shooting Equip. Co., 646 F.2d 313; Nebraska
Eng'g. Corp. v. Shivvers, 557 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1977).
335. Crane Co., 356 F. Supp. 733; Crane Co., 364 F. Supp. 547; Crane Co., 504 F.2d
1086; Lee v. Lee Custom Eng'g, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Wi. 1979); Precision Shooting
Equip.Co., 646 F.2d 313; but see, Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. v. Int'l Salt Co., 183
U.S.P.Q. 748 (N.D.N.Y. 1974); Metallurgical Int'l, Inc. v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 171
U.S.P.Q. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Warner-Jenkinson Co., 567 F.2d 184; Nebraska Eng'g Corp.,
557 F.2d 1257.
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challenge was successful, a circumstance not addressed in Lear where
the licensee had withheld royalty payments prior to its challenge.336' 337
For our purposes, however, it is the reasoning of the post-Lear
courts and not the facts of the cases that is of interest. A review of
selected decisions provides a sampling of the different judicial
interpretations of the scope of the Lear holding, as well as a preview
of the arguments that a court today might rely on in determining the
right of a licensee in good standing to challenge the validity of a
licensed patent or in assessing the enforceability of a pro-licensor
contract provision that has the effect of discouraging a licensee patent
336. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 567 F.2d 184; Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 509 F.2d 1;
Precision Shooting Equip. Co., 646 F.2d 313.
337. In Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55, the
Seventh Circuit endorsed another "extension" of the Supreme Court's Lear holding by
permitting a licensee patent validity challenge in the context of an exclusive (as opposed to
nonexclusive) patent license, where the licensee marked its product with the number of
the challenged patent. With respect to the licensor-defendants' claim that the Lear
holding should be limited to nonexclusive licenses and that licensee estoppel should
continue to apply to exclusive licensees, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that at the time
of the filing of suit in Lear the license had become nonexclusive (see supra note 226) but
held that the status of the license was not relevant to the Supreme Court's ruling in the
case. As the Seventh Circuit explained,
[d]efendants suggest that . . . the basic rationale of Lear is inapplicable to
exclusive licensees because outsiders also have a strong economic incentive to
challenge the monopoly granted the exclusive licensee. In the case of
nonexclusive licenses, defendants argue, all would-be competitors are free to
become licensees, and henceforth would be barred from challenging the patent
unless a limited exception to the doctrine of licensee estoppel were made. We
reject the argument. Even if the failure to distinguish between exclusive and
nonexclusive licenses was oversight [by the Lear Court], we are not convinced
that the Supreme Court would rule differently on the facts of this case. Nor can
we say that the distinction which the defendants suggest is so great as to require a
limitation on the Lear rule, especially in light of the "strong federal policy
favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection." Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins,... 395 U.S. [653] at 656....
433 F.2d at 58 (paragraphing omitted). With respect to the defendants' claim that a
licensee that marks its product with the number of the licensed patent is estopped from
challenging the patent's validity, the Seventh Circuit concluded that such a restriction
would undermine the important public interest, articulated in Lear, of eliminating
worthless patents. In the words of the Seventh Circuit,
[d]efendants have not suggested any reason why the "strong federal policy" in
favor of encouraging challenges to invalid patents should not apply when there
has been marking with the patent number. Perhaps it is true that such marking
provides the licensee with additional protection from competitors, thus making it
seem all the more unfair to allow him to repudiate his obligations. However, it
must be noted that the Supreme Court in Lear conceded that patent invalidity
does not amount to total failure of consideration, but nonetheless held that
patent invalidity must be made a complete defense to the obligation to pay
royalties. We cannot say that the additional consideration or "benefit" flowing to
the licensee who marks his products with the patent number is sufficient to make
the Lear case and its policy rationale inapplicable. Id. at 59 (7th Cir. 1970).
fIVol. 3:2
SUMMER 2011] PATENT LICENSING FOLLOWING MEDIMMUNE
challenge. Federal courts that took an expansive view of the Lear
decision did, in fact, endeavor to provide the patent licensee with
"every possible incentive" to challenge the licensed patent's validity.
In contrast, the minority of courts that refused to extend the Lear
holding expressed the view, later adopted by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, that the Lear decision did not grant every
licensee the right to challenge the licensed patent in every
circumstance."'
Representative of the decisions that reflected an expansive
reading of Lear are the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Massillion-Cleveland-
Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co.' and the Seventh
Circuit's ruling in Kraly v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp.3 40
Each of these cases involved a patent license agreement that was
entered into to settle a dispute regarding the alleged infringement of
the patent and contained an explicit no-challenge provision. In
Massillion, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an express covenant by a
licensee in a settlement agreement not to challenge a licensed patent
was unenforceable under the rationale of Lear, despite the fact that
the patent at issue was acknowledged as valid and infringed in the
agreement. The court noted that the Lear decision did not
specifically address the validity of a no-challenge provision. It
reasoned, however, that such a provision "is in just as direct conflict
with the 'strong federal policy' referred to repeatedly in Lear, as was
the estoppel doctrine and the specific contractual provision [regarding
a royalty payment obligation] struck down in that decision."341 The
Massillion court rejected the argument that the rationale of Lear was
inapplicable in the context of a settlement agreement. In the words
of the Ninth Circuit,
[w]e think it unimportant that in our case the covenant is part of
a settlement agreement rather than of a typical patent licensing
agreement. Were we to recognize such a distinction it would, in
practice, be less then [sic] workable .... [I]t would be ... easy
to couch licensing arrangements in the form of settlement
agreements. If the recognized policy favoring settlement of
338. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1381 ("The Lear doctrine, however, does not grant
every licensee in every circumstance the right to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent").
339. 444 F.2d 425.
340. 502 F.2d 1366.
341. Massillion-Cleveland-Akron, 444 F.2d at 427.
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disputes might be hindered by our holding on this question, that
policy, in our opinion, must give way to the policy favoring free
competition in ideas not meriting patent protection.x'm
In Kraly v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp.,34 the Seventh
Circuit adopted a position similar to that of the Ninth Circuit
regarding the application of the Lear decision. In the Seventh Circuit
case, an infringement action brought by patent holder Kraly against
National Distillers' predecessor-in-interest was dismissed with
prejudice when the parties entered into a settlement agreement that
included a provision that prohibited the alleged infringer from
making any future challenges of the validity of the patent at issue.
National Distillers subsequently stopped paying royalties due under
the settlement agreement and raised patent invalidity as a defense to
Kraly's breach of contract claim. Kraly argued that the prior
dismissal with prejudice was res judicata of the issue of patent validity
and, accordingly, the rationale of Lear did not apply in the instant
case to allow National Distillers' patent challenge. The Seventh
Circuit rejected Kraly's argument. The court acknowledged that a
dismissal with prejudice was generally binding, but concluded that the
case before it presented an exception.
We do not quarrel with the general proposition that a judgment
with prejudice entered upon a settlement or compromise is
binding as to the parties and their privies. See generally 1B J.
Moore, Federal Practice, PO.409 (2d ed. 1948). Nonetheless,
this proposition is subject to qualification where overriding
principles are implicated, and it is well-established that one such
principle is 'the public interest in obtaining a judicial
determination of the invalidity of a worthless patent.' Id.... In
the circumstances of this case, therefore, the doctrine of res
judicata has no applicability?45
342. Id.
343. The Ninth Circuit bolstered its arguments in support of the application of the
rationale of Lear to the facts in Massillion by citing Katzinger v. Chicago Metallic
Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947), in which the U.S. Supreme Court permitted a
licensee patent validity challenge despite an explicit no-challenge provision in an
agreement that resulted from an infringement dispute. See also, infra note 522.
344. 502 F.2d 1366.
345. Id. at 1368 (citation omitted).
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The court first argued that the consent decree in the instant case
did not embody an adjudication of infringement, considered
necessary under Seventh Circuit precedent for res judicata. It then
opined that, even if the consent decree had embodied an adjudication
of infringement, the Lear rationale may still be applicable despite the
presence of the no-challenge provision, since "allow[ing] the parties
to consent to an adjudication of infringement would simply result in
the erection of another obstacle to tests of patent validity."346 The
court concluded "that National Distillers, the licensee, is not estopped
from challenging the validity of the patent even though a prior
consent decree incorporated an understanding not to challenge the
validity of the patent.""'
The Seventh Circuit further extended the application of the
public policy rationale of Lear in Crane v. Aeroquip Corp.,m
demonstrating the potential force of the rationale in overriding the
dictates of contract law. The central question in Crane was whether a
patent licensor could unilaterally terminate its settlement agreement
with a licensee that had failed to pay royalties owed under the
agreement and had repeated its challenge of the licensed patent
despite a prior consent decree declaring the patent valid. The district
court in the case addressed three issues in its holding. Consistent with
the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Kraly, the court concluded that a prior
consent decree of patent validity in the absence of a finding of
infringement did not estop the licensee from again challenging the
licensed patent. Citing case law from the Seventh and other regional
circuits in support of its position, the district court noted that "[t]he
foregoing decisions are founded on the policy that the undesirability
of having the public pay royalties to one who does not have a valid
patent outweighs the desirability of encouraging settlement of
lawsuits.",4 1
The Crane district court then examined the basis for the
licensee's royalty obligation. While concluding that the patent at
issue was valid but not infringed, the court relied on the doctrine of
marking estoppel to hold that the licensee was still obligated to pay
royalties under the settlement agreement. According to the marking
estoppel doctrine, "marking with a patent number will estop the
marker from denying that the marked product is within the scope of
346. Id. at 1369.
347. Id.
348. 356 F. Supp. 733; 364 F. Supp. 547; 504 F.2d 1086.
349. Crane Co., 364 F. Supp. at 549-50.
345
346 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
the patent."3 5 Since the licensee in Crane had marked the product at
issue in the case with the number of the Crane patent, it was estopped
from raising the defense of noninfringement and, accordingly, was
liable for the royalties owed under the settlement agreement, despite
the court's conclusion that the product was not covered by the
licensed patent.351' 352
Having established that the patent validity challenge was
permissible but that the licensee was nonetheless liable for royalties
owed under the settlement agreement, the Crane district court turned
to the question of whether the licensor had the right to terminate the
agreement based on the licensee's failure to comply with its
contractual obligation to pay royalties and its subsequent repudiation
of the licensed patent. Relying the on the rationale of Lear, the court
concluded that the licensor in Crane was not permitted to unilaterally
terminate its settlement agreement. In the words of the court:
Although the authority is somewhat insubstantial, the general
rule of this Circuit appears to be that the mere failure to pay
royalties is not, absent a specific provision in the license,
sufficient to allow the licensor to unilaterally terminate the
license .... With respect to the other alleged grounds for
termination, irrespective of their merits as a matter of contract
law, the policy considerations found to be determinative in the
Lear case should have equal force here. Basically, Crane's [the
licensor's] contention is that Aeroquip's [the licensee's]
repudiation of the validity of the patent and its manufacture,
sale and marking of the "modified" couplings, without payment
of royalties thereon, are sufficient grounds for Crane to
unilaterally terminate the license. Certainly the aforesaid facts
would as a matter of contract law be persuasive support for
Crane's argument. However, as the Court stated in Lear:
"Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily
when they are balanced against the important public interest in
permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which
350. Crane Co., 356 F. Supp. at 741.
351. Crane Co., 364 F. Supp. at 560. ("[Since] defendant is estopped to deny that the
modified couplings [, the product at issue in the case,] are covered by the claims in suit,
irrespective of whether they in fact are, defendant will be liable for royalties on said
couplings.").
352. Citing Beckman Instruments, Inc., 433 F.2d 55 (which relied on the rationale of
Lear), the district court in Crane noted that the marking of a product by a licensee with
the number of a licensed patent did not prevent the licensee from challenging the validity
of the patent. Crane Co., 356 F. Supp. at 741.
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are in reality a part of the public domain.... We think it plain
that the technical requirements of contract doctrine must give
way before the demands of the public interest. . . ." Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 ... (1969). Although the facts and
issues in Lear required the court to go no further than to hold
that the doctrine of licensee estoppel would no longer be a
defense available to licensors and that a licensee would be able
to challenge the validity of the patent without having to
continue paying royalties or, in effect, having the license
contract strictly enforced against it during the pendency of the
litigation, the rationale of Lear must surely extend to the
converse situation raised in this case. Instead of being asked to
enforce the contract, even though the licensee has raised the
validity defense, Crane has asked this court to adjudicate the
license as terminated essentially because the licensee has raised
the validity defense. Yet, just as the imposition of the doctrine
of licensee estoppel would have a chilling effect on meritorious
challenges to patents. . . , so would the threat of termination of
the license have a similar effect.3"
The Seventh Circuit in Crane affirmed the district court's ruling
in the case that the licensee's failure to make royalty payments under
the settlement agreement was not a sufficient ground to allow the
licensor to unilaterally terminate the agreement.354 The circuit court
expressed no opinion, however, regarding the district court's
application of the doctrine of marking estoppel, since it had reversed
the lower court's finding of noninfringement and relied on
infringement rather than marking estoppel as the basis for the
licensee's liability for royalties owed under the settlement agreement.
On first analysis, the Crane decision does not appear to be
distinguishable from other opinions of the regional circuit courts that
extended the rationale of Lear to cover circumstances not present in
the original case. The reasoning relied on by the court in Crane,
however, constituted a significant departure from that of other Lear
progeny cases and has led a number of commentators to view Crane
353. Crane Co., 356 F. Supp. at 738-39 (cited cases omitted).
354. Crane Co., 504 F.2d at 1092-93 ("The court below held that defendant's failure to
pay royalties on the accused couplings was not a sufficient basis for allowing plaintiff to
terminate the license agreement, as it wished, particularly since there was 'an honest
dispute as to the coverage of the patent license.' Crane Co., 364 F. Supp. at 561. This
decision was correct and was more fully explained in an earlier phase of the litigation,
Crane Co. 356 F. Supp. 733, 737-740.").
347347
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as the high-watermark of pro-Lear regional circuit case law. As one
such commentator explained,
Crane took Lear to the extreme. No longer was the judiciary
protecting a licensee's capacity to challenge validity as it did in
Lear and in the areas of no-challenge clauses, settlement
agreements, and consent decrees. Instead, the court articulated
a willingness to eliminate any devices that may "threat[en]" or
"chill" the licensee's eagerness to challenge the validity of the
patent. This approach detrimentally affects the incentive to
-355innovate and license.
When viewed in this light, the Crane decision arguably represents
an example of a court ignoring the dictates of contract law in order to
provide the licensee with "every possible incentive to challenge
patent validity."3 16
A minority of post-Lear regional circuit and district courts,
however, resisted the temptation to apply the Lear holding to the
facts under consideration. For example, in Schlegel Manufacturing
Co. v. USM Corp. ,7 the Sixth Circuit ruled that the public interest in
the settlement of litigation outweighed the benefits of a patent
validity challenge, rejecting the contrary position expressed by the
Seventh Circuit in Kraly and Crane. The case involved an action for
contempt brought by a patent holder for violation by the defendant of
a consent decree enjoining the defendant from future uses of the
patented invention. The consent decree, settling a prior infringement
suit, stated that the patent at issue was both valid and infringed by the
actions of the defendant. Following notice from the patent holder
that the defendant's actions continued to infringe the patent, the
defendant filed a declaratory judgment action for invalidity of the
patent. The patent holder responded with its motion for contempt,
claiming that the prior consent decree was res judicata of the issue of
355. Taylor, supra note 321, at 242; see also McCarthy, (Part I), supra note 321, at 518-
19 ("[Tjhe Crane court found that the spirit of Lear was violated by ... a termination [by a
patentee of a license for nonpayment of royalties] . . . . [D]epriving the patentee of its
normal right to terminate the license and sue for infringement leads to an inequitable
balance of rights between patentee and licensee and discourages inventors from obtaining
and licensing patents . . . . To denude the patentee of its normal infringement remedy
would certainly remove an obstacle to the licensee's incentive to challenge, but at the
sacrifice of an elemental balance of equities and remedies between patent owner and
licensee." (footnote omitted)).
356. See supra note 330.
357. 525 F.2d 775.
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validity and could not again be raised as a defense in the action for
contempt. The defendant countered by claiming that the public
policy interest articulated in Lear "renders a finding of invalidity
more important than the policies of finality served by the doctrine of
res judicata."35 8 The district court in Schlegel ruled in favor of the
patent holder and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
According to the Sixth Circuit, the principal issue in Schlegel was
"whether the entire policy of res judicata is overridden by the public
interest in purging an invalid patent of its status as a government-
created monopoly." 9 The Schlegel circuit court recognized that the
doctrine of res judicata is not inflexible and in rare instances may be
rejected for public policy reasons. In the instant case, however, the
court found no adequate justification for such a rejection. In the
words of the Sixth Circuit majority, "[w]e are aware of no court which
has entertained the suggestion that Lear abrogates the doctrine of res
judicata after a fully litigated result. This would seem to be the logical
extension of denying res judicata effect to a consent decree.... Even
though the degree of judicial involvement is different between a
consent decree and a litigated result, we are not prepared to find that
judicial involvement in a consent decree is so inconsequential as to
justify different treatment."3 The circuit court emphasized the
significant difference between the effect of a consent decree and that
of licensee estoppel.
The parties to the patent suit are entitled to a full and fair
hearing on the merits of the case up until the time a consent
decree is entered. The doctrine of licensee estoppel closed the
doors of the courts to a large group of parties who had sufficient
interest in the patent to challenge its validity. By giving res
judicata effect to consent decrees, we do not close the doors of
the courts to litigation on the issue of patent validity, except as
to parties or their privies, and only after they have had the
opportunity to litigate the issue fully. Third parties are not
affected by the consent decree.361
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that its decision in Schlegel,
relying on res judicata to prevent a licensee patent validity challenge,
358. Id. at 778.
359. Id. at 778.
360. Id. at 780 (citation omitted).
361. Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
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was not consistent with the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Kraly and
Crane (although consistent with prior decisions of the Second and
Eighth Circuits).362 However, the Schlegel circuit court attributed the
inconsistency to a difference in the interpretation of Lear, and not a
lack of recognition of the important public policy in the early
invalidation of specious patents. As the Schlegel majority explained,
[t]he public interest requires that an invalid patent be stripped
of its monopoly, and at as early a date as possible. When a
consent decree is to be given res judicata effect, litigants are
encouraged to litigate the issue of validity rather than
foreclosing themselves by a consent decree. If they were given
a second change to litigate the issue of validity, alleged
infringers might well accept a license under a consent decree
and forego an attack on validity until favored by a stronger
financial position, or until threatened by other manufacturers
who were not paying royalties. By giving res judicata effect to
consent decrees this court protects the public interest in that an
alleged infringer is deprived of a judicial device which could be
used to postpone and delay a final adjudication of validity.363
In Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. v. International Salt Co.,36 a
New York district court provided the counterargument to the
362. Id. at 780 ("We respectfully disagree with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
Lear. In so holding we are in agreement with the Second Circuit, see Broadview Chem.
Corp., 474 F.2d 1391, 1395, and the Eighth Circuit, see United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co.,
430 F.2d 998, 1001-02.").
363. See also Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d, 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1976), in
which the Sixth Circuit relied on its reasoning in Schlegel to enforce an agreement entered
into to settle a patent infringement suit and thereby prevent a licensee patent validity
challenge ("We need add little herein to the comparatively exhaustive discussion by this
court of the relationship between the public interest in getting invalid patents declared
invalid and the public interest in peacefully settling lawsuits in Schlegel Manufacturing Co.
v. USM Corporation, 525 F.2d 775, 187 U.S. P.Q. 417 (6th Cir. 1975) .... Whatever boon
Lear may have provided those who take licenses under certain conditions, it cannot be
interpreted so broadly as to condone a kind of gamesmanship, wherein an alleged
infringer, after employing the judicial system for months of discovery, negotiation and
sparring, abandons its challenge to validity, executes a license in settlement, and then
repudiates the license and seeks to start the fight all over again in the courts. Lear does
not require that the courts answer every beck and call of the fickle suitor whose transient
affection is governed by such on-again, off-again strategies. The mantle of Lear ill befits
him who would use and reuse the courts as pawns in a private game of varying design.
The 'defender of the public interest' role is not available to him who would frustrate on
whim the orderly conclusion of litigation. [paragraphing omitted]").
364. 183 USPO 748.
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Seventh Circuit's expansive reading of the Lear holding in Crane.
The case involved an action by patent licensee Morton-Norwich for a
declaratory judgment that International's licensed patent was invalid.
International counterclaimed that its patent was infringed by Morton-
Norwich on the theory that the latter's suspension of royalty
payments due under the license agreement resulted in a termination
of the agreement in accordance with its terms and Morton-Norwich's
continued use of the patented invention was without authorization.
Morton-Norwich argued "that the infringement charge is insufficient
as a matter of law because the withholding of royalties pending the
outcome of validity litigation was judicially sanctioned in Lear v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 162 USPO 1 (1969), and hence .. . International
cannot use the nonpayment to declare a breach. From this it follows
that the licensing agreement is still in force and, as such, forecloses an
infringement suit."3" The single issue before the court was whether
International's infringement counterclaim was dismissible under
Lear.
In a decision intended to set a limit on the impact of the Lear
holding, the Morton-Norwich district court ruled that International
had the right to unilaterally terminate its license agreement and,
accordingly, its infringement counterclaim was valid. The court
began its opinion by noting the procedural differences between the
Lear case and the case under consideration. In Lear, the licensor had
elected to sue for royalties under the contract and the U.S. Supreme
Court had ruled that the licensee was not estopped from interposing a
patent invalidity defense or required to pay royalties during the
pendency of the litigation. By contrast, Morton-Norwich was
asserting patent invalidity in an offensive posture and was facing a
patent infringement counterclaim by International. This procedural
difference was dispositive of the issue in the case in that the Morton-
Norwich district court adopted the view that "[n]othing in Lear
prevents the licensor from treating a nonpayment of royalties due
under the terms of the contract as a breach of it and a ground for
termination in accordance with its terms. Metallurgical Int'l,... 171
USPQ at 350. Compare Crane v. Aeroquip Corp.,... 356 F. Supp. at
738-39, 177 USPQ at 669-670."- A licensor could sue for royalties
365. Id. at 748-49.
366. Id. at 750, n 10. See also Metallurgical Int'l, Inc., 171 USPQ at 350 ("Lear did not
deal with whether or not a license could or should be terminated, but rather only with
whether a licensee under a license that had not been terminated could challenge a patent's
validity.").
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owed under a patent license agreement, as in the Lear case, or
terminate the license agreement for nonpayment of royalties and sue
for patent infringement, as International had done. The Morton-
Norwich court did not question a licensee's right to bring a
declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the licensed
patent, but concluded that such a challenge, when coupled with a
failure to pay royalties due under the license, had an associated cost,
i.e., the risk of termination of the licensed right to the patent.
The Morton-Norwich district court reinforced its ruling by
emphasizing the "inherent inequity" of extending the Lear holding to
prevent International from terminating its patent license agreement:
At the core of Lear is a balancing of the equities among
licensor, licensee and the public interest. To permit a licensee,
as in this case, to enter into a license agreement after
presumably good faith bargaining and receive the benefits of
the inventor's investment in money, time and talent, and on the
next day institute an action seeking a judgment declaring the
patent invalid while at all times during the litigation withholding
from the licensor the agreed upon consideration certainly does
not score high on the scales of equity.... The licensor, having
granted the right to use his presumptively valid invention,
should not be cut off from the reward he has bargained for
absent the circumstances set forth in Lear [in which the licensor
elected to sue for royalties under the contract]. The plaintiff
[licensee] can seek a declaration of invalidity and protect his
rights under the license agreement by continuing to pay
royalties. However, permitting the licensee to unilaterally and
offensively ignore his contract obligation to make payments
required under the contract, and at the same time denuding the
licensor of the remedy of declaring a breach and seeking relief
against the licensee as an infringer, . . . does violence to contract
principles .... Considered from the standpoint of equitable
treatment of the parties, the licensor is clearly being
shortchanged.
The Morton-Norwich district court ended its analysis by arguing
that relying on the Lear holding to prevent International from
terminating its license agreement would not be compatible with
federal patent policy. The court noted that "[w]hile this policy favors
367. Id. at 749-50, 751 (footnotes omitted) (paragraphing omitted) .
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the free dissemination of unpatentable ideas and the early judicial
determination of validity challenges, it also provides for the limited
grant of a secure monopoly to inventors as an incentive to develop
new ideas and to disseminate them in the licensing marketplace so as
to deter the 'hoarding' of new ideas and new patents."'6 Discarding
all relevant state law in an effort to promote the elimination of invalid
patents would have the effect of "loading the scales against" the
patentee/licensor in the process of negotiating a patent license and
could, thereby, diminish the incentive to create, and reduce the
inclination to license and/or publicly disclose, intellectual property in
a way that would, on balance, frustrate the overarching goal of
federal patent policy.3 69
The district judge writing for the court in Morton-Norwich
provided the following closing comment: "In summary, I have
concluded that it would be inappropriate to extend the scope of Lear
to such a point that the licensee would be in a 'heads I win - tails you
lose' situation [citing Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d
1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1972)]. The shield that licensees would enjoy
were Lear so extended might encourage more validity litigation, but
at too high a price."370 In marked contrast to the position taken by the
Seventh Circuit in Crane, the Morton-Norwich court rejected the view
that "any and all rules of contract law, patent law, and civil procedure
[must] be ignored to give licensees every possible incentive to
challenge patent validity." 371  The decision of the Morton-Norwich
court, like that of the Sixth Circuit in Schlegel, is representative of a
minority of post-Lear federal court decisions in which the temptation
to apply the Lear holding to the facts under consideration was
resisted.372  Such decisions set the stage for the more methodical
368. Id. at 750 (footnotes omitted).
369. Id. at 750-51.
370. Id. at 750.
371. McCarthy, (Part II), supra note 321, at 568.
372. See Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391 (2d Cir. 1973);
Morton-Norwich Prods,183 USPQ 748; Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532
F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976); Metallurgical Int'l., Inc., 171 USPQ 348; Interdynarnics, Inc., 653
F.2d 93; Schlegel Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 775; Aro Corp., 531 F.2d 1368; Ransberg Electro-
Coating Corp., 489 F.2d 974; Amer. Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544 (7th
Cir. 1980); U.S. ex. rel. Shell Oil Co., 430 F.2d 998; Neb. Eng'g. Corp., 557 F.2d 1257; see
also Timely Products, Inc. v. Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 96 (D. Conn. 1979) for a district
court's interpretation of the limited scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision. ("In
its holding, Lear does not go so far as to invalidate an agreement that only reduces the
incentive of a licensee to challenge patent validity. However, Lear did invalidate an
agreement which, if enforced, would have left the licensee with 'little incentive' to
353353
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limitation of the reach of Lear later undertaken by the Federal
Circuit, as discussed in the next section.
iii. The Federal Circuit
From its inception, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has rendered decisions that have recognized limits to the scope of the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Lear. The Federal Circuit has
rejected Lear-based arguments in preventing patent validity
challenges (1) by patent assignors,"' (2) in the context of the
settlement of litigation,374 and (3) under certain circumstances where
such challenges were contractually prohibited.' In addition, the
court identified prerequisites to patent validity challenges that must
be met by a patent licensee376 and established jurisdictional barriers to
licensee patent challenges." Most significantly, for the purposes of
this Article, the Federal Circuit has held that a patent licensee that
challenges the validity of the licensed patent can be subject to
consequences that could constitute a disincentive to make the
challenge in the first place,7  despite the public interest, highlighted in
Lear, in eliminating invalid patents. In this section, we review the
Federal Circuit's important Lear-related decisions. While the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in MedImmune rejected the Federal Circuit's
position with respect to a jurisdictional barrier to a licensee patent
validity challenge and called into question the Federal Circuit's
challenge the patent. Id. [Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653] at 674 .... Thus, at a
minimum, Lear means that the policy of the patent laws must displace contract provisions
which, if enforced, leave the licensee without any incentive to challenge the patent.").
373. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Shamrock
Techs., Inc. v. Med. Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Acoustical Design,
Inc. v. Control Elecs. Co., Inc., 932 F.2d 939 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Q.G. Prods., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d
1211 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 424 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
374. Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991), Diversey Lever, Inc.
v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999), Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
375. Diversey Lever, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350; Flex-Foot, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362.
376. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 112 F.3d 1561.
377. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d 1376; Medlmmune, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376; MedImmune,
Inc., 427 F.3d 958.
378. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Cordis Corp. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991 (Fed Cir. 1985); Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc.,
872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 112 F.3d 1561; Dow Chem. Co.,
226 F.3d 1334.
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pronouncement that there are prerequisites to a licensee patent
challenge, other Lear-related holdings of the Federal Circuit remain
good law. The extent to which one should rely on the implications of
such holdings, however, to craft explicit pro-licensor contract
provisions that have the effect of reducing the incentive of a licensee
to challenge a licensed patent remains an open question, as will be
discussed in Part IV of this Article.
* Assignor Estoppel
In Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc.,39 the Federal Circuit
was presented with one of its first opportunities to limit the reach of
the Lear holding. In that case, the court was asked to consider the
continued viability of the doctrine of assignor estoppel following the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lear. Assignor estoppel prevents
the assignor of a patent from challenging the validity of the assigned
patent as a defense to an infringement claim brought by the
assignee .3  As noted elsewhere in this Article,"' assignor estoppel is a
contract-based prohibition to a challenge of a patent's validity that is
considered closely related to licensee estoppel, and judicial decisions
addressing the former have had a pronounced influence on decisions
addressing the latter.3 8 In Diamond Scientific, however, the Federal
Circuit relied on an important difference between the two estoppel
doctrines to conclude that, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear
decision, assignor estoppel remained a viable doctrine under
appropriate circumstances and in the case before the court the
doctrine prevented the assignor's patent validity challenge. The
Federal Court distinguished the Lear decision by noting that:
Lear resolved the issue of licensee estoppel by writing its
obituary; but for courts wrestling with assignor estoppel it was
less clear whether Lear had also sounded the death knell for
that doctrine. Certainly, there was nothing in its holding that
379. 848 F.2d 1220.
380. Under the doctrine of assignor estoppel, a party in privity with the assignor is also
estopped from raising patent invalidity as a defense to an infringement claim. See, e.g.,
Diamond Scientific Co., 848 F.2d 1220; Shamrock Technologies, Inc., 903 F.2d 789; Intel
Corp., 946 F.2d 821; Carroll Touch, Inc., 15 F.3d 1573; Mentor Graphics Corp. v.
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 150 F.3d 1374.
381. See supra section III.A.; supra note 61; supra section III.A.5.a.
382. See, e.g., supra section III.A.5.a. for a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions in Westinghouse and Scott Paper and supra section III.C.3. for the Lear court's
reliance on those decisions in its abrogation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
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eliminated the doctrine. Beyond the questioning dicta in Lear,
the Court has left assignment estoppel untouched for the past
nineteen years ....
In examining Lear, one important distinction between assignors
and licensees becomes apparent - a distinction that cautions
against the automatic application to assignment cases of the
rationale underlying Lear and licensees. The public policy
favoring allowing a licensee to contest the validity of the patent
is not present in the assignment situation. Unlike the licensee,
who, without Lear might be forced to continue to pay for a
potentially invalid patent, the assignor who would challenge the
patent has already been fully paid for the patent rights:
The Federal Circuit's primary consideration in applying assignor
estoppel in Diamond Scientific was "the measure of unfairness and
injustice that would be suffered by the assignee if the assignor were
allowed to raise defenses of patent invalidity."a The court reasoned
that "an assignor should not be permitted to sell something and later
to assert that what was sold is worthless, all to the detriment of the
assignee. "m According to the court, "it is the implicit representation
by the assignor that the patent rights that he is assigning (presumably
for value) are not worthless that sets the assignor apart from the rest
of the world and can deprive him of the ability to challenge later the
validity of the patent. To allow the assignor to make that
representation at the time of the assignment (to his advantage) and
later to repudiate it (again to his advantage) could work an injustice
against the assignee." 386
The Federal Circuit concluded its decision in Diamond Scientific
with the following:
Our holding is that this is a case in which public policy calls for
the application of assignor estoppel. We are, of course, not
unmindful of the general public policy disfavoring the
repression of competition by the enforcement of worthless
patents. Yet despite the public policy encouraging people to
challenge potentially invalid patents, there are still
383. 848 F.2d at 1223-24.
384. Id. at 1225.
385. Id. at 1224.
386. Id.
[Vol. 3:2
SUMMER 20111 PATENT LICENSING FOLLOWING MEDIMMUNE
circumstances in which the equities of the contractual
relationships between the parties should deprive one party (as
well as others in privity with it) of the right to bring that
challenge ....
... Although the doctrine of assignor estoppel may no longer be
a broad equitable device susceptible of automatic application,
the case before us is appropriate for its use . . . .8
Following its decision in Diamond Scientific, the Federal Circuit
has continued to apply the doctrine of assignor estoppel on a case-by-
case basis,3 8 including in a case in which the assignor was a licensee
under the assigned patent."' In Acoustical Design, the Federal Circuit
rejected the argument that, because the assignor was also a licensee,
the U.S. Supreme Court's abrogation of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel in Lear was dispositive in the case and permitted the
assignor's patent validity challenge. Relying on its decision in
Diamond Scientific, the Federal Circuit concluded:
This argument [that Lear is controlling] is not persuasive. That
a patent assignor takes back a license does not free him from
the fact that he previously sold the patent for value. As the
district court concluded, the assignor, in challenging the patent,
is still asserting that what he sold is worthless, and the existence
of a license back does not alter that fact .... We consider an
assignor-licensee to be in a different situation from that of an
ordinary licensee and view Diamond Scientific to be applicable
even when there is a subsequent license back to the
assignor .. ..'
387. Id. at 1224-26 (footnote omitted).
388. See Shamrock Technologies, Inc., 903 F.2d 789; Acoustical Design, Inc., 932 F.2d
939; Intel Corp., 946 F.2d 821; Q.G. Products, Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d 1211 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Carroll Touch, Inc., 15 F.3d 1573; Mentor Graphics Corp., 150 F.3d 1374; Pandrol
USA, LP v. Airboss Railway Products, Inc., 424 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2005); but see Sun
Studs, Inc., 872 F.2d 978.
389. Acoustical Design, Inc., 932 F.2d 939.
390. Id. at 943.
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* Res Judicata and Contractual Estoppel
In Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing Co.,39 1 the Federal Circuit was
presented with another opportunity to limit the application of the
Lear holding. The issue before the court was whether "the patent
policy expressed in Lear v. Adkins ... override[s] the res judicata
effect of a consent decree declaring a patent valid"9 and, accordingly,
barred the patent validity challenge brought in the instant case. The
Federal Circuit acknowledged the conflict in precedent of the
regional circuits, citing, inter alia, the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Massillon, the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Crane and Kraly and the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Schlegel. Adopting arguments set forth in
Schlegel, the Federal Circuit concluded "that general principles of
res judicata apply, despite the policies favoring challenges to validity
expressed in Lear."3 93
The Federal Circuit in Foster distinguished the Lear holding by
noting that "[t]he application of res judicata principles... involves a
public policy totally absent from Lear."394As the court explained,
[t]he Supreme Court in Lear did not consider the policy
concerns evoked when preserving the finality of a judgment, but
only the policies involved in resolving the right of a patent
licensee to challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a suit
for royalties under the contract. That question puts at odds
only the binding effect of contract provisions under state
contract law and the federal patent policy favoring free use of
ideas rightfully belonging to the public domain ... 395
In considering whether or not to bar the repeat patent validity
challenge in the case before it, the Foster court cited the res judicata
effect of a consent judgment that acknowledges both patent validity
and infringement, the strong public interest in the settlement of
patent litigation and the fact that enforcing the binding effect of res
judicata encourages early and vigorous patent validity challenges
favored by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lear.'9 The Federal Circuit
ended its consideration of the Lear holding by stating that "we cannot
391. 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
392. Id. at 474.
393. Id. at 475.
394. Id. at 476.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 476-77 (quoting from Schlegel with respect to the last point).
[Vol. 3:2
SUMMER 20111 PATENT LICENSING FOLLOWING MEDIMMUNE
conclude that the public policy expressed in Lear is so overriding that
challenges to validity must be allowed when under normal principles
of res judicata applicable to a consent judgment, such challenge would
be precluded."9
In an important respect, the Federal Circuit's decision in Foster
was more nuanced than prior decisions of the regional circuits
addressing the preclusive effect of a consent judgment of patent
validity in the aftermath of Lear, in that the Federal Circuit
considered claim preclusion and issue preclusion separately. The
Federal Circuit in Foster held that a consent judgment respecting
validity, where a device is adjudicated to infringe the valid patent, is
to be given res judicata effect in the form of claim preclusion where
the device in the second suit is essentially the same (i.e., identical or
with only colorable differences or with changes unrelated to the
limitations in the patent claim) as that in the first suit settled by the
consent judgment. In such a circumstance, claim preclusion would
block a subsequent patent validity challenge because of the res
judicata effect of the consent judgment, despite the Lear public policy
argument.398 The Foster court went on to note, however, that the
situation is different with respect to issue preclusion. A consent
judgment respecting validity has res judicata effect to preclude a
patent challenge by the same alleged infringer with an allegedly
infringing device that is not essentially the same as the device in the
first suit only where the language in the consent judgment (or an
associated settlement agreement) clearly indicates the intent of the
parties to bar the defense of invalidity in any future dispute between
the same parties with respect to infringement of the same patent
irrespective of whether the allegedly infringing device is the same as
that in the first suit, demonstrating the need for and enforceability of
397. Id. at 477 (footnote omitted).
398. The Federal Circuit's holding in Panduit Corp. v. Hellermanntyton Corp., 451 F.3d
819 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (adjudicating a claimed breach of a settlement agreement, in the
absence of a consent judgment) may qualify (by narrowing) the conclusion in Foster
regarding the claim preclusion effect of a consent judgment. If the consent judgment (or,
presumably, an associated settlement agreement) also contains an obligation of the alleged
infringer to not engage in infringing activity with respect to a specifically identified
product, then the claim preclusion effect of the consent judgment would only cover the
specifically identified product (or a product that is physically the same as the specifically
identified product) and not other products that are not physically the same as the
specifically identified product, including ones that are, in the language used in Foster,
"essentially the same" but not physically identical (i.e., those with only colorable
differences or with changes unrelated to the limitations in the patent claims). This is a
type of contractual override that narrows the effect of res judicata in the absence of a
contract limitation.
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an unambiguous "no-challenge" provision (which, according to the
Federal Circuit, was absent in the Foster consent judgment). The
court concluded its analysis by stating that
[t]his position strikes a reasonable balance between the policy
considerations enunciated in Lear, and those favoring voluntary
settlement of litigation. While we have concluded that the Lear
policy considerations do not mandate that future challenges to a
patent's validity cannot be barred by a consent judgment, such
considerations should weigh into the interpretation of the terms
in a consent judgment for purposes of issue preclusion. Barring
subsequent challenges favors the public policy of encouraging
voluntary settlement; at the same time, a narrow construction
of. . . provisions [in a consent judgment asserted to preclude
litigation of the issue of patent validity in a subsequent
infringement suit] favors challenges to validity. Thus, a balance
in the policy expressed in Lear and the interest in encouraging
settlement is achieved.m
The Federal Circuit's decision in Foster anticipated its
subsequent decisions in two related cases. In both Diversey Lever,
Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc.400 and Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.,4' the Federal
Circuit found that issue preclusion barred a patent validity challenge
based on an unambiguous agreement by the parties settling a prior
patent-related suit. In Diversey Lever, the settlement agreement that
accompanied a consent judgment acknowledged that the two patents-
in-suit were valid and enforceable and provided that Ecolab, the
alleged infringer, "will not directly or indirectly aid, assist or
participate in any action contesting the validity of either [of] the . . .
patents. 4"' The agreement also prohibited Ecolab from making or
selling products that utilized two specific chemical compositions.
Interpreting the prohibition in the agreement to be limited to the use
of the specified compositions, Ecolab developed products using other
compositions, which it acknowledged were covered by the patents at
issue. Diversey, the patent holder, brought suit against Ecolab
challenging the latter's use of the different compositions and asserted
that Ecolab was barred from contesting the validity of the patents
399. Foster, 947 F.2d at 481.
400. 191 F.3d 1350.
401. Flex-Foot, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362.
402. 191 F.3d at 1351.
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allegedly infringed in the new suit and the subject of the prior, settled
dispute. Relying on the legal reasoning in Foster, the Federal Circuit
held that the "no-challenge" provision contained in the settlement
agreement precluded Ecolab from challenging the patents-in-suit. In
the words of the court,
[w]e have recognized that a consent judgment of patent validity
may preclude a party from asserting invalidity in subsequent
litigation involving new accused products, as long as the
agreement manifests an intent to be bound. See Foster, 947
E2d at 481. However, any surrender of the right to challenge
validity of a patent is construed narrowly. See id. In Foster, we
refused to hold that a consent judgment had surrendered the
invalidity defense as to future accused products, even though
the agreement stated that the patents were "valid and
enforceable in all respects." See id. The settlement agreement
between Diversey and Ecolab similarly declares "that the ...
patents [in suit] are valid and enforceable," but Foster requires
more for a waiver of the invalidity defense as to future accused
products. To show that Ecolab's right to contest validity of the
patents has been unequivocally foreclosed, Diversey Lever
points to the settlement agreement provision that Ecolab will
not "directly or indirectly aid, assist or participate in any action
contesting the validity" of the patents. Ecolab argues that this
clause merely precludes it from voluntarily assisting third
parties accused of infringement by Diversey Lever. We cannot
agree. As the district court held, "only one interpretation flows
from" the clause, which uses the broadest possible language in
describing the prohibited activity-that Ecolab surrendered its
right to challenge the validity of the patents in any context.403
In Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.i the Federal Circuit was faced
with a fact pattern that differed slightly from that in Diversey Lever.
The parties in Flex-Foot had settled a prior litigation relating to the
validity of a Flex-Foot patent by entering into a settlement agreement
and corresponding license agreement. While the parties agreed to a
dismissal of the suit with prejudice, they did not enter into a consent
judgment adjudicating the issues of infringement and validity. The
settlement agreement, however, provided that CRP, Inc. d/b/a
Springlite would not "challenge or cause to be challenged, directly or
403. Id. at 1352 (paragraphing omitted).
404. Flex-Foot, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362.
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indirectly, the validity or enforceability of the ... patent ... in any
court or other tribunal, including the United States Patent and
Trademark Office."40 The agreement also required Springlite to
"waive ... any and all invalidity and unenforceability defenses in any
future litigation, arbitration, or other proceeding,"4 06 with respect to
any of Springlite's products. The corresponding license agreement
had similar language restricting Springlite's right to challenge the
Flex-Foot patent. Flex-Foot subsequently filed a complaint alleging
that a Springlite product infringed its patent. Following an
arbitration procedure that was decided in favor of Flex-Foot,
Springlite filed a motion in a district court to vacate the arbitrators'
decision and to consider the patent invalidity defense that it had
raised during arbitration. The district court confirmed the decision of
the arbitrators' in favor of Flex-Foot and held that "Springlite was
'collaterally estopped' from challenging the validity and
enforceability of Flex-Foot's ... patent. 4 0 Springlite appealed the
district court's judgment to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in
favor of Flex-Foot, but rejected the lower court's collateral estoppel
argument, ruling instead that Springlite's patent invalidity defense
was barred on the basis of contractual estoppel resulting from the
"no-challenge" provisions in the settlement and accompanying license
agreements. The Federal Circuit acknowledged Springlite's argument
that it had not entered into a consent judgment in settling its prior
dispute with Flex-Foot. It emphasized, however, that Springlite had
agreed to a dismissal with prejudice following a settlement agreement
that included a commitment by Springlite to not challenge the Flex-
Foot patent. According to the Federal Circuit, these facts did not
give rise to "collateral estoppel," which the court defined in a
footnote as "an affirmative defense barring a party from relitigating
an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the
second action differs significantly from the first one."' The facts did,
however, give rise to contractual estoppel of Springlite's challenge to
the validity of the Flex-Foot patent. The remaining question before
the Federal Circuit, raised by Springlite, was "whether such
405. Id. at 1364.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1368, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 256 (7th ed. 1999) (with emphasis
added by the court).
[Vol. 3:2
SUMMER 2011] PATENT LICENSING FOLLOWING MEDIMMUNE
contractually created estoppel is void as against public policy
pursuant to Lear v. Adkins.""
In distinguishing Lear, the Federal Circuit noted that, unlike the
agreements in the instant case, the license agreement in Lear was not
entered into by the parties to settle litigation nor did it contain a
promise by the licensee not to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent. The court in Flex-Foot considered the altered circumstances
in the instant case to be particularly meaningful in that they
implicated "the important policy of enforcing settlement agreements
and res judicata [which] must themselves be weighted against the
federal patent laws' prescription of full and free competition in the
use of ideas that are in reality a part of the public domain." 4 10 The
court then cited Federal Circuit precedent, including Hemstreet v.
Spiegel, Inc.4 1  and Foster, in concluding that the public interest in
encouraging the settlement of litigation trumped that of eliminating
invalid patents.
Hemstreet did not involve a licensee's right to challenge the
validity of the licensed patent, but a licensee's contractual obligation
to make payments under a patent license agreement entered into to
settle a prior infringement suit. The license agreement in Hemstreet
granted the alleged infringer a license to the patents-in-suit with an
obligation to make payments "as they become due notwithstanding
that said patents-in-suit may be held invalid and/or unenforceable in
any other proceeding at a later date[.]"4 12 After the patents-in-suit
were held to be unenforceable in a case involving another party, the
licensee sought a court order to be relieved of having to make further
payments, despite its contractual obligation. The licensee argued that
the requirement to make payments with respect to an unenforceable
patent would be inconsistent with the public interest, expressed in
Lear, in encouraging patent licensees to challenge invalid patents and
in relieving them of any royalty obligation during the pendency of a
challenge. The Federal Circuit in Hemstreet rejected this argument in
stating that "Lear .. . did not involve a settlement of litigation, but
only the right of a patent licensee to challenge the validity of the
409. Id. ("Springlite does not contend that its intent in entering into the ... Settlement
Agreement and . .. Licensing Agreement was anything other than a waiver of future
challenges to ... [Flex-Foot's] patent's validity. Instead, Springlite argues that it should be
entitled, under the public policy rationale set forth in Lear, to renege on its prior written
agreement with Flex-Foot ...
410. Id.
411. 851 F.2d 348.
412. Id. at 349.
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licensed patent. The enforcement of settlement of litigation involves
another public policy totally absent in Lear: the encouragement of
settlement of litigation and the need to enforce such settlements in
order to encourage the parties to enter into them." 413 The Federal
Circuit in Flex-Foot summarized its prior decision in Hemstreet as
follows:
[Tihe holding in Hemstreet was premised on the policy that
while the federal patent laws favor full and free competition in
the use of ideas in the public domain over the technical
requirements of contract doctrine, settlement of litigation is
more strongly favored by the law .... Clearly, the importance
of res judicata and its hierarchical position in the realm of
public policy was not a relevant consideration in Lear and
therefore the Supreme Court never evaluated the importance of
res judicata and whether it trumps the patent laws' prescription
of full and free competition in the use of ideas that are in reality
a part of the public domain... .414
The Federal Circuit in Flex-Foot cited Foster for the proposition
that, despite Lear's abrogation of licensee estoppel, a consent decree
acknowledging patent validity and infringement gives rise to res
judicata that can barr a subsequent patent validity challenge. The
Flex-Foot court further noted that:
Foster echoes Hemstreet's teaching that there is a strong public
interest in settlement of patent litigation and that upholding the
terms of a settlement encourages patent owners to agree to
settlements-thus fostering judicial economy .... These
interests are relevant to the instant case, even though this case
deals with a settlement agreement and resulting dismissal with
prejudice, rather than a consent decree.415
The Federal Circuit concluded its holding in Flex-Foot with the
following pronouncement:
Once an accused infringer has challenged patent validity, has
had an opportunity to conduct discovery on validity issues, and
413. Id. at 350.
414. Flex-Foot, Inc., 238 F.3d atl 369.
415. Id. at 1369-70.
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has elected to voluntarily dismiss the litigation with prejudice
under a settlement agreement containing a clear and
unambiguous undertaking not to challenge validity and/or
enforceability of the patent in suit, the accused infringer is
contractually estopped from raising any such challenge in any
subsequent proceeding. 416417
416. Id. at 1370.
417. For a post-Foster Federal Circuit decision in which the court failed to find
evidence of the clear and unambiguous intent of the parties necessary to barr a subsequent
patent validity challenge, see Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (citing its prior decision in Foster, the Federal Circuit in Ecolab required explicit
language in a consent judgment evidencing the parties' intent that the patent-in-suit not be
challenged by the alleged infringer in any future action, if the allegedly infringing party is
to be precluded from relying on an invalidity defense in an infringement suit brought by
the patent-holding party involving the alleged infringer's sale of a product that is not
essentially the same as the product in the parties' original suit. Since there was no such
language in the Ecolab consent judgment, the patent validity challenge was permitted,
despite the consent judgment's acknowledgement of patent validity and its infringement
by the product involved in the original suit. In the words of the Federal Circuit, "[h]ere,
the consent judgment is more analogous to the agreement in Foster than Diversey Lever.
Paraclipse [the alleged infringer] merely agreed in the consent judgment that 'the '690
patent is a valid patent.' Greater clarity than this is required to foreclose a validity
defense in a new infringement suit involving a new product. Because the language of the
consent judgment does not, standing alone, preclude the validity challenge, we must
determine whether the products are 'essentially the same'... [and] ... the record
demonstrates to our satisfaction that the Insect Inn II and IV devices are not 'essentially
the same."'). See also, Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Bryan W. Roberts, 619 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (relying on its prior decisions in Foster, Flex-Foot, Diversey Lever and Ecolab, the
Federal Circuit in Baseload concluded that the language of the settlement agreement in
the instant case was not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to prevent a subsequent patent
validity challenge. As the court explained, "[i]n the context of settlement agreements, as
with consent decrees, clear and unambiguous language barring the right to challenge
patent validity in future infringement actions is sufficient, even if invalidity claims had not
been previously at issue and had not been actually litigated. Here, however, there is no
such clear language...." Id. at 1363 (paragraphing omitted)). For a recent district court
holding that relied on Flex-Foot and related Federal Circuit jurisprudence regarding
contractual estoppel in the context of a settlement agreement, see Warrior Lacrosse, Inc. v.
Brine, Inc., 2006 WL 763190 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (citing Flex-Foot, Diversey Lever, Foster,
Hemstreet and Ecolab, the district court in Warrior held that contractual estoppel in the
context of a prior settlement involving the patents-in-suit and a settlement agreement
containing a no-challenge provision estopped the alleged infringer, Brine, from
challenging the validity and enforceability of the patents-in-suit as a defense to an
infringement challenge brought by the holder of the patents, Warrior. In the words of the
Warrior court, "[g]overning Federal Circuit case law at the time... [the parties] drafted
the Settlement Agreement established that the promise not to contest the validity and
enforceability of an asserted patent, entered in connection with the settlement of
litigation, had binding effect." Id. at *26.).
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* Licensee Patent Validity Challenges; Prerequisites and
Jurisdictional Barriers
With the exception of Hemstreet, in each of the Federal Circuit
cases discussed thus far in this section, a licensee's patent validity
challenge was barred on the basis of considerations not addressed in
Lear's balancing test, e.g., the inequity of an assignor's challenge of
the validity of a patent that it had assigned for value or the public
interest in encouraging the settlement of litigation through either the
recognition of the preclusive effect of a consent decree that gives rise
to res judicata or the enforcement of a "no-challenge" provision in a
settlement agreement. We now turn to Federal Circuit decisions in
which licensee patent validity challenges were acknowledged as
permissible, but only after a licensee fulfills certain prerequisites and
meets the jurisdictional requirements to bring the challenge.
Two Federal Circuit cases, Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v.
Shell Oil Co.4 18 and Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. ,419 set the stage for
the dispute that was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
MedImmune. In Shell Oil, Studiengesellschaft Kohle ("SGK")
granted a license to Shell under a patent that covered a process for
the manufacture of polypropylene pursuant to a license agreement in
which Shell was obligated to (1) pay royalties for the sales of
polypropylene manufactured using the patented process and (2)
provide SGK with a report regarding its entire polypropylene
production, including polypropylene manufactured using methods not
covered by the licensed patent. Shell subsequently introduced a new
method of polypropylene manufacture (the Seadrift Process) which,
according to Shell, was not covered by the licensed patent. Shell did
not pay royalties on the sales of polypropylene manufactured by the
new process nor provide SGK with an accounting of such sales. Upon
discovering Shell's breach of its contractual obligation, SGK
terminated the license agreement, brought an action for unpaid
royalties owed prior to the termination of the license, and sued Shell
for infringement based on Shell's use of the patented process
following the termination of the license. In response, Shell
challenged the validity of certain of the patent claims.
The district court in the case ruled that the challenged patent
claims were invalid and that the question of infringement of the other
claims was not properly before the court. With respect to SGK's
418. 112 F.3d 1561.
419. 359 F.3d 1376 (overruled in part by MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. 118).
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claim for royalties owed under the license agreement, the district
court certified the following question for consideration by the Federal
Circuit: "Where the Court has found the relevant patent claims
invalid, may the Licensor recover damages for breach of contract for
past royalties due on processes allegedly covered by such claims, from
the date of the alleged breach until the date that the Licensee first
challenged validity of the claims?"420 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
(1) affirmed the district court's invalidity judgment, (2) reversed the
district court's judgment regarding infringement and remanded the
issue for further consideration, and (3) answered the certified
question in the affirmative. For purposes of this Article, it is the
Federal Circuit's analysis of the certified question that is of
significance.
The Federal Circuit began its assessment of the certified question
in Shell Oil by evaluating the provisions of the patent license
agreement under consideration. The court concluded that, based
solely on the dictates of contract law, Shell was obligated to pay the
royalties owed prior to SGK's termination of the license agreement,
irrespective of whether the relevant patent claims were valid.
"Enforcement of these contract terms is not contingent upon validity
of the patent which defines the subject matter of the license.
Assuming that the Seadrift Process infringes claim 1 of the . . . patent
and thus fits within the terms of the license, Shell breached the license
by failing to pay royalties. Enforcement of the license, if the Seadrift
Process infringes the. . . patent, would require Shell to pay back
royalties." 42' The Federal Circuit then "examine[d]... the contract
for rare, but potential, conflicts between state contract law and
federal patent law."422 Citing the Lear decision,423 in which "the
Supreme Court prevented the enforcement of a valid royalty payment
agreement to facilitate a determination of patent validity," 424 the
Federal Circuit acknowledged its obligation in the case before it "to
420. 112 F.3d at 1562.
421. Id. at 1567.
422. Id.
423. The Federal Circuit in Shell Oil described the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision
in less than approving terms. In a frequently referenced clause from its Shell Oil opinion,
the Federal Circuit began its restatement of the Lear Court's rationale for its decision to
abrogate the doctrine of licensee estoppel with "In tones that echo from a past era of
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consider 'whether overriding federal policies would be significantly
frustrated' by enforcing the license." 425
In concluding that Shell was bound by its contractual
commitment to pay royalties pursuant to its license agreement with
SGK, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Lear, the Federal
Circuit presented two arguments. The first was based on the
"avoidance of injustice" argument that the Federal Circuit had relied
on in Diamond Scientific in support of the doctrine of assignor
estoppel. In the words of the court in Shell Oil,
[a]s in Diamond Scientific, this court detects no significant
frustration of federal patent policy by enforcing the ... license
agreement between Shell and SGK, to the extent of allowing
SGK to recover royalties until the date Shell first challenged the
validity of the claims. First, as in Diamond Scientific, Shell
executed a contractual agreement which produced significant
benefits for the corporation and attested to the worth of the
patent. Under the agreement (with its provision for Shell to
notify SGK of all polypropylene production), Shell had the
benefits of producing polypropylene insulated from unlicensed
competition, insulated from investigations of infringement, and
even insulated from royalties (until SGK's discovery of the
Seadrift Process). To these benefits, Shell now seeks to add the
benefit of abrogating its agreement and avoiding its breach of
the contract. Following the reasoning of Diamond Scientific,
this court must prevent the injustice of allowing Shell to exploit
the protection of the contract and patent rights and then later to
abandon conveniently its obligations under those same rights.
See Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1224-25. ... 426
Simply stated, the Federal Circuit concluded that the facts in
Shell Oil presented "circumstances in which the equities of the
contractual relationship ... between the parties."427 required that the
agreement between SGK and Shell be enforced, in spite of the federal
patent policy expressed in Lear.
The Shell Oil court then raised a second argument, based on its
determination that "Shell's apparent breach of its duty to notify
under the agreement is itself more likely to frustrate federal patent
425. Id. (quoting Lear, 395 U.S. at 673).
426. Id. at 1568.
427. Id. at 1567 (quoting Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1224-25).
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policy than enforcement of the contract." 428 As the Federal Circuit
explained,
Lear focused on the "full and free use of ideas in the public
domain." Lear, 395 U.S. at 674, 89 S.Ct. at 1913. By abrogating
its notification duty, Shell delayed a timely challenge to the
validity of the '698 patent and postponed the public's full and
free use of the invention of the '698 patent. Shell enjoyed the
protection of the license from 1987 until SGK became aware of
the Seadrift Process. Upon SGK's discovery of its Seadrift
process, Shell suddenly seeks the protection of the Lear policies
it flaunted for many years. However, a licensee, such as Shell,
cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i)
actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to
the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is
because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid. Other
circuits addressing this issue have arrived at the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast,
Inc., 706 F.2d 933, 936-37 (9th Cir.1983); Hull v. Brunswick
Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir.1983); American Sterilizer
Co. v. Sybron Corp., 614 F.2d 890, 897-98 (3d Cir.1980);.PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 706, 708 (6th
Cir.1976). [Emphasis added].429
The Federal Circuit concluded its opinion in Shell Oil by holding
that "[i]n this factual setting ... enforcement of the license according
to its terms, even if this entails a determination of whether the
Seadrift process infringes a now-invalidated patent, does not frustrate
federal patent policy."43 0 Accordingly, it remanded the case to the
district court for enforcement of Shell's contractual obligation to pay
royalties owed prior to Shell's patent validity challenge.
In retrospect, the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil decision is
significant for the italicized pronouncement in the above-quoted
excerpt ("the prerequisite statement"), rather than for the actual
holding in the case. The plain meaning of the prerequisite statement
is that in order for a patent licensee to invoke the protection of the
Lear doctrine (i.e., to be able to challenge the validity of a licensed
patent and be relieved of its royalty payment obligation during the
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pendency of the challenge and thereafter, if the challenge is
successful), the licensee must first cease the payment of royalties and
provide notice to the licensor that it has ceased the payment because
it has determined that the licensed patent is invalid. The problem
with the prerequisite statement is that patent licensors and courts
have attempted to expand its application to fact patterns that differ
significantly from that in Shell Oil and, thereby, make the cessation of
royalties with appropriate notice a requirement for a licensee patent
challenge in any context. For example, in a series of post-Shell Oil
decisions, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
431. See Revson v. Claire's Stores, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326-327 (S.D. New York
2000) ("[T]he doctrine of licensee estoppel is not entirely dead. The Kohle [v. Shell Oil
case ... stands for the proposition that a licensee is estopped to challenge the validity of a
licensed patent in defense of a claim for unpaid royalties 'until it (i) actually ceases
payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing
payment of royalties is because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid.' [112 F.3d
at 1568] But it does leave open the possibility that Lear, Inc. v. Adkins will be applied
once the licensee stops paying royalties on the grounds of alleged invalidity . . . .");
Advanced Card Technologies LLC v. Versatile Card Technology, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d.
158, 160-61 (S.D. New York 2006) ("I did not mean ... to suggest that the doctrine of
licensee estoppel had not been dealt a severe blow by the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,... (1969). However, as my esteemed colleague,
Judge Kaplan, noted several years ago, 'the doctrine of licensee estoppel is not entirely
dead.' Revson v. Claire's Stores, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (S.D.N.Y.2000) .... VCT
[the licensee] is estopped to challenge the validity of the patents in suit because it has
neither ceased payment of royalties nor notified plaintiff that the reason for cessation was
the claimed invalidity of the patents. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil
Co., 112 F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied,522 U.S. 996, 118 S.Ct. 560, 139 L.Ed.2d 401
(1997); ... It is undisputed that VCT has paid and continues to pay royalties to ACT [the
patentee] for all products that VCT believes are covered by Claims 8 of the '158 patent
and 1 of the '584 patent. It is also undisputed that VCT has refused to pay royalties to
ACT for other products it manufactures-the royalties that are the subject of this action-
only because it believes that those claims do not read on certain of its products, and not
because the claims are invalid. No party has suggested, and I have no reason to believe,
that VCT has ever notified ACT that the reason it is not paying the royalties that are the
subject of this action is that the claims in suit are invalid. Thus, the Kohle [v. Shell Oil]
exception to Lear applies. [Paragraphing omitted]"); Pony Pal. LLC v. Claire's Boutiques,
Inc., 2006 WL 846354 *3-4 (S.D. New York 2006) ("See Shell Oil, 112 F.3d at 1568, where
the court held that, in order for a licensee to avail himself of the doctrine embodied in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), i.e., that a licensee is not estopped from
challenging the validity of a patent, and to avoid liability for royalty payments on the basis
of patent invalidity, the licensee must (1) cease making royalty payments, and (2) give
notice to the patentee that the licensee contests the validity of the patent. The Federal
Circuit's rationale in Shell Oil was that a licensee who fails to challenge the validity of a
patent benefits by retaining the protection of the license while depriving the public of the
full and free use of the patented product by withholding a successful challenge to validity.
Accordingly, such a licensee should not be allowed to avoid liability for royalties for any
such time period on grounds of patent invalidity. See Revson v. Claire's Stores, Inc., 120 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 327 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (licensee cannot avoid liability for royalty payments on
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spoke of the prerequisite statement as creating an exception to Lear's
abrogation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel, leaving that court to
conclude that, despite Lear, "licensee estoppel is not entirely dead."43 2
And as discussed above in Part II of this Article, one of the contract-
based arguments of the licensor in MedImmune was that the
licensee's action for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity was
impermissible because the latter failed to meet the requirements to
bring the challenge by continuing to pay royalties under the license,
an argument that was acknowledged, but not resolved, by Justice
Scalia in his opinion.
A more limited interpretation of the meaning of the prerequisite
statement in Shell Oil is based on the recognition, noted above in this
Part III, that the two prongs of the Lear doctrine, while related, are
separable. It could be argued that the Federal Circuit's reference in
the Shell Oil prerequisite statement to the protection of the Lear
doctrine was not meant to include the patent challenge right but only
the right to avoid a royalty payment obligation. After all, the
question certified by the district court in Shell Oil involved the
recovery of past royalties due and not the requirements for a patent
validity challenge. The licensee's patent validity defense to the
licensor's claim for unpaid royalties was raised after the license
agreement had been terminated by the licensor for breach,
eliminating any question of licensee estoppel in the case. The
licensee in Shell Oil had breached the agreement by failing to pay
royalties on product sales that the licensor was initially unaware of
(i.e., a silent breach), and these were the payments that the licensee
sought to avoid making in light of the court's finding of patent
invalidity. For this reason, Shell Oil presented the unusual
circumstance in which a non-payment-of-royalties breach continued
to occur over a considerable period of time prior to the licensor
becoming aware of the breach and to the licensee challenging the
validity of the previously licensed patent. The language in Shell Oil
could be interpreted to mean that a licensee can challenge the validity
of a licensed patent whether or not it stops complying with its royalty
the basis of patent invalidity for that period of time before licensee both ceased making
royalty payments and notified patentee that validity was contested) (citing both Lear and
Shell Oil );see also Advanced Card Tech., LLC. v. Versatile Card Tech., Inc., 410 F.
Supp.2d 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y.2006). ('[The licensee] is estopped to challenge the validity of
the patents in suit because it has neither ceased payment of royalties nor notified plaintiff
that the reason for cessation was the claimed invalidity of the patents.') (citing Shell Oil)."
(footnotes omitted) (paragraphing omitted)).
432. Revson, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
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payment obligation; but, if the licensee wishes to avoid its royalty
payment obligation in the event that the licensed patent is ultimately
found to be invalid as a result of its patent challenge, the licensee
must have indicated to the licensor at the time it stopped making the
royalty payments that it stopped because it believed that the licensed
patent was invalid.433
The major objection to this alternative interpretation of the
prerequisite statement is Judge Rader's description in Gen-Probe43 of
the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil decision, which description must be
given special weight in light of the fact that Judge Rader also wrote
the Shell Oil opinion. In Gen-Probe, Judge Rader provided the
following explanatory comment after quoting the prerequisite
statement from Shell Oil: "This language posits that a licensee must,
at a minimum, stop paying royalties (and thereby materially breach
the agreement) before bringing suit to challenge the validity or scope
433. The declaratory judgment plaintiff in Medlmmune appears to have argued in
favor of this interpretation of the Shell Oil prerequisite statement on remand of the case to
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Medlmmune, Inc., 535
F.Supp.2d 1000. In noting that the Supreme Court in MedImmune had failed to resolve
the question of whether Lear applied only to a repudiating licensee or whether the Shell
Oil prerequisite statement was inconsistent with Lear, the district court repeated the
Supreme Court's statement that "[w]e express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiating
licensee is similarly relieved of its contract obligation during a successful challenge to a
patent's validity-that is, on the applicability of licensee estoppel under these
circumstances." MedImmune, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1016 (quoting MedImmune, Inc., 549
U.S. at 124). The district court then provided the following information in a footnote: "At
oral argument, Medimmune cited the 'successful challenge to a patent's validity' language
in the Supreme Court's decision as implying that a licensee could challenge validity-and
only the relief from the contract obligation under Lear was left undetermined." Id. at
1016 n.12. The district court did not comment further on this argument by MedImmune,
that could be interpreted as suggesting that the Shell Oil prerequisite statement applied
only to the royalty payment prong, and not the patent challenge prong, of the Lear
doctrine. Rather, as will be discussed in section III.C.4.c.iv. of this Article, the district
court in Medlmmune ruled that the Shell Oil holding should be confined to the unusual
facts in that case and it was, therefore, inapposite to the instant case. As to the above-
quoted statement by the Supreme Court, it should be noted that it was made in the
context of the Court's discussion of MedImmune's contractual obligation to pay royalties.
While the statement is, perhaps, not as clear as it might be, moving from an assessment of
MedImmune's contractual obligation to the applicability of licensee estoppel, it could be
read to mean that the Court did not intend to express an opinion as to whether, as in the
case of a repudiating licensee, a nonrepudiating licensee is permanently relieved of its
contractual obligation to pay royalties that accrued during the pendency of its patent
challenge (were such a challenge permitted following a ruling on the merits of any
contract-based arguments against it, which the Court in Medlmmune was not prepared to
make), if the patent-at-issue were ultimately held to be invalid.
434. 359 F.3d 1376.
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of the licensed patent."435 It would appear, then, that the Shell Oil
prerequisite statement was intended to apply to a licensee's patent
challenge right as well as the right to avoid a royalty payment
obligation, at least under certain circumstances.
Perhaps a better interpretation of the meaning of the Shell Oil
prerequisite statement can be derived from consideration of the
policy argument underlying the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision
and the regional circuit holdings that the Federal Circuit cited in Shell
Oil as consistent with the prerequisite statement.436  Under this
interpretation, the critical factor in determining whether or not a
licensee is permitted to challenge the validity of a licensed patent is
whether the licensee has taken an affirmative step to encourage the
early adjudication of invalidity in order to eliminate a worthless
patent. Such a step could come in the form of the cessation of royalty
payments under the license agreement with notice provided to the
licensor as to the reason (in the case of a repudiating licensee) or an
action brought by the licensee to contest the validity of the licensed
patent, even under circumstances in which the licensee continues to
pay royalties under the license agreement (in the case of a
nonrepudiating licensee in good standing). According to this view, it
is immaterial as to whether the licensee had received benefits under
the license agreement prior to its taking the affirmative step to
encourage the patent challenge, or continues to receive benefits as a
licensee in good standing following such step. Moreover, the date of
the licensee's affirmative step determines the point at which the
licensee's obligation to comply with the royalty payment provision of
its license agreement terminates.
In each of the regional circuit court opinions cited by the Federal
Circuit in Shell Oil (PPG, American Sterilizer, Rite-Nail and Hull), as
well as in the Shell Oil case itself, a fundamental question before the
court was whether the validity of the licensed patent was relevant to
the licensee's obligation under its license agreement to pay royalties
during the period that preceded an action by the licensee to
encourage the patent challenge. And in each case, including Shell
Oil, the court ruled that the answer to the question was no.437 The
435. Id. at 1381 (emphasis added).
436. See Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.1983); Hull
v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1983); Am. Sterilizer Co., 614 F.2d 890; PPG
Indus., Inc., 530 F.2d 700.
437. On the few occasions, other than in Shell Oil, where the Federal Circuit was asked
to specifically rule on a licensee's royalty payment obligation in the context of a patent
validity challenge in the aftermath of Lear, the court expressed its willingness to interpret
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licensee was bound by its agreement to pay royalties in consideration
for rights under the licensed patent, irrespective of the patent's
validity, until it undertook an action "of the type to prompt an early
adjudication of invalidity," 43 thereby furthering the public's interest
in eliminating specious patents. In Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS
Technologies, Inc.,439 the Ninth Circuit summarized the holdings in
PPG and American Sterilizer as follows:
A licensee remains obligated to pay all royalties under a
licensing agreement which accrue until it takes an affirmative
step that would prompt the early adjudication of the validity of
the patent, such as filing an action contesting the patent's
validity or notifying the licensor that the payments were being
stopped because the patent was believed to be invalid. PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Westwood Chemical, Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 701
the reach of Lear in a manner consistent with prior rulings of regional circuit courts. In
RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the Federal Circuit
reviewed a district court's denial of a claim for breach of contract damages resulting from
the failure of the licensee to pay royalties owed under the contract following its purported
notice to the licensor that it intended to challenge the licensed patent, which was
ultimately held to be invalid. In affirming the lower court's ruling, the Federal Circuit
provided the following view on the limits of the Lear decision:
RCA [the patent holder] appears to rely on Lear as mandating breach of contract
damages where a licensee does not pay royalties. Lear simply does not address
that issue... . Lear does not ... dictate ... what damages must be awarded for a
breach, or under what circumstances, if any, a licensee can recover royalties paid.
Those questions continue to be matters dependent on particular fact situations,
contract provisions and state contract law, albeit they must be resolved in
harmony with general principles discernible from Lear. See, e.g., . . . Rite-Nail
Pkg. Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933, ... (9th Cir.1983); Bristol Locknut Co.
v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 677 F.2d 1277 ... (9th Cir. 1982); PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700,... (6th Cir.),....
Id. at 1064. In Go Medical Industries, Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed.
Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit provided convincing evidence that its interpretation of the
royalty payment prong of the Lear doctrine was consistent with those of the regional
circuit courts discussed in this section that had opined on the matter. The issue on appeal
in Go Medical was whether the district court was correct in its determination of the point
in time at which the patent licensee in the case was relieved of its contractual obligation to
pay royalties following a finding in a third party infringement suit that the patent-at-issue
was invalid. Relying on its prerequisite statement from Shell Oil, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the district court had erred in its application of the Lear doctrine, in that
the lower court had prematurely relieved the licensee of its payment obligation while the
patent invalidity finding was still pending appeal and the licensee had neither stated its
reason for withholding its royalty payments nor filed its own declaratory judgment action
challenging the validity of the licensed patent.
438. PPG Indus., Inc., 530 F.2d at 706.
439. 677 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
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(6" Cir.) ... (1976); accord, American Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron
Corp., 614 F.2d 890, 895-98 (3rd Cir.),... (1980).4"
Echoing the position taken by the Sixth Circuit in PPG, the
Bristol Locknut court concluded that "[e]ither method of giving
adequate notice would fulfill the strong federal policy [articulated in
Lear] of prompting an early adjudication of patent validity.""'" 2
440. Id. at 1283 (footnote omitted).
441. Id. at 1283 n.7.
442. For additional regional circuit court cases addressing a licensee's royalty payment
obligation in the context of a patent validity challenge in the aftermath of Lear, see Troxel
Manufg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972) (Troxel 1), Troxel
Manufg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 489 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973) (Troxel II), Atlas Chem.
Indus., Inc., 509 F.2d 1, Warner-Jenkinson Co., 567 F.2d 184, St. Regis Paper Co., 552 F.2d
309 and Precision Shooting Equip. Co., 646 F.2d 313. That the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear
decision was viewed principally as a call for the early adjudication of patent invalidity is
underscored by the position taken by a number of regional circuit courts in post-Lear
royalty refund cases. Two of the regional circuit courts (the Sixth and the Ninth)
referenced by the Federal Circuit as supporting its Shell Oil prerequisite statement
addressed the question of "whether a licensee can recover royalties on a patent paid
before filing an action in which the patent was found to be invalid." St. Regis Paper Co.,
552 F.2d at 313. In St. Regis Paper, the Ninth Circuit provided the following summary of
the reasoning that it and the Sixth Circuit had relied on to conclude that no such royalty
recovery by the licensee should be permitted:
The Sixth Circuit considered the Lear doctrine in light of the goals sought to be
achieved and concluded that the federal policy which permits a licensee to assert
invalidity of the underlying patent does not entitle the licensee to a refund of all
royalties paid for the use of the invalid patent. See Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972) (Troxel I ); .... The Sixth Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court in Lear rejected the estoppel doctrine on the
ground that it effectively "muzzled" licensees who might be the only individuals
with sufficient economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an invention.
As stated in Lear, . . . 395 U.S. at 668, . . . "federal law requires that all ideas in
general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected
by a valid patent." This policy encourages full and free competition in the use of
ideas which are in the public domain. Lear, therefore, is an inducement to an
early adjudication of invalidity; but the Sixth Circuit cautioned that the
possibility of a royalty refund might delay such a determination. The possibility
of obtaining a refund of all royalties paid might induce a manufacturer to accept
a license based on a patent of doubtful validity, derive the benefits of suppressed
competition which the patent affords, and challenge validity only after the
patent's expiration. The licensee would have a chance to regain all the royalties
paid while having enjoyed the fruits of the license agreement. Therefore, if a
refund were permitted, licensees who were only recently unmuzzled by Lear
would again be silenced by economic self-interest rather than by state law. We
agree with the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit.
Id. at 314 (paragraphing omitted). An issue not addressed in St. Regis Paper and still
unresolved is whether a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing that continues to pay
royalties following its challenge of the licensed patent is entitled to a refund of those
royalty payments. See infra note 498 for a discussion of this issue by the United States
District Court for the Central District of California in its opinion in MedImmune on
remand.
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It is noteworthy that in only one of the four regional circuit court
cases referenced in the Shell Oil prerequisite statement was the
licensee's patent validity challenge barred, and insight into the
Federal Circuit's perspective on the patent challenge prong of the
Lear doctrine may be found in the distinction between the facts of
that case (Hull) and those of the other cited regional circuit court
cases (PPG, American Sterilizer and Rite Nail). In each of PPG,
American Sterilizer and Rite Nail, the patent licensee refused to make
royalty payments due under the license agreement and took an
affirmative step to encourage the early adjudication of the licensed
patent's validity (either in the form of a declaratory judgment action
or a notice to the patent holder challenging the patent). Moreover, in
each of these cases the royalty payment obligation under
consideration spanned a period that both preceded and followed the
action by the licensee questioning the patent's validity that
purportedly terminated the licensee's payment obligation. The issue
regarding the licensee's post-challenge payment obligation made the
patent's validity an essential element in the disposition of the case
and justified the patent challenge permitted by the court. In Hull,
however, the unpaid royalties sought by the patent holder all accrued
prior to the licensee's patent challenge. The licensee in that case had
ceased paying royalties due under a patent license agreement without
indicating the reason and subsequently terminated the agreement in
accordance with its terms. The patent holder was not informed that
its former licensee questioned the validity of its patent until it
received an answer to its complaint filed after the agreement had
terminated. Based on these facts, the Tenth Circuit in Hull concluded
that the validity of the patent had no bearing on the question before
the court and, accordingly, the patent challenge was not allowed. As
the Hull court explained,
Lear permits licensees to refuse to pay royalties on a patent
they believe to be invalid and then to defend an action for
royalties on the basis of patent invalidity.... [Lear v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653, 673-674 (1969)]. Courts interpreting Lear,
however, have focused on whether the suspension of royalty
payments is connected to the challenge to the patent's validity.
These cases hold that if licensees wish to preserve patent
invalidity as a defense to litigation over unpaid royalties, the
licensees must notify the licensors that they are suspending
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payments because they question the validity of the patents. See
Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 677 F.2d 1277,
1283 (9th Cir.1982); American Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp.,
614 F.2d 890, 895-98 (3d Cir.) ... (1980); PPG Industries, Inc. v.
Westwood Chemical, Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 706 (6th Cir.) ...
(1976); .... We agree that this limitation best effectuates the
policies enunciated in Lear.
One reason Lear permits licensees to suspend royalty payments
prior to a final judicial determination of validity is to discourage
licensors from delaying such a determination. The Court feared
that if licensees were required to continue making royalty
payments during the pendency of a validity challenge, licensors
would be encouraged to stall a judicial determination as long as
possible. See Lear, 395 U.S. at 673-74 .... If licensees are
permitted to suspend royalty payments without notifying
licensors that the reason for the suspension is to question the
validity of the patents, they will be subject to a similar
temptation to forestall validity litigation .... The longer they
could ... [stall] validity litigation, the greater the amount of
royalties they could avoid while still enjoying the monopoly
benefits conferred by the license. Permitting licensees to avoid
royalties that they suspended for reasons other than to
challenge validity would give the licensees "additional economic
incentive to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort
to postpone the day of final judicial reckoning." Id. at 673 ....
Limiting the royalties licensees can avoid to those accruing after
the licensees effectively notify the licensors that they question
the validity of the licensed patents prevents the rule in Lear
from being used to frustrate the policies enunciated there.43
By delaying the challenge of the licensed patent, the licensee in
Hull failed to advance the public interest, as articulated in Lear, in the
early adjudication of patent invalidity, and for that reason the Tenth
Circuit concluded that "the trial court properly ruled that invalidity
could not be a defense to the payment of royalties at issue in this
case."4' 4S The holding in Hull can also be viewed as a variation of
443. Hull, 704 F.2d at 1203-04.
444. Id. at 1204.
445. There is an important distinction between the facts in Hull and those in Shell Oil.
Whereas in both cases the patent challenge followed the termination of the applicable
license agreement, only in Hull was the payment obligation under consideration limited to
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the relevance rule of Rooklidge, discussed above in this Part III.46
The patent validity challenge in Hull was barred, not on the basis of a
formalistic application of the doctrine of licensee estoppel which the
Lear Court had rejected, but because the challenge was not relevant
to the specific royalty payment issue before the court. However,
unlike the relevance rule of Rooklidge, which held that the validity of
a licensed patent is irrelevant to the obligation of a patent licensee to
pay royalties that accrued over the period during which the licensee
enjoyed the benefits of the patent pursuant to the license agreement,
this variant of the relevance rule looks to the point at which the
licensee takes an affirmative step to encourage the challenge of the
licensed patent as the cut-off for the royalty payment obligation,
irrespective of whether the licensee continues to enjoy a benefit
under the license following such step.
One way, then, to reconcile the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil
opinion with the Lear decision is to conclude that a patent validity
challenge can be brought by a licensee if the validity of the patent is
relevant to the issue to be resolved between the licensee and the
patent holder. In Hull, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the validity
of the licensed patent was not relevant to the single issue before the
court, namely the obligation of the licensee to pay pre-challenge
royalties and, accordingly, the patent challenge was not allowed.
Whereas, in the other regional circuit court cases cited in Shell Oil
(i.e., PPG, American Sterilizer and Rite Nail), as well as in the Shell
Oil case itself, the resolution of at least one issue under consideration
by the court was dependent on the validity of the patent (i.e., the
licensee's obligation to make post-challenge payments) and the
patent challenge was permitted. Whether this interpretation of
patent challenge jurisprudence is reflective of the thinking of the
Federal Circuit when it handed down its opinion in Shell Oil is open
to question.
The problem with this interpretation of the Shell Oil opinion,
based on a review of the cited regional circuit court cases, is that it
does not support the broad reading of the Shell Oil prerequisite
statement that holds that, in all circumstances, a licensee must stop
paying royalties owed under its license agreement before it can
challenge the licensed patent. In particular, the interpretation does
a period prior to the patent challenge. In Shell Oil, Shell's obligation to make payments
for its continued use of the patented technology following its patent challenge was also at
issue in the case, making the validity of the patent "relevant."
446. See supra section IIl.A.4.; supra notes 136 and 137.
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not explain why a patent licensee that hopes to avoid future royalty
payments for rights under a licensed patent that it believes to be
invalid without risking the loss of those rights, such as the licensee in
MedImmune, cannot seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity while
continuing to meet its contractual payment obligations. Unlike the
circumstances in Hull and similar to the circumstances in PPG,
American Sterilizer and Rite Nail, in the MedImmune scenario the
validity of the patent under consideration is relevant to an issue
before the court (i.e., the licensee's post-challenge payment
obligation) and, accordingly, the licensee's patent challenge should be
permitted.
This specific issue was considered in two earlier regional circuit
cases that the Federal Circuit failed to address in its Shell Oil opinion.
In both Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp."' and
Precision Shooting Equipment Co. v. Allen,448 the regional circuit
court hearing the case on appeal permitted a patent licensee to bring
a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the licensed
patent while continuing to enjoy its benefit under the license
agreement by paying post-challenge royalties." The Second Circuit
in Warner-Jenkinson provided the following argument against the
need to withhold royalties prior to a patent validity challenge by a
licensee:
Addressing the question whether a patent licensee must
actually withhold royalty payments before he can challenge
validity, we conclude-as have most courts who have
447. 567 F.2d 184. The Federal Circuit did cite the Warner-Jenkinson case in its Shell
Oil decision, but not in reference to its articulation in Shell Oil of the prerequisite
statement. The Shell Oil court relied on the Warner-Jenkinson holding as support for its
argument that it would be unjust to permit Shell to reap the benefits of its license
agreement with SGK while avoiding its contractual obligation to pay royalties during the
period that proceeded its patent validity challenge. 112 F.3d at 1568.
448. 646 F.2d 313.
449. The holdings in the Warner-Jenkinson and Precision Shooting decisions differ in
that in the former the Second Circuit required that royalty payments be made to the
licensor directly while in the latter the Seventh Circuit permitted the royalties to be paid
into the court's escrow account. This difference, which is not relevant to the point being
made in this paragraph, does not reflect a conflict between the circuits in that the Second
Circuit in Warner-Jenkinson had ruled that payments could be made into an escrow
account where there is an indication that the licensor might be judgment-proof at the
conclusion of the litigation, and the Seventh Circuit in the Precision Shooting case had
concluded that if the licensee were to make payments directly to the licensor, the licensee
"would have no adequate remedy at law to recoup the post-challenge royalties." 646 F.2d
at 321.
379379
380 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
considered the issue-that such repudiation of the licensing
agreement should not be precondition to suit.... Under most
licensing arrangements, as in the present case, withholding of
royalty payments constitutes a material breach of the contract.
A licensee who wishes to continue using the patented element
cannot withhold royalty payments without laying himself open
to large potential liability for infringement and an injunction
against all future use of the patented substance. If forced to
make the hard choice, many licensees will choose the less
perilous course, and the patents under which they are licensed
will remain uncontested. Lear established that removing
restraints on commerce caused by improperly-held patents
should be considered more important than enforcing promises
between contracting parties. Thus, the seeming inequity of
allowing a licensee to keep his license while he attacks the
validity of the licensor's patent is outweighed by the public
interest in placing no impediment in the way of those in the best
position to contest the validity of the underlying patent.450
It is unclear as to why the Federal Circuit in Shell Oil, when it
articulated its prerequisite statement, neglected to address the
argument offered by the Second Circuit in Warner-Jenkinson against
the need to withhold royalties prior to a licensee patent validity
challenge. However, as noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court in
MedImmune refused to opine on the merits of the Federal Circuit's
Shell Oil prerequisite statement. Accordingly, the prerequisite
statement is binding on the lower federal courts and must be taken
into account by these courts when relevant to a matter under
consideration. As will be discussed in section III.C.4.c.iv. below, this
is precisely what happened in MedImmune on remand to the District
Court for the Central District of California, where the court
acknowledged that the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil prerequisite
statement is controlling law but the Shell Oil holding was
distinguishable on the basis of the peculiar facts in that case.451
The Shell Oil decision remains a source of uncertainty regarding
the scope of the right of a licensee to challenge the validity of a
licensed patent. The impact of that uncertainty was diminished,
however, with the subsequent introduction by the Federal Circuit in
450. 567 F.2d at 187-88 (citations omitted).
451. MedImmune, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000.
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Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.452 of an additional barrier to a licensee
patent validity challenge, one that was jurisdictional in nature. In that
case, Gen-Probe took a license to practice the Vysis' patent as part of
a settlement of an unrelated litigation. Gen-Probe then filed a
declaratory judgment lawsuit alleging that the Vysis patent was
invalid and that the Gen-Probe product did not infringe any claims of
the patent. Gen-Probe, however, remained a nonrepudiating licensee
in good standing by continuing to pay the royalties due under the
license agreement, albeit under protest, and by complying with its
other contractual obligations. The district court in the case ruled in
favor of Gen-Probe, holding that the patent-at-issue was invalid. On
appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in
favor of the declaratory judgment plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction to
hear the merits of the case in the absence of an actual controversy
between the parties.
The Federal Circuit's holding in Gen-Probe formed the basis for
its ruling in MedImmune v. Genentech453 and, as noted in Part II of
this Article, was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in the latter
case. Having already reviewed the jurisdictional arguments relied on
by the Federal Circuit in Gen-Probe and rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court in MedImmune, we need not restate them here. The
Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe opinion remains instructive, however, in
that it may still reflect the Federal Circuit's views on the scope of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision. In distinguishing the Lear
decision, the Federal Circuit in Gen-Probe provided the following
assessment:
The district court also relied on Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 89 S.Ct. 1902, 23 L.Ed.2d 610 (1969), wherein the Supreme
Court explained that a license does not alone bar the licensee
from challenging the validity of a patent. See, e.g., Flex-Foot,
Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir.2001). The Lear
doctrine, however, does not grant every licensee in every
circumstance the right to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent. In several instances, this court has declined to apply the
Lear doctrine. Id. at 1368-70; Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H.
v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir.1997); Foster
v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Fed. Cir.1991); ...
Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350-51 (Fed. Cir.1988);
452. 359 F.3d 1376 (overruled in part by MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. 118).
453. 427 F.3d 958.
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Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224-25
(Fed. Cir.1988). Among these clarifications of the Lear
principle, Shell Oil is particularly relevant, though not factually
identical, to this case. In Shell Oil, this court decided that a
licensee is liable for unpaid royalties that accrued under the
terms of the license before invalidation of the subject patent's
claims. While that case did not discuss jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, this court stated: "[A] licensee...
cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i)
actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to
the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is
because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid." Shell
Oil, 112 F.3d at 1568. This language posits that a licensee must,
at a minimum, stop paying royalties (and thereby materially
breach the agreement) before bringing suit to challenge the
validity or scope of the licensed patent.454
With the elimination in MedImmune of the Gen-Probe
jurisdictional barrier to a licensee patent validity challenge, the
uncertainty generated by the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil opinion
(which the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on) assumes greater
significance.
* "Challenge-but-face-the-consequence" Decisions
In Gen-Probe, Judge Radar interpreted his Shell Oil prerequisite
statement as requiring a licensee to materially breach its license
agreement by withholding royalty payments in order to bring a suit to
challenge the validity of the licensed patent.455 As discussed in the
preceding section, there is a question as to whether the Federal
Circuit intended to have this challenge requirement apply in all
circumstances. Judge Radar's comment is noteworthy for another
reason, however, in that it highlights one of the central questions to
be addressed in this Article, namely, is it consistent with the "spirit of
Lear" to expose a licensee that brings a patent challenge in
furtherance of the public's interest in eliminating worthless patents to
the possibility of an unwanted consequence, e.g., the termination of
its license agreement and its rights under the patent? Stated another
way, does the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lear, which protects
a patent licensee's right to challenge the licensed patent, require that
454. 359 F.3d at 1381.
455. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1381.
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the licensee be given some incentive to challenge or every possible
incentive? If the former is true, then the fact that a licensee faces the
potential of a negative consequence in challenging a patent would not
necessarily be inconsistent with the "spirit of Lear." If the latter is
true, however, a significant unwanted consequence resulting from a
licensee's patent challenge would be impermissible. In this section,
we discuss a number of Federal Circuit holdings in which the court
acknowledged that, in the event that a patent licensee materially
breaches its license agreement in the exercise of its Lear-protected
right to challenge the licensed patent, it could lose its rights under the
patent license. While each of these "challenge-but-face-the-
consequence" decisions preceded the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Medlmmune, the MedImmune Court did not address the
"incentive" issue, and the Federal Circuit's holdings in these cases as
they relate to this issue remain good law.
In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz,45 a case that predated Gen-Probe,
the Federal Circuit held that a patent licensee could meet the
jurisdictional requirement to bring a declaratory judgment action to
declare the licensed patent invalid while the license agreement was
still in effect. At first glance, the holding in Bard would appear to
conflict with the Federal Circuit's subsequent holdings in Gen-Probe
and MedImmune. However, as noted in Gen-Probe, the licensee in
Bard was not a licensee in good standing. It had ceased paying
royalties under the agreement to the licensor, enabling the licensor to
terminate the agreement at any time and bring an infringement suit
against the licensee. The Bard court concluded that, "[i]n light of the
totality of the circumstances," the licensee in the case had a
reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit that qualified as a
federal controversy required for jurisdiction.458
What is significant for purposes of this section is that the Federal
Circuit's jurisdictional argument in favor of the patent challenge was
predicated on the ability of the licensor in Bard to terminate the
license agreement as a result of the licensee's having materially
breached the agreement by bringing the challenge and withholding
royalty payments. The license agreement in the case provided in
pertinent part that "[i]n the event... [the licensee] asserts invalidity
of any of the said Patents within the scope of this Agreement and
refuses to pay royalties on account of such asserted invalidity, then
456. CR. Bard, Inc., 716 F.2d 874.
457. 359 F.3d at 1380.
458. CR. Bard, Inc., 716 F.2d 874.
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GRANTOR may terminate this Agreement as to the Patent or
Patents as to which invalidity is asserted."459 While the licensor in
Bard did not, in fact, terminate the license agreement, the court
concluded that it could unilaterally do so "under the very terms of the
agreement,, 460 and the licensee had no ability to prevent the
termination and a subsequent infringement suit.
The Federal Circuit did not consider the enforcement of the
"termination-for-challenge-and-failure-to-pay-royalties" clause in the
Bard license agreement as incompatible with the "spirit of Lear."
While the right of the licensee in Bard to bring the patent challenge
was protected under Lear, the consequence of its challenge and its
failure to pay the agreed-to royalties that created the controversy in
the case necessary to meet the jurisdictional requirement put the
licensee at risk for losing its rights under the agreement should the
licensor elect to terminate it. This "challenge-but-face-the-
consequence" ruling in Bard reflected the Federal Circuit's view that
the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear holding did not require that a licensee
be given every possible incentive to challenge the validity of a licensed
patent, including relief from all related contractual obligations that
would otherwise bind the licensee.
This view was also evident in the Federal Circuit's subsequent
decision in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc.461 That case involved an
appeal of a district court's order (1) permitting a licensee to deposit
into an escrow account all future royalties due under a patent license
agreement during the pendency of the licensee's declaratory
judgment action to invalidate the licensed patent, and (2) enjoining
the licensor from terminating the license agreement based on the
licensee's failure to make royalty payments pursuant to the
agreement, thereby protecting the licensee from a patent
infringement counterclaim. In vacating the order of the district court,
the Federal Circuit stated that "we find no authority in Lear for
establishing an escrow account for royalties due pendente lite or
preliminarily enjoining a licensor from cancelling the license
agreement and, thus, from counterclaiming for patent infringement
when this material breach of the license occurs." 462  The court
concluded that "[the] public policy statement [in Lear] does permit a
licensee to cease payments due under a contract while challenging the
459. Id. at 881 n.5.
460. Id.
461. 780 F.2d 991.
462. Id. at 995.
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validity of a patent. It does not permit the licensees to avoid facing
the consequences that such an action would bring. The holding of
Lear only prevents the affirmative enforcement by the licensor of the
royalty payment provisions of the license agreement while the
patent's validity is being challenged by the licensee."43 In adopting
this "challenge-but-face-the-consequence" perspective, the Federal
Circuit relied on the Second Circuit's reasoning in Warner-Jenkinson,
a case in which a licensee challenging the licensed patent was
prevented from paying royalties into an escrow account.
Characterizing the Warner-Jenkinson reasoning as "in keeping with
the holding of and policy statements in Lear,"45 the Cordis court
offered the following excerpt from that Second Circuit case (where
the licensees were the plaintiffs and the patent holder was the
defendant):
We believe that if the plaintiffs wish to continue to invoke the
protections of their licensing agreements, they should be
required to continue paying their royalties to the defendant.
Ultimately, all royalties paid after the filing of the complaint
may have to be returned to the plaintiffs .... At present,
plaintiffs already have the option of withholding royalties and
thereby breaching the licensing agreement; of course, they
would then run the risk of an injunction if they should lose on
the merits. It would not be fair for the plaintiffs to be allowed
simultaneously to reap all the benefits of the licensing
agreement and to deprive the licensor of all his royalties.
Patents are presumed to be valid . . ; until invalidity is proven,
the patentee should ordinarily be permitted to enjoy the fruits
of his invention. The principal effect of an escrow arrangement
would be to put undeserved pressure on the defendant.
463. Id.
464. 567 F.2d 184; see also this section III.C.4.c.iii. (Licensee Patent Validity
Challenges; Prerequisites and Jurisdictional Barriers).
465. Cordis, 780 F.2d at 995.
466. Id. (quoting from Warner-Jenkinson, 567 F.2d at 188-89, with emphasis added by
the Federal Circuit in Cordis). See also Nebraska Engineering Corp., 557 F.2d. 1257, a
decision favorably cited by the Federal Circuit in Cordis for its reliance on the reasoning
set forth in Warner-Jenkinson ("Lear prevents only the affirmative enforcement of royalty
payment provisions in license agreements against licensees engaged in patent validity
challenges. Thus, . . . [the licensee] was free to cease paying royalties. Nothing in Lear,
however, precludes defendant [licensor] from treating such nonpayment as grounds for
termination under the agreement. Unless . . . [the licensee] is willing to forego the safety
of the license agreement, it should continue to comply with the agreement's provisions."
557 F.2d at 1259-60.
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In addition to serving as another example of the Federal Circuit's
willingness to limit the scope of the Lear holding by subjecting a
challenging licensee to an unwanted consequence, the Cordis decision
is noteworthy for two other reasons. First, in contrast to the Bard
case, the Federal Circuit in Cordis considered the withholding of
agreed-to royalties by a patent licensee to be a material breach of the
license agreement that provided the licensor with a right of
termination, even in the absence of an express provision in the
contract addressing that circumstance. Second, and more
importantly, by concluding that the licensee in Cordis was required to
pay royalties directly to the licensor if the former intended to
maintain its benefits under the license agreement during the
pendency of its patent challenge, the Federal Circuit implicitly
sanctioned a declaratory judgment action seeking patent invalidity by
a licensee in good standing that had neither complied with the
dictates of the Shell Oil prerequisite statement nor met the
jurisdictional requirement to challenge recognized in Gen-Probe.
The Federal Circuit's Cordis decision is consistent with the view that
a licensee may challenge the validity of a licensed patent whether or
not it stops paying royalties to the licensor, but the licensee cannot
avoid the risk of agreement termination by the licensor for material
breach if it pays the royalties into an escrow account and not to the
licensor. Interpreted in that way, the Cordis decision closely tracks
that of the Second Circuit in Warner-Jenkinson, a case that was
applauded in Cordis, but largely ignored in Shell Oil and not
addressed in Gen-Probe. This apparent inconsistency in the Federal
Circuit's rulings presents some difficulty in defining the position of
that circuit with respect to the scope of Lear. However, looking at the
more recent rulings of the Federal Circuit (Shell Oil and Gen-Probe)
it would appear that, in the years leading up to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in MedImmune, the Federal Circuit had solidified its
stance against a broad reading of the Lear holding (that would permit
a licensee in good standing to challenge a licensed patent) and took
increasingly aggressive positions in limiting that holding when
presented with the opportunity.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,467 the last case to be
discussed in this section, the Federal Circuit again ruled that a
licensee that challenged the validity of the licensed patent risks losing
467. 226 F.3d 1334.
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its rights under the patent if it fails to meet its contractual obligation
to make royalty payments. The patentee/licensor in the case, Dow,
commenced a suit against its licensee, the U.S. Government, for
damages for the government's failure to pay royalties allegedly due
under a patent license agreement. In the alternative, Dow sought
reasonable royalties for the government's infringement of the
licensed patent, having previously notified the government that it was
terminating the license on the basis of the government's contractual
breach in failing to pay royalties. The Court of Federal Claims "held
that the ... patent was not invalid and was infringed by the
government" and "that the government's non-payment of royalties
and repudiation of the license constituted a material breach that
warranted voiding the contract ab initio."a On appeal, the
government challenged the court's holding that the patent-in-suit was
valid and infringed and that the license was void ab initio.
The government's ability (as a licensee) to challenge the validity
of the licensed patent was not at issue in this case. Even if the
government were to prevail in its claim that the license agreement
had not been properly terminated by Dow, the government had both
withheld royalties allegedly owed under the agreement and had
informed Dow of its doubts as to the validity of the licensed patent
prior to its challenge, satisfying the requirements established in Shell
Oil. Regarding the judgment that the license was void, the Federal
Circuit concluded that although the patent license agreement was not
rendered void ab initio by the actions of the government, Dow had
the right to terminate the agreement, despite the absence of an
express termination provision. The court first dismissed the lower
court's ruling that because the government had never performed
under the license agreement and had indicated to Dow that that was
its intention, the termination of the agreement by Dow had ab initio
effect, constituting a rescission that voided the contract from its
inception. The Federal Circuit argued that "[b]ecause rescission is
essentially an equitable remedy, it will not ordinarily be invoked
where money damages-in this case damages for breach of contract-
will adequately compensate a party to the contract ... [and] [n]either
Dow nor the Court of Federal Claims has pointed to any reason why
contract damages for breach are not adequate here."49 The Federal
Circuit then addressed the government's claim that the license
agreement could not be properly terminated by Dow in the absence
468. Id. at 1337.
469. Id. at 1345-46.
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of an express provision permitting such termination for nonpayment
of royalties. It argued that a material breach or repudiation of an
agreement gives rise to a right of termination. In the instant case,
"[t]he government's challenge to the validity of the patent and the
viability of the license, together with the refusal to pay any royalties,
made the absence of a termination clause in the license immaterial ...
[and] ... a termination right is properly implied." 47 0
Interestingly, by the time the Federal Circuit rendered its
decision in Dow (seventeen years after Bard, fifteen years after
Cordis and three years after Shell Oil), any concern on the part of the
court that permitting a licensor to terminate its license agreement
based on a patent-challenging licensee's refusal to pay agreed-to
royalties would violate the "spirit of Lear" was so significantly
diminished that the Dow court addressed this issue in a lone footnote.
In responding to the government's argument that its license
agreement had been improperly terminated by Dow, the Federal
Circuit offered the following succinct analysis:
In support of its argument the government cites the public
policy arguments in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653...
(1969). The Court of Federal Claims noted that Lear does
allow a licensee to cease payments due under a license while
challenging the validity of a patent, but that it does not permit
the licensee to avoid the consequences that such actions would
bring. See Dow II [Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 32 Fed.
Cl. 11 (1994)] at 16 (citing Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780
F.2d 991, 995 ... (Fed. Cir.1985)). The court concluded that the
policy rationale of Lear does not prevent Dow from terminating
the license agreement. In RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887
F.2d 1056, 1064 ... (Fed.Cir.1989), this court stated that "Lear
does not ... deal with a licensor's right to terminate or rescind a
license agreement .... " We therefore reject the government's
471
contention as to the applicability of Lear to this case.
In sum, each of the three cases discussed in this section (Bard,
Cordis and Dow) demonstrates a willingness on the part of the
Federal Circuit to limit the applicability of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Lear decision and to hold a licensee that challenges the validity of a
licensed patent accountable for a contractual breach related to the
470. Id. at 1346.
471. Id.at1344n.11.
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challenge.472 In taking that position, the Federal Circuit adopted a
narrow interpretation of the meaning of the "spirit of Lear" that was
limited by the facts in Lear and the actual language of the opinion in
the case, with little extrapolation. The Federal Circuit's reference in
Dow to its prior holding in RCA Corp. is instructive in this regard.
The Dow court accurately quoted from RCA Corp. in noting that
"Lear does not ... deal with a licensor's right to terminate or rescind
a license agreement." 473  However, the Federal Circuit in Dow
neglected to complete the thought expressed in RCA Corp. The
sentence in the RCA Corp. opinion that followed the above-quoted
language made the point that the question of whether a licensor had a
right to terminate or rescind a license agreement in the aftermath of
Lear "continue[s] to be [a] matter ... dependent on particular fact
situations, contract provisions and state contract law, albeit ... [it]
must be resolved in harmony with general principles discernible from
Lear. 474
Restated in more general terms, the Federal Circuit in RCA
Corp. was expressing the view that, with respect to an issue as to
which the Lear opinion was silent, a court addressing that issue had
the latitude to determine the applicability of the Lear holding, based
on a consideration of the facts in the case, the dictates of any
472. Another case that has been cited as an example of the willingness of the Federal
Circuit to limit the applicability of Lear and bind a party that challenges the validity of a
patent to its contractual obligations is Sun Studs, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, overruled on other
grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir
1992). See references to this case in Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 112 F.3d at 1567 and Gen-
Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1381. In Sun Studs, the Federal Circuit permitted a patent validity
challenge by an assignor (not licensee) of a patent, but held the challenger liable for the
consequences of the contractual breach caused by the challenge. In essence, the court in
this case concluded that (1) the assignor's contractual obligation to protect, defend and
enforce the assigned patents (which the district court viewed as an agreement not to
contest the assigned patents' validity) was not against the public policy expressed in Lear,
(2) the assignor was not estopped, however, under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from
challenging the validity of the assigned patents (which doctrine, according to the court in
Diamond, is not applied automatically but only when a balancing of the equities in a
particular case justifies its application), and (3) nonetheless, the challenge by the assignor
constituted a material breach of its contractual obligation to protect, defend and enforce
the assigned patents and, accordingly, such breach relieved the assignee (under the
relevant state law) of its contractual obligation to pay royalties to the assignor. In Sun
Studs, then, the Federal Circuit provided yet another example of a "challenge-but-face-
the-consequence" decision.
473. Dow Chem. Co., 226 F.3d at 1344 n.I1 (quoting RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp.,
887 F.2d 1056, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
474. 887 F.2d at 1064, citing, inter alia, the Federal Circuit's Cordis decision. For a
further discussion of RCA Corp., see supra note 437.
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applicable state contract law and the "general principles discernable
from Lear." As evidenced by the holdings in Bard, Cordis and Dow,
the Federal Circuit had determined that permitting a patent licensor
to terminate its license agreement with a patent-challenging licensee
that had failed to comply with its contractual obligation to pay
royalties was compatible with the public policy rationale underlying
Lear of encouraging early adjudication of patent invalidity. In
keeping with its reputation for being protective of the rights of a
patent holder, the Federal Circuit had concluded in these cases that
"the 'spirit of Lear' cannot logically demand that any and all rules of
contact law ... be ignored to give licensees every possible incentive to
challenge patent validity."47
iv. MedImmune Revisited
As noted in Part II of this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court in
MedImmune did not rule on the merits of the contract-based
arguments against a patent validity challenge by a nonrepudiating
licensee in good standing. In particular, the MedImmune Court failed
to resolve the question of whether the Supreme Court's prior holding
in Lear, abrogating the doctrine of licensee estoppel, extends to a
nonrepudiating licensee or whether the Shell Oil prerequisite
statement is inconsistent with that holding. These questions were
addressed, however, by the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California in its decision in MedImmune on remand of the
case by the Supreme Court.476 After an analysis of the relevant case
law, the district court in MedImmune concluded that (1) the Federal
Circuit's holding in Shell Oil was limited to the unusual facts in that
case and was, therefore, inapposite to the instant case, and (2) the
Lear Court's abrogation of licensee estoppel applied to the dispute
under consideration, protecting the right of Medlmmune, a
nonrepudiating licensee in good standing, to challenge the validity of
the Genentech patent-at-issue. In this section of the Article, we
review the arguments of the MedImmune district court in support of
its conclusions in the case.
In the interval between the Supreme Court's ruling in
MedImmune and the district court's hearing of the case on remand,
MedImmune had stipulated that, but for its license agreement with
Genentech, the production of its Synagis product would infringe one
475. McCarthy, (Part II), supra note 321 at 568.
476. MedImmune, Inc., 535 F. Supp.2d 1000.
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(but only one) of the claims (Claim 33) of the Genentech patent
under consideration in the case (the '415 Patent). In response,
Genentech had filed "an unconditional, irrevocable covenant not to
sue [for infringement] or seek royalties (from MedImmune) with
respect to Synagis on any Claim of the '415 Patent other than Claim
33.",477 On the basis of analyses not relevant to our discussion here,
the district court concluded that the Genentech covenant not to sue
for infringement had extinguished subject matter jurisdiction as to all
of the claims of the '415 Patent except Claim 33. With respect to that
claim, however, an actual case or controversy adequate to support a
declaratory judgment claim of invalidity existed. There remained,
therefore, the need for the district court to address Genentech's
argument that, as a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing,
MedImmune was barred from challenging the validity of Claim 33 by
the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
The district court summarized the Genentech position as follows:
Genentech asserts that licensee estoppel bars MedImmune's
patent invalidity claim because MedImmune has not repudiated
the contract. It argues that the 1969 Supreme Court decision in
Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 ... (1969), which "resolved the
issue of licensee estoppel by writing its obituary," Diamond
Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1223
(Fed.Cir.1988), should be distinguished on the grounds that
MedImmune is a nonrepudiating licensee. Genentech
buttresses this argument by explaining that recent courts,
including the Federal Circuit, have declined to extend Lear.
Moreover, it notes that the Federal Circuit in
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561
(Fed.Cir.1997) ("Kohle "), expressly imposes a repudiation
requirement on the invocation of Lear. Because that
requirement has not been met, Genentech reasons,
MedImmune is estopped from challenging patent
validity False 478
The MedImmune response was "that Lear does apply because its
fundamental holding was broad enough to cover nonrepudiating
477. Id. at 1003.
478. Id. at 1012.
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licensees, and Kohle [v. Shell Oil] is inapplicable because of the
narrow question in front of the Federal Circuit in that case."479
The district court began its analysis of the patent challenge
question in MedImmune by summarizing the Supreme Court's Lear
decision, which it described as the "definitive statement on licensee
estoppel doctrine." 480 The district court then turned to a brief review
of selected post-Lear regional circuit and district court cases that
preceded the establishment of the Federal Circuit. It cited
Massillon,481 Panther Pumps,48 Atlas Chemical Industries, 483 Beckman
Instruments,484 American Sterilizer,485 and Timely Products486 as cases
that "if nothing else, indicate that courts applied the policy rationale
behind Lear, [rather than a reliance on its specific holding,] to other
factual scenarios where patent invalidity was raised in an agreement
between licensor and licensee." 487 The district court next addressed
the Federal Circuit's treatment of the Lear decision. It concluded
that, while the Federal Circuit had initially endorsed the policies
behind the Lear holding (citing Bard and Cordis), that court had
"[m]ore recently ... distinguished Lear in several instances"488 (citing
Diamond Scientific, Hemstreet, Foster and Flex-Foot ). The Federal
Circuit's decision in Shell Oil was reviewed in some detail by the
MedImmune district court, which described the Shell Oil case as
noteworthy for the unusual facts that it presented for consideration.
The district court ended its review of the relevant case law by
noting that the Supreme Court provided "little doctrinal guidance" 489
in its MedImmune decision regarding the right of a nonrepudiating
licensee in good standing to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent. As the district court explained,
479. Id. at 1012-13.
480. Id. at 1013.
481. Massillion-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co., 444 F.2d 425; see supra section II.C.4.c.ii.
& notes 332 & 333.
482. 468 F.2d 225; see infra section IV.B.1 and supra note 332.
483. 509 F.2d 1; see supra notes 334, 336 and 442.
484. 433 F.2d 55; see supra note 337.
485. 526 F.2d 542; see supra note 334.
486. 465 F. Supp. 91; see supra note 372.
487. 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 1016.
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[the Supreme Court] .. . stated only that Lear certainly applied
to repudiating licensees, but "expressed no opinion on whether
a nonrepudiating licensee is similarly relieved of its contract
obligation during a successful challenge to a patent's validity-
that is, on the applicability of licensee estoppel under these
circumstances." . . . [549 U.S. 118, 124 (2007)]. The Court cited
the two-prong rule provided by the Federal Circuit in Kohle [v.
Shell Oil] but did not address whether that rule was consistent
with Lear, or whether that rule was inapplicable to the present
scenario.4 9 491
In the absence of the necessary guidance from the Supreme
Court, the MedImmune district court was required to provide its own
assessment of the case law relevant to a patent validity challenge by a
nonrepudiating licensee, recognizing its obligation to consider binding
Federal Circuit precedent. It first argued in support of its conclusion
that the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil decision "Does Not Prohibit
MedImmune's Invocation of Lear Because It Dealt With a
Significantly Different Factual Scenario."4 2 According to the district
court, while the language of Shell Oil appeared to prevent
MedImmune's reliance on the protection of the Lear doctrine
because it had failed to cease paying royalties as required by the first
prong of the prerequisite statement, "that language taken out of
context extends the holding far beyond the rest of the case." 493 The
MedImmune district court viewed the Shell Oil holding as addressing
"whether Shell could be held liable for past-due royalties where [the]
patent was later held invalid, in light of the fact that Shell had delayed
adjudication of validity by clandestinely continuing to operate under
the agreement."4 94  Narrowly interpreted in that way, two key
distinctions between the factual scenario in Shell Oil and that in
MedImmune justified the district court's conclusion that the Shell Oil
holding was inapposite to the instant case. First, unlike Shell that had
490. Id. (footnote omitted).
491. The district court in MedImmune did note that the Supreme Court, in its prior
opinion in the case, expressed skepticism as to the strength of the contract-based argument
against a patent challenge by a nonrepudiating licensee. However, as discussed in Part II
of this Article, the Supreme Court did not rule on this matter, as such a ruling would be a
decision on the merits of the argument, which the Court was not required to make in order
to resolve the jurisdictional issue before it in MedImmune.
492. 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
493. Id. at 1016-17.
494. Id. at 1017 (emphasis added).
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delayed a timely challenge to the validity of the licensed patent,
Medlmmune had affirmatively sought a declaratory judgment that
the patent-at-issue was invalid. Viewed from that prospective, Shell's
actions frustrated the Lear policy of early adjudication of patent
invalidity while MedImmune's actions furthered that policy. The
district court acknowledged that, as in Shell Oil, "MedImmune
continues to benefit in some ways by retaining the protection of the
license." 495  But the court emphasized that, unlike in Shell Oil,
"MedImmune is not 'depriving the public of the full and free use of
the patented product by withholding a successful challenge to
validity."' 496 This critical difference between Shell Oil and
MedImmune led the district court to conclude that "[a] party can
'challenge' the validity of a patent [in a manner consistent with the
Lear public policy rationale] by ceasing payment of royalties and
notifying the licensor of its beliefs, or by affirmatively seeking
declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid, as Medlmmune has
done here."497
The second key distinction, in the opinion of the district court,
was that the only royalties at issue in MedImmune were those that
were owed on a "going forward" basis.498 In contrast, in Shell Oil and
other cases that had relied on the Shell Oil prerequisite statement,
495. Id.
496. Id. quoting from Pony Pal, 2006 WL 846354, at *3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14962
at *8.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1010 n.7 ("At oral argument, MedImmune stated that it may seek
restitution if the patent is invalidated, but emphasized that 'the highlight if [sic] [its] claim
is that [it does not] owe any money going forward.' See Jan. 14 Hearing Tr. 52:16-52:17
(emphasis added)."). It is noteworthy in this regard that the Medlmmune district court
declined to opine on whether MedImmune was entitled to recover royalties paid during
the pendency of its patent challenge in the event that the Genentech patent-at-issue was
ultimately held to be invalid or, more generally, on the point in time at which a licensee is
relieved of its contractual royalty payment obligation in the event of a successful patent
challenge. ("The Court expressly declines to reach the issue of whether MedImmune can
recover back royalties (i.e. royalties already paid) if the patent is deemed invalid. As noted
earlier, the Court also declines to address at this point whether MedImmune is
immediately relieved of its contract obligation upon that event." 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000,
1018 (C.D. California 2008)). The district court justified its decision to avoid these issues
on the grounds that (1) any ruling would be advisory in that the Genentech patent had not
been invalidated, and (2) the only question that the district court was required to answer
in deciding the case before it was whether MedImmune's royalty payment obligation was
impacted by the validity of the Genentech patent (which the court had determined it was)
and not the question of at what point in time is a licensee that successfully challenges the
licensed patent relieved of its royalty payment obligation or whether it is entitled to
restitution for royalties already paid.
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e.g., Revson v. Claire's Stores, Inc.m and Advanced Card Technologies
LLC v. Versatile Card Technology, Inc.," past-due royalties were at
stake. And it was not simply past-due royalties, but royalties that had
accrued prior to the licensee's challenge of the licensed patent. While
not explicitly stated in its opinion, the argument of the MedImmune
district court appears to be that a patent licensee can invoke the
protection of the Lear doctrine (i.e., the right to challenge the validity
of the licensed patent and to obtain relief from its royalty payment
obligations), only if and when it takes an affirmative step encouraging
the challenge of the licensed patent, either through the cessation of
royalty payments on the grounds of alleged patent invalidity or
through a judicial action contesting the patent's validity.s'o
Accordingly, a licensee cannot assert patent invalidity as a defense to
a claim for royalties owed prior to an affirmative step by the licensee
toward challenging the licensed patent and, if only those royalties are
at issue in the case, the court can bar the licensee's patent challenge
altogether. This argument has elements of the one that we presented
above in our discussion of the Hull case. There we concluded that the
patent validity challenge in Hull was barred because the licensed
patent's validity was not "relevant" to the licensor's claim for pre-
challenge royalties, where relevance was determined, not on the basis
of any benefit received by the licensee under the license agreement,
but by the public's interest in encouraging the early adjudication of
patent invalidity, as expressed in Lear.
In sum, the district court in MedImmune rejected the view that
the Federal Circuit's decision in Shell Oil created a broad exception
to Lear. Rather, it interpreted the Shell Oil holding as standing for
the proposition that a licensee that acts to delay a timely challenge to
499. 120 F. Supp. 2d 322; see supra note 431.
500. 410 F. Supp. 2d 158; see supra note 431.
501. Our conclusion regarding the district court's argument is based on that court's
discussion of the first key distinction between Shell Oil and MedImmune and the excerpts
from Revson and Advanced Card Technologies that the court had elected to include in its
MedImmune opinion ("The Kohle [v. Shell Oil] case and other courts that have applied its
rule relate to situations where past-due royalties are at stake. See, e.g., Revson v. Claire's
Stores, Inc., 120 F. Supp.2d 322, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (applying licensee estoppel
because 'the consequence of Kohle is that Boutiques' assertion of invalidity is no defense
to plaintiff's claim for royalties due in respect of sales made prior to the filing of the
complaint'); Advanced Card Techs., LLC v. Versatile Card Tech., Inc., 410 F. Supp.2d 158,
161 (S.D.N.Y.2006) ('just as the defendant in Revson was barred from asserting an
invalidity defense to royalty payments that accrued in respect of sales occurring prior to
the filing of the in that action, so here VCT may not assert its [invalidity defense] to
royalty payments that were [allegedly due] prior to the filing of this action.')." 535 F.
Supp. 2d 1000, 1017-18 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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the validity of the licensed patent, and thereby frustrates the
important federal policy of eliminating worthless patents, cannot
invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine. MedImmune, with its
declaratory judgment action seeking a timely adjudication of patent
invalidity, was not such a licensee and, accordingly, its patent
challenge was not prohibited by Shell Oil.
Having distinguished Shell Oil, the MedImmune district court
argued that the Lear holding controlled the dispute in the instant
case, protecting the right of MedImmune to challenge the Genentech
patent, despite its status as a nonrepudiating licensee in good
standing. The district court noted that in those instances in which the
Federal Circuit had distinguished Lear, it had done so on the basis of
policy considerations that had not been addressed by the Lear Court
in its balancing test. It cited Flex-Foot, in which the public's interest
in the settlement of litigation and the binding effect of res judicata
were at stake, and Diamond Scientific, which addressed the injustice
of permitting a patent assignor to receive full value for the assigned
patent and later repudiate the patent to the assignor's advantage. As
the district court had already argued, the Shell Oil holding turned on
the fact that the licensee in that case had actually frustrated the policy
rationale of Lear by delaying a timely adjudication of the licensed
patent's validity. In that none of those "policy-altering distinctions"
were relevant to the dispute under consideration and that "[t]he
distinction that MedImmune ... [was] a nonrepudiating licensee ...
[was] insufficient to depart from Lear's analysis,"502 the MedImmune
district court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court's Lear holding
was applicable to the case before it and MedImmune's patent validity
challenge was not barred by licensee estoppel. The district court
summarized its position on the relevance of Lear in the following
excerpt:
In this case, where invalidity has been raised affirmatively by
the licensee, the Lear Court's reasoning applies in full force
even though MedImmune has not repudiated the license: to
prevent MedImmune from challenging the validity of the patent
would give greater weight to the technicalities of contract
doctrine than to federal patent policy. Because the Court
definitively answered that question for patent license
agreements like this one, this is a case where the court will not
"strike a balance which would result in an outcome different
502. 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
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from that reached by the Supreme Court in Lear." American
Sterilizer Co., 526 F.2d ... [542, 547 (3rd Cir. 1975)].so3
D. Licensee Estoppel and the Nonrepudiating Licensee in Good
Standing
The goal of this Part III of the Article has been to determine the
scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's abrogation of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel in Lear v. Adkins, the Court's definitive statement
on the subject. Specifically, we have focused on whether Lear's
rejection of licensee estoppel was sufficiently broad to cover a
nonrepudiating licensee in good standing. Our analysis has yielded
the following conclusions. One, the weight of the evidence indicates
that the Supreme Court's endorsement of licensee estoppel in
Automatic Radio, the last endorsement to be issued by the Court
prior to its Lear holding, addressed the traditional version of the
doctrine, with its eviction and repudiation limits, and not the "strong
form" version of the doctrine defined by the termination rule. Two,
in overruling its prior holding in Automatic Radio, the Supreme Court
in Lear rejected the traditional version of licensee estoppel that
already incorporated a repudiation limitation, and thereby
determined that even a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing was
permitted to challenge the licensed patent. Three, both the language
and the reasoning of the Lear decision extend beyond the facts in that
case, which involved a repudiating licensee, and apply with equal
force to a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing. Four, the
majority of post-Lear regional circuit and district court decisions that
considered the estoppel doctrine evinced the adoption of a broad
reading of the Lear Court's holding and a willingness to apply that
holding to fact patterns that differed from that in Lear. Five, the
Federal Circuit rulings that have distinguished Lear have done so on
the basis of policy considerations not addressed by the Lear Court in
its balancing test, e.g., the public's interest in the settlement of
litigation and the binding effect of res judicata, or the injustice of
permitting a patent assignor to receive full value for the assigned
patent and later repudiate the patent to the assignor's advantage. Six,
the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil holding, with its prerequisite statement,
is best explained on the basis of the unusual facts in that case, which
involved a licensee that had acted in a manner that delayed the early
503. Id. at 1018-19 (footnotes omitted).
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adjudication of patent invalidity; moreover, in reaching its decision,
the Shell Oil court relied on another fact-specific holding in Hull
(where a licensee's patent validity challenge was found to be
irrelevant to the licensor's claim for pre-challenge royalties) and
ignored prior regional circuit decisions (in Warner-Jenkinson and
Precision Shooting) that had effectively argued in favor of permitting
a nonrepudiating licensee in good standing to challenge the licensed
patent. Seven, and finally, the most recent comprehensive assessment
of the scope of the Supreme Court's Lear holding, provided by the
MedImmune district court, yielded the conclusion that barring a
nonrepudiating licensee in good standing from challenging the
validity of a licensed patent "would give greater weight to the
technicalities of contract doctrine than to federal patent policy,"O
and was neither mandated by Shell Oil nor permitted under Lear.
On the basis of the above considerations, we conclude that if and
when the issue is presented, the U.S. Supreme Court will interpret its
prior Lear holding as having rejected the doctrine of licensee estoppel
in its entirety. According to this view, and despite the apparent
obstacle presented by the Federal Circuit's prerequisite statement in
Shell Oil, a patent licensee may challenge the validity of the licensed
patent even if it neither repudiates nor terminates its patent license
agreement and intends to continue to reap the benefits provided
pursuant to the agreement. Based on this broad reading of the
Supreme Court's rejection in Lear of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel, coupled with the Court's elimination in MedImmune of the
Federal Circuit's jurisdictional barrier to a patent validity challenge
by a licensee in good standing, we believe that a patent licensor would
be ill-advised to rely on some vestige of the common law doctrine of
licensee estoppel to prevent its licensee from challenging the validity
of its licensed patent. Rather, the concerned licensor should consider
introducing explicit contractual provisions in the patent license
agreement to account for the increased likelihood of such a patent
challenge. The question then becomes which provisions are
enforceable and, if not clearly enforceable, which are least likely to
give rise to unintended consequences, including a reasonable claim of
patent misuse. Part IV, therefore, explores the enforceability and
effects of explicit contractual protections of the patent licensor.
504. Id. at 1018.
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IV. EXPLICIT CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS OF THE
LICENSOR FOLLOWING MEDIMMUNE
The U.S. Supreme Court's Lear decision sounded the death knell
of the common law doctrine of licensee estoppel and, as we concluded
in Part III, abrogated the doctrine in its entirety. The license
agreement under consideration in Lear did not contain an express
contractual prohibition barring a patent validity challenge by the
licensee (a licensee "no-challenge" clause). It did, however, include a
royalty payment provision that could, according to the Lear Court,
frustrate the important federal policy of eliminating specious patents,
even if the licensee were permitted to challenge the licensed patent.
The provision required the licensee to continue paying royalties
during the pendency of the patent challenge and, if enforced, would
have encouraged the patent licensor to postpone a final
determination regarding the patent's validity and could have deterred
the licensee from bringing the patent challenge in the first place. In
holding that the Lear royalty payment provision was not enforceable
(the second prong of the Lear doctrine), the Court placed the public's
interest in the full and free use of ideas actually in the public domain
above the technical requirements of contract doctrine.
As discussed in Part III, the majority of post-Lear regional circuit
and district courts were aggressive in their application of the Lear
holding and, when confronted with the issue, ruled that a contract
provision that eliminated one of the protections of the Lear doctrine
was unenforceable5 5  In contrast, the Federal Circuit, which
distinguished Lear when policy considerations not addressed in that
case were at stake, held that a licensee "no-challenge" clause (as in
Flex-Foot) and a contractual post-patent invalidation royalty payment
obligation (as in Hemstreet) were enforceable in the context of a
settlement of prior patent infringement litigation. Moreover, the
Federal Circuit's "challenge-but-face-the-consequence" decisions,
505. For holdings that a licensee "no-challenge" clause is unenforceable under Lear,
see Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(affd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1975)); Kraly, 319 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1970); 502 F.2d 1366
(7th Cir. 1974); Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116 (D.
Md. 1972) (rev'd on other grounds, 489 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1973)); Panther Pumps &
Equipment Co., 468 F.2d 225; Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1972);
Massillion-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co., 444 F.2d 425; Robintech, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 817;
Wallace Clark & Co., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637; Plastic Contact Lens Co., 330 F. Supp. 441.
For a holding that a contractual obligation to pay royalties during the pendency of a
licensee patent validity challenge is unenforceable under Lear, see Bayer AG v. Housey
Pharm., Inc., 228 F. Supp.2d 467 (D. Del. 2002).
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discussed in Part III, supported the view that a patent licensee that
challenged the validity of the licensed patent could be subjected to a
contractually mandated unwanted consequence as a result of the
challenge. However, the Federal Circuit's Shell Oil and Gen-Probe
decisions, requiring that a licensee repudiate its license agreement
prior to a patent challenge, functioned as deterrents to licensee patent
validity challenges and thereby lessened the need for contractual
protections of the patent licensor in the event of a challenge. But
with the Supreme Court's rejection of Gen-Probe in its MedImmune
decision and the growing uncertainty as to the general applicability of
the Shell Oil prerequisite statement, interest in the enforceability of
contractual protections of the patent licensor has been rekindled. As
patent licensors have considered a variety of such provisions,
including those that contemplate the patent license agreement
surviving an unsuccessful patent challenge, attention has focused on
the question of when an agreed-to consequence of a licensee patent
challenge constitutes an impermissible disincentive to challenge that
undermines the public policy, articulated in Lear, of encouraging the
early adjudication of patent invalidity.
In this Part IV, we discuss the enforceability and effects of
explicit contractual protections of the patent licensor intended to
account for an increased likelihood of a licensee patent validity
challenge. Recognizing that a detailed review of each of the various
provisions that have been considered by patent licensors is beyond
the scope of this Article, we present an approach to analyze any such
provision. We then apply the approach to a number of representative
provisions that are frequently encountered in patent license
agreements.
A. An Approach to Contract Provision Analysis
It is important to note at the outset that many of the contractual
protections that have been relied on by patent licensors to account for
an increased likelihood of a licensee patent validity challenge have
not been subjected to judicial review. Accordingly, an assessment of
the enforceability and effects of provisions of this type frequently
entails unavoidable uncertainty. There is, however, an approach to
evaluating such a provision that can reduce the level of uncertainty.
A contractual provision that directly eliminates one of the
protections of the Lear doctrine is unlikely to be enforceable unless a
policy consideration not addressed in the Lear balancing test is at
stake, and even then the enforceability of such a provision may
depend on Federal Circuit jurisprudence that has yet to be endorsed
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by a U.S. Supreme Court that has had its issues of late with a number
of Federal Circuit patent-related decisions. Provisions that do not
directly eliminate a protection of the Lear doctrine but place an
unwanted consequence on a licensee that contests the validity of the
licensed patent present a greater challenge. There may be relevant
case law that can provide some guidance regarding enforceability. In
the absence of such case law, however, one is left with making a
judgment as to enforceability on the basis of considerations such as
whether the contractually mandated consequence of a licensee's
patent validity challenge is such that it would likely prevent the
challenge in the first place. Here the analysis focuses on whether the
consequence constitutes a penalty for the mere act of challenging the
patent or takes effect only after an unsuccessful patent challenge and
reflects the enhanced value of a patent that has been adjudicated as
valid. Provisions with consequences that fall into the latter category
are more likely to be enforceable than those that fall into the former
category. In the final analysis, one must determine where on the
"disincentive-to-challenge" spectrum a contractual consequence falls
and whether its position on the spectrum places it outside of the zone
of enforceability under Lear. In essence, one is required to provide
an answer to the question posed in section III C.4.c.ii. regarding the
meaning of the "spirit of Lear," namely, where did the Lear Court
draw the line of enforceability in the gap between providing a
licensee with "some incentive" to challenge a licensed patent and
providing a licensee with "every possible incentive?"
In addition to considering the enforceability of a contemplated
pro-licensor contract provision, one must determine whether the
provision protects the licensor as intended and whether the inclusion
of the provision in a patent license agreement could have unintended
consequences. For example, as we discuss in section IV.B.2.,
enforcement of a "termination-for-challenge" clause, which provides
a patent licensor with the right to terminate the patent license
agreement in the event of a patent validity challenge by the licensee,
would place a terminated licensee that continues to practice the
patented invention in the position of an infringer, should the patent
challenge fail. However, the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.50 allows for the very real
possibility that the former licensee may not be enjoined from the use
of the patented invention, but rather be permitted to continue to
506. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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practice the invention in consideration for the payment of an ongoing
royaltyt ' If the patent licensor has not taken this possibility into
consideration by specifying in its contract that the royalty would
(reasonably) increase in the event of an unsuccessful patent
challenge, it may not have obtained the maximum available benefit
from its "termination-for-challenge" provision. Another example,
also discussed below, arises in the context of a patent license
agreement that contains a provision that directly eliminates one of the
protections of the Lear doctrine, e.g., a licensee "no-challenge" clause
or a contractual royalty payment obligation that requires the licensee
to make payments during the pendency of its patent challenge. While
a licensor is unlikely to obtain the aid of a court in seeking the specific
performance of the licensee's contractual obligation, the licensor may
be permitted to terminate the license agreement on the basis of the
licensee's material breach, a potential outcome of obvious
significance to each of the parties to the agreement. Finally, a
licensor should consider whether the inclusion of an unenforceable
contract provision in the patent license agreement could have
ramifications that extend beyond its agreement with the licensee.
Here the example is the inclusion of an unenforceable contract
provision that constitutes an act of patent misuse, which would
prevent the enforcement of the licensed patent, even against a third
party infringer, until the misuse has ended and its effects have been
dissipated.
With the above considerations in mind, we propose that the
following questions be answered in evaluating a contractual
protection of a patent licensor intended to account for an increased
likelihood of a licensee patent validity challenge:
(1) Does the contract provision eliminate the protection
afforded by either of the two prongs of the Lear doctrine, and if it
does, are there any policy issues at stake that were not considered by
the U.S. Supreme Court in its balancing test in Lear?
(2) Is there any case law, other than the Supreme Court's Lear
holding, relevant to the particular contract provision under
consideration?
(3) Where does the contract provision fall on the "disincentive-
to-challenge" spectrum; is the disincentive punitive in nature; does
the disincentive constitute, in practice, a prohibition to challenge?
507. See Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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(4) Does the contract provision protect the patent licensor as
intended; could the inclusion of the provision in a patent license
agreement have unintended consequences?
(5) If the contract provision is determined to be unenforceable
on the basis of the Lear public policy argument, is the inclusion of the
contract provision in a patent license agreement an act of patent
misuse?
B. Analysis of Representative Contract Provisions
1. Licensee "no-challenge" clause
While the wording may vary, a contract provision that prohibits a
patent licensee from challenging the validity of the licensed patent
during the term of the license agreement qualifies as a licensee "no-
challenge" or "no-contest" clause. As noted above, the license
agreement under consideration in Lear did not contain a licensee
"no-challenge" clause. However, enforcement of such a provision
would eliminate the protection afforded a licensee under the first
prong of the Lear doctrine, namely, that a licensee cannot be barred
from challenging the validity of a licensed patent. It is not surprising,
therefore, that virtually every post-Lear court" and commentator 5 01
that has considered the matter has concluded that, in a typical
licensing arrangement, an explicit licensee "no-challenge" clause is
invalid and unenforceable under Lear. In fact, considering the
extensive case law and commentary regarding the licensee "no-
challenge" clause and the near uniformity as to its unenforceability, it
might appear unnecessary to undertake the five-part approach to
contract provision analysis outlined in the preceding section with
508. See e.g., Congoleum Industries, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 220, aff'd 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.
1975); Kraly, 319 F. Supp. 1349; 502 F.2d 1366; Blohm & Voss AG, 346 F. Supp. 1116,
rev'd on other grounds 489 F.2d 231; Bendix Corp., 471 F.2d 149; Panther Pumps & Equip.
Co., 468 F.2d 225; Massillion-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co., 444 F.2d 425; Robintech, Inc.,
450 F. Supp. 817; Wallace Clark & Co., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637; Plastic Contact Lens Co.,
330 F. Supp. 441; but see infra note 529.
509. See e.g., Rooklidge, Lear v. Atkins Revisited (Part III), supra note 68, at 69-70;
Taylor, supra note 321, at 236-39; McCarthy (Part II), supra note 321, at 566-67; David M.
Treadway, Has the Supreme Court Forgotten the Patentee? Recent Patent Licensing
Decisions Contradict Patent Policy, Harm Licensors, and Alter Negotiation, 33 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 303, 327-328 (2007-2008); but see Richard W. Goldstucker, Stop the Bleeding:
MedImmune Ends the Unjustified Erosion of Patent Holders' Rights in Patent Licensing
Agreements, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. 137, 163-64 (2008-2009) (arguing that, while "Lear
invalidated no-challenge clauses in patent licensing agreements" the enforceability of such
clauses should be reconsidered in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's MedImmune
decision.)
403
404 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
respect to such a clause. As will be demonstrated in this section,
however, following such an approach yields useful insight into the
possible effects of including a licensee "no-challenge" clause in a
patent license agreement, even if such a clause is unenforceable, and
provides a clear example of the value of addressing each of the
questions included in the recommended approach.
Having established that a licensee "no-challenge" clause
eliminates one of the protections of the Lear doctrine, the next
question to answer is whether such a clause or the context in which it
is used raises any policy issue that was not considered by the Lear
Court in its balancing test. While a fact specific analysis, any
agreement by a licensee to refrain from challenging the validity of a
licensed patent arguably introduces elements not present in Lear, i.e.,
freedom of contract and certainty in the contractual relationship
between the parties to an agreement. As one commentator has
pointed out, post-Lear courts that have "equated the demise of
licensee estoppel in Lear with the unenforceability of no-challenge
clauses"1 o have given "absolutely no consideration to the
distinguishable fact that the licensees agreed not to challenge the
patent's validity.,..
The problem with this line of reasoning, attempting to distinguish
a bar to a patent challenge based on a "no-challenge" clause from
that based on the common law doctrine of licensee estoppel, is that
the Lear Court rejected a freely negotiated royalty payment provision
that was less restrictive than a "no-challenge" clause of a licensee's
patent challenge right, but was still considered impermissible as a
result of its potential to frustrate the public's interest in eliminating
worthless patents. The fact that the rejected royalty payment
obligation was set forth in an explicit contract provision in the license
agreement was immaterial. Rooklidge summarized the basis for the
widely accepted view that the Lear Court would have invalidated a
licensee "no-challenge" clause in the following excerpt:
[T]he holding of Lear had nothing to do with no-challenge
clauses, and the case did not consider the policies favoring such
clauses [e.g. freedom of contract and certainty in contractual
relationships]. Nevertheless, the "spirit" of Lear is that policies
rooted in contract law must give way to the policy favoring
patent validity challenges. Further, in deciding whether the
510. Taylor, supra note 321, at 237.
511. Id.at 236.
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licensee can be required to pay royalties during its validity
challenge, the Court stated that "[t]he parties' contract,
however, is no more controlling on this issue than is the State's
doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in contract
principles." . . . [Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969)] If
there had been a no-challenge clause in the Lear license
agreement, the Court undoubtedly would not have hesitated in
striking it down.5 12
A more intriguing question regarding the impact of policy
considerations on the validity of a licensee "no-challenge" clause is
whether such a clause is enforceable in the context of the settlement
of a prior patent infringement litigation involving the licensed patent.
The license agreement in Lear did not result from a settlement of a
prior patent infringement suit and the Lear Court did not consider
the important public interest in encouraging the settlement of
litigation in its balancing test. As discussed in section III.C.4.c.iii., the
Federal Circuit relied on this distinction in Flex-Foot in its refusal to
extend the Supreme Court's Lear holding to block the enforcement of
a "no-challenge" clause contained in a settlement agreement. The
Federal Circuit's holding in Flex-Foot remains good law and provides
support for the view that the inclusion of a "no-challenge" clause in a
settlement agreement will contractually estop a licensee from
contesting the validity of the licensed patent. The risk of adopting
this position is that if and when the U.S. Supreme Court considers the
issue it will follow its recent pattern of showing little deference to the
Federal Circuit's pro-patentee jurisprudence and rule that a licensee
"no-challenge" clause is unenforceable under any circumstance.
The conclusion that a licensee "no-challenge" clause is almost
certainly unenforceable, at least in the context of the typical licensing
arrangement, is bolstered by case law in which the validity of such a
provision was directly ruled on, including a U.S. Supreme Court case
that predated the Lear decision by more than three quarters of a
century. In Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully,514 decided in 1892,
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to enforce the specific performance
of a licensee's contractual obligation to never dispute the validity of
the licensed patent. The license agreement in the case provided that
512. Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part III), supra note 68, at 69-70.
513. For examples of recent decisions in which the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed and
rejected a Federal Circuit holding favoring a patentee, see supra note 302.
514. 144 U.S. 224.
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the licensee would not "in any way, either directly or indirectly,
dispute or contest the validity of the letters patent hereinbefore
mentioned"' and that the obligation of the licensee was irrevocable.
The Court noted that the contract provision was "unusual and
oppressive,"' and the fact that the no-challenge obligation survived
the term of the contract suggested that the licensee did not fully
comprehend the agreement that he had entered into. While these
considerations clearly influenced the Court in refusing to grant
specific performance in the case, the policy rationale relied on by the
Court for its holding did not depend on these considerations and was
the same as that relied on by the Lear Court decades later. The Pope
Court recognized the importance of the parties' "right to make such
contracts as they please, . . . [but such contracts] shall not be against
public policy."' The Court stated that "[t]he real question is whether
the defendant can estop himself from disputing patents which may be
wholly void.""' Noting that "[i]t is as important to the public that
competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his
monopoly,""9 the Court cited favorably a prior case in which it was
held that a party "could not bind himself by contract not to avail
himself of ... [a] right if it be secured to him on grounds of public
policy."5 20 The Court declined to determine whether or not the
agreement in question was void as contravening public policy, but
concluded that "it does not belong to that class of contracts, the
specific performance of which a court of equity can be called upon to
enforce."5 21, 522
515. Id. at 228.
516. Id. at 237.
517. Id. at 233.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 234.
520. Id. (citing Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503, 530, 532 (Miss. 1860)).
521. Id. at 236.
522. In Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 394
(1947), one of the U.S. Supreme Court cases that established the antitrust-based exception
to licensee estoppel, see discussion supra section III.A.5.b., the Court was again
confronted with an explicit "no-challenge" clause that prevented the licensee from
challenging the validity of the licensed patent following the termination of the license
agreement. In ruling that the clause was unenforceable, the Court reasoned that the
licensee's "specific contract not to challenge the validity of Katzinger's patent can no more
override congressional policy than can an implied estoppel," id. at 402, although in
Katzinger the congressional policy at stake was the Sherman Act's proscription of a price-
fixing provision in the absence of a valid patent monopoly.
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As noted above, a number of regional circuit and district courts
ruled on the enforceability of the "no-challenge" clause in the
aftermath of Lear. The clause was evaluated in the context of a
typical licensing arrangement,523 as part of a prior settlement of patent
infringement litigation,524 and in assessing whether a patent holder
had misused its patent by including a "no-challenge" clause in a third
party license agreement.525 In each of these post-Lear cases the "no-
challenge" clause was found to be invalid and unenforceable. The
cases were similar in another significant respect, namely, that the
court's conclusion regarding unenforceability was reached with a
minimum of analysis. As one commentator noted, "[s]oon after the
United States Supreme Court decided Lear, lower courts struck down
no-challenge clauses in case after case without exception. Many
lower courts invalidated these provisions without analysis. They
simply assumed that Lear made the unenforceability of no-challenge
clauses obvious."526 Yet, despite criticisms regarding the limited
analysis in each of these cases, the unanimous condemnation of the
"no-challenge" clause effectively eliminated its use in licensing
agreements. Commentators who argued that the "no-challenge"
clause should not be considered per se invalid and still had a place in
patent license agreements were forced to look to the Federal Circuit,
with its traditional pro-patentee bias, or Congress for support.527
Writing in 1987, Rooklidge summarized the situation in the following
excerpt:
The obstacle presented by the Lear progeny ... is that there
may be no more no-challenge clause cases. After Lear, prudent
licensors stopped including no-challenge clauses in licenses and
expressly disclaimed reliance on existing no-challenge
clauses ... Despite the potential for a fresh look at no-
challenge clauses in the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit,
the courts may not get the opportunity. Assuming that the
courts never get the chance to straighten out their post-Lear
523. See Plastic Contact Lens Co., 330 F. Supp. 441; Robintech, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 817.
524. See Kraly, 319 F. Supp. 1349; 502 F.2d 1366; Massillion-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co.,
444 F.2d 425; Wallace Clark & Co., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637.
525. See Panther Pumps & Equip. Co., Inc., 468 F.2d 225; Bendix Corp., 471 F.2d 149;
Blohm & Voss, 346 F. Supp. 1116 (rev'd on other grounds,489 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1973));
Congoleum Indus., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 220.
526. Taylor, supra note 321, at 236 (footnote omitted).
527. See Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part III), supra note 68, at 63.
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excesses concerning no-challenge clauses, Congress is the sole
remaining hope.""
As we have already discussed, the Federal Circuit in Flex-Foot
did subsequently rule that a licensee "no-challenge" clause in a
settlement agreement was enforceable. However, to the knowledge
of the authors, no court has challenged the consensus among the Lear
progeny that a "no-challenge" clause in the context of a typical
licensing arrangement is unenforceable. 29 Moreover, while Congress
528. Id. at 89 (paragraphing omitted).
529. A U.S. district court recently addressed, but did not rule on, the enforceability
under Lear of a licensee "no-challenge" clause in a license agreement that did not result
from the settlement of patent litigation. In Mayo Clinic Jacksonville v. Alzheimer's
Institute of America Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (M.D. Florida 2009), the District Court for
the Middle District of Florida considered, inter alia, whether the licensee in the case
(Mayo) breached its license agreement by contesting the validity of licensed patents in
response to a patent infringement claim brought by the licensor (AIA). The agreement at
issue contained a provision that stated that Mayo was not permitted to ". . . 'initiate or
voluntarily participate in [] any action' to undermine, invalidate, or declare unenforceable
claims of AIA's patents." Id. at 1294. Notwithstanding the provision, Mayo asserted both
an affirmative defense of patent invalidity and a defensive counterclaim seeking a
declaration of invalidity in response to AIA's patent infringement claim. The Mayo
district court concluded that while federal patent policy, as articulated in Lear, may
invalidate the "no-challenge" clause under consideration, the court need not decide that
issue in that a strict reading of the clause indicated that Mayo's actions in challenging the
AIA's patents did not constitute a breach of the agreement. ("Because the no-challenge
clause is neither part of an agreement reached in settlement of litigation nor the result of a
consent decree, federal patent policy may invalidate the clause and permit Mayo to
challenge the validity of AIA's patent. However, resolution of that question is
unnecessary . . . . Even assuming for a moment that federal patent policy permits
enforcement of the no-challenge clause, the no-challenge clause, which gravitates against
patent policy in a manner reminiscent of Lear, receives the strict construction warranted
by a provision that constrains a constitutional, statutory, or other legal right. Applying a
strict construction to the no-challenge clause and confining the reach of the clause to that
defined by its terms, [AIA's] count . . . fails to state a claim because the facts of this case
present no event of breach of the no-challenge clause." Id. at 1298.) In the view of the
court, Mayo neither "initiated" nor "voluntarily participated in" an action in violation of
its license agreement by raising patent invalidity as a defense, in that it was AIA's patent
infringement claim that initiated the action and prompted Mayo's defensive assertions.
While the Mayo court did not resolve the question of whether a licensee "no-
challenge" clause is valid, it provided the following arguments in support of the
enforceability of such a clause in a license agreement that did not result from the
settlement of litigation, at least under certain circumstances: One, the Lear decision does
not address the enforceability of a "no-challenge" clause. ("Lear stands for the
proposition that the law will not infer from a license a bar to a licensee's challenging a
patent. However, Lear fails to discuss whether (or under what circumstances) informed
persons, acting from positions of substantial parity and benefitting from the advice of
counsel, may negotiate a contract that, consequent upon the exchange of a valuable
consideration, knowingly, intelligently, explicitly, and voluntarily waives the right to
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has considered the issue on a number of occasions," no legislation
has been enacted to address the enforceability of a licensee "no-
challenge" clause.
The next question to address in our analysis of a pro-licensor
contract provision is where does the provision under consideration
fall on the "disincentive-to-challenge" spectrum? As noted above, a
contractual disincentive that constitutes a penalty for the mere act of
challenging a licensed patent is more likely to run a foul of the "spirit
of Lear" than a consequence that takes effect only after an
challenge a patent's validity. . . . Lear holds, at most, that the mere existence of a license
agreement is insufficient to estop a licensee's challenge to a patent." Id. at 1296, and
footnote 7. Two, "[t]he law frequently permits an individual to waive either a
constitutional or a statutory right [e.g., a licensee's right to challenge the licensed patent]
notwithstanding the strong public interest in preserving the right." Id., footnote 7
(citations deleted). Three, "[c]ritics argue that invalidation of a no-challenge clause
erodes a patent holder's liberty to contract, decreases economic efficiency, hurts the
patent law's goal of innovation, and renders more difficult the negotiation of a license
agreement." Id. at 1295, footnote 3 (citations deleted). Four, "no-challenge" clauses have
been held to be enforceable in the context of the settlement or judicial disposition of
litigation, but "neither Lear nor any case decided in consequence of Lear suggests a sound
basis in law, fact, or policy to distinguish between, on the one hand, a licensee's waiver in a
settlement agreement formalized by the parties a day before litigation otherwise would
have occurred (which waiver Lear may reject) and, on the other hand, a licensee's waiver
in a settlement agreement formalized a day after litigation began and which agreement is
memorialized in a mere moment by court order (and which waiver Lear may accept). A
less problematic result follows from focusing the governing distinction not on the
occurrence of litigation but on whether the potentially estopped party knew the basis of
the alleged invalidity before entering the waiver and whether the parties exchanged a
consideration discretely attributable to the prospect of invalidity and waiver (i.e., by
focusing on the resolution of a bona fide dispute and not merely on the resolution of a
dispute in litigation). In the resolution of a bona fide dispute, both a licensor extending a
distinct consideration to avoid an identified risk and a licensee accepting that
consideration (e.g., a reduced royalty) should remain bound by the contract-the licensor
with a more secure patent but receiving less money and the licensee paying less but unable
to challenge. This distinction preserves the public interest in dispute resolution but
discourages duplicity and deception." Id at 1296, footnote 7. And five, the courts have
recognized a distinction between defensive assertions of patent invalidity (e.g., an
affirmative defense or a defensive counterclaim) and aggressive assertions of invalidity,
and while the "no-challenge" clause in the instant case failed to prohibit defensive
assertions, it may have prevented aggressive assertions. ("If intended to bar a challenge to
AIA's patent validity, the no-challenge clause is clumsily and ineffectively constructed,
omits to preclude even the typical challenge of invalidity by affirmative defense, and
overlooks the potential for a counterclaim. If intended to prevent Mayo's aggressive
attack on patent validity, the no-challenge clause perhaps persists, although subject to the
vagaries of Lear." Id. at 1298 (footnote deleted).).
530. For discussions of legislative efforts to address the enforceability of licensee "no-
challenge" clauses, see Rooklidge, Lear v. Adkins Revisited (Part III), supra note 68, at
81-82; John W. Schlicher, Patent Licensing, What to Do After MedImmune v. Genentech,
89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 364, 392-394 & n.49 (2007); Goldstucker, supra
note 509, at 160-61.
409
HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
unsuccessful challenge and reflects the enhanced value of a patent
that has been adjudicated as valid. With respect to the "no-
challenge" clause, it might appear that such a question is irrelevant, in
that a contractual disincentive that results from a licensee's patentee
validity challenge presupposes that there is a challenge in the first
place. However, if we accept the reasonable conclusion that a "no-
challenge" clause in the context of a typical licensing arrangement
will not prevent the licensee from challenging the licensed patent, the
inclusion of the unenforceable provision in the license agreement may
still result in a consequence upon the licensee's challenge that works
to the detriment of the licensee. Viewed from that perspective, a "no-
challenge" clause may discourage rather than necessarily prevent a
licensee patent validity challenge, justifying an assessment of the
provision's disincentive effect. Moreover, evaluating the "no-
challenge" clause in this way leads to a consideration of the final
questions in our analysis of a pro-licensor contract provision, namely,
might the inclusion of the contract provision in the license agreement
have unintended consequences and can one such consequence be the
rendering of the licensed patent unenforceable, even against third
party infringers, as a result of patent misuse?
As we have already discussed, the applicable case law indicates
that a "no-challenge" clause in a license agreement that did not result
from the settlement of a prior litigation involving the licensed patent
is not likely to be specifically enforced by a court. That does not
mean, however, that the inclusion of the provision in the license
agreement is without effect. A review of the oral argument before
the U.S. Supreme Court in MedImmune is instructive in exploring this
point. While the Medlmmune decision was jurisdictional in nature
and the case did not involve a "no-challenge" clause, the Justices (as
evidenced by their questions during the oral argument in the case)
were very much interested in the potential impact of such a provision
or, for that matter, any contractual provision that would prevent or
discourage a licensee from challenging the validity of the licensed
patent, on the rights of licensors and licensees in a patent license
agreement. In fact, the first question of the oral argument, posed by
Chief Justice Roberts, was whether MedImmune's position in the
case would be different if the Genentech/Medlmmune license
agreement had contained a licensee "no-challenge" clause."' Not
531. The oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in MedImmune began with the
following exchange between the Justices and John G. Kester, Esq., speaking on behalf of
Medimmune:
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surprisingly, the Chief Justice's inquiry did not result in a ruling by
the Court on the enforceability of such a provision. The discussion
did, however, provide insight into the Chief Justice's interpretation of
the Court's prior decision in Pope and the potential effect of the
inclusion of a "no-challenge" clause in a patent license agreement.
In questioning Deanne E. Maynard, Esq., the Assistant to the
Solicitor General speaking in support of MedImmune, Chief Justice
Roberts provided the following response to Maynard's contention
that the "no-challenge" clause considered in Pope was unenforceable:
"I think you overread Pope. All Pope said was that they're not going
to grant specific performance. In fact, they've said, 'Whatever you
may think of the policy here, . . . specific performance calls on ...
equitable discretion, and we're not going to do it.' But, I don't read
Pope as holding that the clauses are otherwise unenforceable. In
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Kester, would it --
MR. KESTER: Yes?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- would it -- would your position be different if
the contract contained a specific -- the license -- a specific provision specifying
that the licensee may not sue [i.e. bring an action for a declaratory judgment that
the licensed patent is invalid]?
MR. KESTER: No, it would not, Your Honor, because --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You -- do you think such a provision would be
enforceable?
MR. KESTER: I doubt it would be enforceable. It would be a matter -- under
the Lear case, Lear against Adkins, it would be an -- it would be an affirmative
defense if such -- if such a claim were raised. This case is here at the level of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me, I don't -- I don't understand what you just said.
You mean, it would be enforceable; that if such a suit were brought, the licensor
could raise that contractual provision as a basis for dismissing the suit. Is that --
MR. KESTER: Under 12- -- under 12(b)(6) --
JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.
MR. KESTER: -- perhaps.
JUSTICE SCALIA: So, then it is enforceable.
JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but --
MR. KESTER: No.
JUSTICE SOUTER: -- your point is, it's not jurisdictional.
MR. KESTER: It's not jurisdictional, exactly, Justice Souter. This is a
jurisdictional ruling. And that's all that this Court granted certiorari on.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but as a matter of policy, we, at some point, either
in this case or some later case, may have to address the question of whether or
not such a provision is enforceable. If it is, we may be -- not be talking about
much. It's just going to be boilerplate in every license agreement, and that's the
end of it ....
MedImmune oral argument, at *3-*6.
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other words you're maybe entitled to damages ... . Accepting the
limitations of a comment made during an oral argument regarding a
fact pattern not present in the case under consideration, the Roberts'
statement is nonetheless noteworthy for its suggestion that a "no-
challenge" clause, if breached by the licensee, may result in a
consequence detrimental to the licensee's interests, even if it is not
specifically enforced by a court. Whether the licensor would be
entitled to damages, a right to terminate the license agreement or
both, the inclusion of an unenforceable "no-challenge" clause in the
license agreement could penalize the licensee if it were to exercise its
Lear-protected right to challenge the validity of the licensed patent
and might discourage the licensee from bringing the challenge in the
first place.533 In that case, however, the consequence of a breach of a
"no-challenge" clause, as dictated by contract law, may itself be
considered incompatible with the "spirit of Lear" and, therefore, held
to be unenforceable. While the Chief Justice's comment on the
Court's Pope decision fails to clarify the effect of a "no-challenge"
clause in a license agreement, the important point here is that care
must be exercised in including such a provision in a patent license
agreement if one is to avoid potential unintended consequences.
Another potential unintended consequence of the use of a "no-
challenge" clause is that its inclusion in a license agreement may
constitute an act of patent misuse. Patent misuse is an equitable
defense to a claim of patent infringement analogous to the doctrine of
unclean hands. Misuse will be found if a patent is used in an effort to
extend the physical or temporal scope of the patent monopoly with
anticompetitive effect or in the violation of the antitrust laws. Where
a patent has been misused in negotiating a license agreement, the
offending provision is invalid and the misused patent is
unenforceable, even against third party infringers, until the misuse
terminates and its consequences are fully dissipated."'
532. Id. at *19.
533. Where the consequence of a breach of a "no-challenge" clause is the right of the
patent licensor to terminate the license agreement, inclusion of the "no-challenge" clause
in the agreement is the functional equivalent of a "termination-for-challenge" clause, the
enforceability and effects of which will be discussed in the next section.
534. For a summary of the doctrine of patent misuse see Server, Mousavi, & Love,
supra note 192, at 65-75. See also Princo Corp. v. Int'l. Trade Comm'n, 616 F.3d 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2010), for a recent discussion by the Federal Circuit of the scope of the misuse
doctrine,
535. See supra note 534.
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In the context of a "no-challenge" clause, the potential for a
finding of patent misuse is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the
misuse would occur whether or not the licensee actually challenges
the licensed patent. The fact that the patent holder had used the
leverage of its government-granted patent monopoly to force the
inclusion of the offending provision into the agreement would
constitute the misuse and lead to the associated consequences.
Second, a finding of patent misuse could have a detrimental effect on
not only the licensor, but the licensee as well. Obviously, the licensor
would suffer from its inability to enforce the "no-challenge" provision
(even if it were not unenforceable under Lear), as well as from its
inability to enforce its patent until the misuse had been purged.
However, a licensee may also suffer in the situation where it never
intended to challenge the patent, but rather planned to rely on the
enforceability of the licensed patent to prevent the unauthorized use
of the patented invention by others. In fact, many of the cases that
considered whether a "no-challenge" clause constituted patent misuse
involved a claim by an alleged infringer that the patent-at-issue was
not enforceable based on the patent holder's inclusion of a "no-
challenge" clause in its patent license agreements with third parties."'
One such case involving a patent misuse claim by an alleged
infringer is Panther Pumps & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Hydrocraft,
Inc."' Noted for its thoughtful analysis and reliance on U.S. Supreme
Court precedent for its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit in Panther
Pumps ruled that "the 'no contest' clause in the ... license, though
unenforceable under Lear, does not constitute the kind of 'misuse' of
the patent which forecloses recovery of damages from an unlicensed
infringer""" The court based its holding on the interpretation of the
Lear decision provided in Blonder-Tongue."9 In the words of the
Seventh Circuit,
536. See Panther Pumps & Equip. Co., Inc., 468 F.2d 225; Blohm & Voss, 346 F. Supp.
1116, rev'd on other grounds 489 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1973); Congoleum Industries, Inc., 336
F. Supp. 220; Note that in Bendix Corporation v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1972)
the alleged infringer also raised patent misuse as a defense, but rather than argue that the
patents-at-issue (which had been held by the court to be invalid) were unenforceable, the
alleged infringer sought (but was denied) damages for the patent holders alleged antitrust
violation resulting from the inclusion of a "no-challenge" clause in its third party patent
license agreements.
537. 468 F.2d 225.
538. Id. at 232.
539. See supra section IIL.C.4.c.i.
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[a] fair evaluation of defendants' [the alleged infringers']
argument requires us to identify two different lines of authority.
The first is "the series of decisions in which the Court has
condemned attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope
of the patent monopoly." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 343.. .. It is this line of
cases in which the "misuse" doctrine developed. "A second
group of authorities encourage authoritative testing of patent
validity." Id. at 344 .... Although the Court explained that the
Lear opinion relied on both lines of authority, it expressly
stated that its "holding that licensee estoppel was no longer
tenable was rooted in the second line of cases eliminating
obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the validity of a
patent." Id. at 345 . . . . In our opinion neither of these two
lines of cases justifies the application of the "misuse" doctrine
in this case.540
The Panther Pumps court concluded that "the policy of
encouraging authoritative testing of patent validity ... [endorsed in
Lear and rendering the "no-challenge" clause unenforceable], is not
served by a rule which enables an infringer to escape liability without
challenging the validity of a patent."5 41
A strict reading of the Seventh Circuit's wording in Panther
Pumps might suggest that while the inclusion of a "no-challenge"
clause in a patent license agreement would not prevent the
enforcement of the licensed patent against third party infringers, it
could prevent such enforcement against a licensee that elects to
breach the provision by challenging the licensed patent and continues
to practice the patented invention. However, the partial application
of the doctrine of patent misuse, based on a distinction between
patent licensee and third party infringer, has never been adopted by
the courts.542 Moreover, the adoption of such a policy in the context
of assessing the effects of a "no-challenge" clause would be
inconsistent with the public's interest, articulated in Lear, in the early
540. 468 F.2d 225, 231.
541. Id.
542. A partial application of the doctrine of patent misuse would be inconsistent with
the policy rationale underlying the doctrine, which holds that the abuse of a government-
granted patent monopoly, where found, constitutes a harm to the public as a whole that
deprives the patent holder of the right to enforce its patent not only against a licensee
victimized by the misuse but also against third party infringers that are not directly
affected by the conduct that gave rise to the misuse. See supra note 534.
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adjudication of patent invalidity, where patent licensees often have
the greatest incentive to challenge patents. It is, perhaps, for these
reasons that courts that have considered the effects of the inclusion of
a "no-challenge" clause in a patent license agreement following the
Panther Pumps decision have routinely rejected claims of patent
misuse, and have done so (frequently citing Panther Pumps) whether
543the misuse claim was brought by an alleged third party infringer or
by a patent licensee.54
Although there is a consensus among the courts that have
considered the issue that the inclusion of a "no-challenge" clause that
restricts a licensee during the term of the license agreement does not
constitute patent misuse, the possibility of misuse has been
recognized in cases in which the "no-challenge" clause remains in
effect following the termination of the agreement. In Bendix Corp. v.
Balax, Inc.,5 45 the Seventh Circuit considered a "no-challenge" clause
in third party patent license agreements that provided that the
"[1]icensee agrees that it will not contest the validity of any patent
which is now a part of this agreement during the life of this agreement
and thereafter",5  Unlike the typical "no-challenge" clause, the
provision in Bendix, like the one in Pope, was irrevocable and
survived for the life of the patent. The Bendix court concluded that
while the "no-challenge" clause was unenforceable under Lear, the
inclusion in the agreements of that portion of the provision that
restricted the licensee during the term of the agreement was not
patent misuse. However, as the court explained, "some misuse may
be inferred from the mere presence of the 'thereafter' clause, ....
[since] [l]icensees ... may have been induced to continue their
licensing . .. arrangements with the plaintiff [patent holder] because if
they terminated those arrangements to seek a deal with a
competitor ... they would, prior to Lear, have been unable to defend
against an infringement suit by the plaintiff.",4 7 While the applicable
case law suggests that something more than the typical "no-
challenge" clause is required to support a finding of patent misuse,
the Bendix decision makes clear that the inclusion of a "no-challenge"
clause in a license agreement is not without risk as it relates to patent
543. See supra note 536.
544. Robintech, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 817; Wallace Clark & Co., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637.
545. 471 F.2d 149.
546. Id. at 155, n.10.
547. Id. at 158.
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misuse, and that risk could work to the disadvantage of both the
patent holder and its licensee."'
In sum, an analysis of the enforceability and effects of a "no-
challenge" clause presents a consistent picture cautioning against the
use of the provision in a typical license agreement. If enforced, a "no-
challenge" clause would eliminate one of the protections of the Lear
doctrine. Moreover, the same policy rationale relied on by the Lear
Court in its abrogation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel and its
rejection of a royalty payment provision that could discourage a
licensee patent validity challenge was cited by the Court years earlier
in Pope as the basis for its refusal to enforce the specific performance
of a licensee's contractual obligation to never contest the validity of
the licensed patent. Regional circuit and district courts that have
considered the issue have uniformly concluded that a "no-challenge"
clause is unenforceable in the aftermath of Lear. In fact, only the
Federal Circuit, with its pro-patentee bias, has ruled in favor of
contractual estoppel based on a "no-challenge" clause, and that was
548. Commentators have raised the question of whether the timing of the agreement
not to challenge the licensed patent in relation to the Lear decision was relevant to a
determination of patent misuse. McCarthy, for example, presented the following
discussion:
From Panther Pump and Bendix, one may conclude that ordinary no-contest
clauses which were inserted in licenses before 1969 [the year that Lear was
decided] cannot form the basis for a misuse defense or an antitrust claim. To be
safe, however, many licensors cancelled such clauses after Lear in an attempt to
purge any possible misuse. The question remains whether a post-Lear inclusion
of a no-contest clause in a patent license constitutes misuse. Of course, such a
clause would be unenforceable under Lear, but many contractual clauses
traditionally relied upon as misuse are equally unenforceable. The fact that a
licensor fails to enforce a contractual clause does not preclude a holding of
misuse, and mere existence of the clause can constitute misuse. Although the
Panther Pump decision, unlike the Bendix opinion, did not rely upon the date of
the no-contest clause, one may infer that a patent licensor endangers the
enforceability of his patent by inclusion of such a clause in a post-Lear license.
The courts would ask what is the purpose of having such an unenforceable
promise made by the licensee? If the purpose is to provide a ground for
termination if the licensee challenges but otherwise pays and performs under the
license, then such a clause would appear to violate the spirit of Lear and amount
to misuse.
McCarthy, (Part II), supra note 321, at 566-67 (footnotes omitted). As McCarthy himself
points out, however, courts assessing "no-challenge" clauses that were agreed to or
intentionally retained following the Lear decision continued to reject patent misuse claims,
suggesting that the timing of the agreement not to challenge in relation to the Lear
decision was not relevant to the misuse assessment. See, Congoleum Indus., Inc., 366
F. Supp. 220, affd 510 F.2d 334; Wallace Clark & Company, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 637;
Robintech, Inc, 450 F. Supp. 817.
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in the context of a prior settlement of litigation involving the licensed
patent. Accordingly, with one notable exception, the only possible
effects of the inclusion of an unenforceable "no-challenge" clause in a
typical license agreement would be those that do not conform to the
parties' intention as expressly stated in the agreed-to provision. A
licensee bound by a contractual "no-challenge" obligation could not
be barred from exercising its Lear-protected right to challenge the
licensed patent. In addition, the inclusion of a "no-challenge" clause
in a license agreement could render the licensed patent
unenforceable, if the provision was not carefully drafted in order to
avoid patent misuse. The only instance in which a "no-challenge"
clause would work as explicitly intended would be where a licensee
elects not to bring a patent challenge in order to avoid a negative
consequence that would result under contract law from a breach of
the provision. In that case, however, the disincentive effect of the
threatened consequence might itself violate the "spirit of Lear,"
prompting a court to reject the consequence. Considering the various
problems and uncertainties associated with the "no-challenge" clause,
it is reasonable to conclude that its use in a typical license agreement
should be avoided. As we will see in the sections that follow, other
pro-licensor contract provisions can be used, whether alone or in
combination, that have a far greater likelihood of being enforceable
and are associated with significantly less risk of giving rise to
unintended consequences.
2. "Termination-for-challenge" clause
A "termination-for-challenge" clause, also referred to as a "no-
challenge termination" clause, confers upon a patent licensor the
right to terminate the license agreement in the event that the licensee
challenges the validity of the licensed patent. If enforceable, the
provision provides a contractual means of counteracting the effect of
the Supreme Court's MedImmune decision, which relieved a licensee
of the jurisdictional requirement of having to repudiate its patent
license agreement before challenging the licensed patent. By
permitting a licensor to terminate the license agreement upon the
licensee's patent challenge, the "termination-for-challenge" clause
places the licensee in the same position it would have been in prior to
549. Taylor, supra note 321, at 230 ("An example of a no-challenge termination clause
might be similar to the following provision: '[LICENSOR] retains the right to terminate
this agreement if [LICENSEE] asserts in any judicial proceeding or document, during the
lifetime of this agreement, that said patents are invalid.").
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the MedImmune Court's rejection of the Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe
holding, i.e., in order to bring a patent challenge, a licensee is
required to risk losing the benefits of its patent license.sso Not
surprisingly, the "termination-for-challenge" clause is encountered
with increasing frequency in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
MedImmune decision. However, the question of whether the clause
is enforceable is not a simple one. As will be discussed in the analysis
of the provision that follows, the "termination-for-challenge" clause
has received little attention in the courts and a determination as to its
enforceability is largely dependent upon whether one concludes that
the disincentive effect of such a provision places it outside of the zone
of enforceability under Lear in the gap between providing a patent
licensee with "some incentive" to challenge a licensed patent and
"every possible incentive."
Unlike the "no-challenge" clause, a "termination-for-challenge"
clause does not eliminate one of the protections of the Lear doctrine.
In the words of one commentator, "[t]his type of contractual
provision does not bar a licensee from challenging the patent's
validity. It merely gives the licensor the right to terminate the license
in such a case, enabling the licensor to sue the licensee for
infringement.""' The "termination-for-challenge" clause differs from
the "no-challenge" clause in another important respect. While the
latter has been the subject of judicial review on a number of occasions
(as discussed in the preceding section), the "termination-for-
challenge" clause has only rarely been evaluated by a court. One
such evaluation was provided by the U.S. District Court of Delaware
in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc.552 In that case the court
ruled on the validity of a contract provision that included a
"termination-for-challenge" clause. Bayer, the plaintiff in the case,
sought a declaratory judgment that the Housey patents were
unenforceable as a result of Housey's misuse of the patents. Among
the alleged acts of misuse was the inclusion in patent license
agreements with third parties of the following provision:
550. Schlicher, supra note 530, at 388 ("For years, I have recommended that patent
owners use a termination provision that permits the patent owner to terminate the license,
if the licensee alleges in any action that the licensed patent is invalid. This is the simplest
and most direct response to Medimmune, because it puts the situation back to where is
was before MedImmune." (footnote omitted)).
551. Taylor, supra note 321, at 231.
552. 228 F. Supp. 2d 467.
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[LICENSOR] acknowledges the LICENSEE is not estopped
from contesting the validity or enforceability of the Licensed
Patent Rights. However, LICENSEE acknowledges that such
an attack on validity or enforceability of the Licensed Patent
Rights is inconsistent with the purposes of this License
Agreement. Accordingly, LICENSEE hereby agrees that if it
decides to assert its right to contest the Licensed Patent Rights,
in whole or in part, that ... [LICENSOR] shall have the right,
at ... [LICENSOR's] option, to terminate this License
Agreement by giving written notice thereof to LICENSEE.
Further, unless terminated by ... [LICENSOR], LICENSEE
agrees to make all payments due under this License Agreement
notwithstanding any challenge ... by LICENSEE ... to the
Licensed Patent Rights, so long as the applicable patent(s) or
patent application(s) remain in effect."'
Bayer contended that the provision was an attempt "to muzzle
licensees in violation of Lear""4 and its presence in the Housey
license agreements constituted patent misuse.
The district court in Bayer began its analysis by restating the dual
protections afforded a patent licensee under the Lear doctrine,
namely, that a licensee cannot be barred from challenging the validity
of a licensed patent nor required to pay royalties to the licensor
during the pendency of its patent challenge. Concluding that neither
of these protections can be eliminated by the agreement of
contracting parties, the court held that the portion of the Housey
provision under consideration that obligated the licensee to continue
to pay royalties while challenging the licensed patent was
unenforceable. The court went on to note, however, that the
inclusion of this unenforceable portion of the provision in the Housey
license agreements did not constitute patent misuse, citing Panther
Pumps, Wallace-Clark, Congoleum Industries and Robintech. We will
revisit this aspect of the Bayer decision in the next section, which
addresses royalty payment provisions. What is significant for the
purpose of this section is that the Bayer court found no fault with the
"termination-for-challenge" portion of the Housey provision. It is
true that the "termination-for-challenge" portion of the provision was
not explicitly endorsed by the district court, nor even analyzed in the
Bayer opinion. However, the provision as a whole was under review
553. Id. at 473.
554. Id. at 473.
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in the case and it could be argued that the risk of termination of the
licensee's rights under the agreement upon a patent challenge would
constitute as much or more of a disincentive to challenge, thereby
"muzzling" the licensee, as an ongoing obligation to pay royalties.
Had the Bayer court rejected the royalty payment portion of the
Housey provision on the basis of its disincentive effect, it almost
certainly would have found the "termination-for-challenge" portion
of the provision problematic as well. The fact that the district court
selectively rejected the royalty payment portion of the provision
suggests that the basis for the rejection was that that portion of the
provision, in contrast to the "termination-for-challenge" portion,
directly eliminated one of the protections of the Lear doctrine.
The Bayer decision, however, is only a tacit endorsement of the
"termination-for-challenge" clause, and questions as to the
provision's enforceability remain to be answered. The uncertainty
regarding the "termination-for-challenge" clause is reflected in the
U.S. Government's Amicus Brief submitted to the Supreme Court in
MedImmune.ss In supporting MedImmune's position that, from a
jurisdictional standpoint, a licensee in good standing can challenge
the validity of the licensed patent, the Government made the
following argument:
Application of traditional "case or controversy" principles in
the patent context [that would permit a patent licensee in good
standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the
validity of the licensed patent] does not leave patent owners
defenseless .... [A] patent owner may be able to negotiate
license provisions that anticipate and ameliorate the effects of
the filing of a declaratory judgment action by a licensee. This
Court has held that a patentee cannot require a licensee to
abandon forever its right to challenge a patent, see Pope Mfg.
Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 232-237 (1892), and that a
licensee who successfully challenges a patent cannot be
required to pay royalties during the pendency of the challenge,
see Lear, 395 U.S. at 673-674. But a licensor may be able to
make the filing of a declaratory judgment action [challenging the
validity of the licensed patent] a basis for terminating the license,
changing the royalty rate to a specified higher rate, or otherwise
adjusting the pre-challenge terms ... . While the enforceability
555. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner, MedImmune,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118.
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of such provisions is an open question in light of the strong
public policy favoring patent challenges as reflected in Pope and
Lear, those decisions do not necessarily entitle a licensee both
to challenge the licensed patent and to retain all the benefits of
his license agreement, if the agreement expressly provides
otherwise. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991,
995 (1985) (explaining the Federal Circuit's view that Lear
"does permit a licensee to cease payments due under a contract
while challenging the validity of a patent. It does not permit the
licensees to avoid facing the consequences that such an action
would bring."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) .......
While a number of the Supreme Court Justices expressed an
interest during the MedImmune oral argument in the Government's
suggestions regarding contractual protections for the patent
licensor," neither the oral argument nor the Court's opinion in
MedImmune provided an answer to the "open question""" as to the
enforceability of a "termination-for-challenge" clause. As indicated
556. Id. at 27-28 (paragraphing omitted) (emphasis added).
557. MedImmune oral argument, at *10-11.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, there's no way, . . . under your view, that a
patent holder can protect itself from suit through any license arrangement or any
agreement of any kind.
MR. KESTER: I suspect there are many ways, Mr. Chief Justice, but not by
throwing them out on a jurisdictional basis at the very first moment of the
lawsuit.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How about -
MR. KESTER: There may be ways this could be arranged at the second level,
through --
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, what are those ways -1 mean, the ones that have
been mentioned as possibilities in the Government brief -- one, you rejected, and
the other that was mentioned was: if you sue -- if the licensee sues, then the
royalty fees will be upped. Would that be effective?
MR. KESTER: That is a question that would arise under Lear against Adkins.
And the question before this Court in that situation, if it got to this Court, would
be, Is that kind of a provision compatible with the policy that was so firmly
expressed by Justice Harlan in Lear, and has been reiterated in so many
subsequent cases of this Court?
JUSTICE GINSBURG: So, you have rejected both of the Government's
suggestions on what the patent holder might do to protect itself. Do you have
anything concrete that you would concede the patent holder could do?
MR. KESTER: I don't think that I have rejected both the Government's
suggestions. I've said that they raise problems on -- as to the scope of Lear.
558. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner, MedImmune,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, at 28.
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in the Government's Medlmmune Brief, the answer to the question is
to be found in a determination of whether the "termination-for-
challenge" clause runs afoul of "the strong public policy favoring
patent challenges as reflected in Pope and Lear."'" And the answer
to that question is dependent on an assessment of the provision's
disincentive effect and on one's conclusion as to where the Lear
Court drew the line of enforceability in the gap between providing a
patent licensee with "some incentive" to challenge a licensed patent
and "every possible incentive." It is instructive, therefore, to return
to our approach to the analysis of pro-licensor contract provisions and
consider the position of the "termination-for-challenge" clause on the
"disincentive-to-challenge" spectrum.
Requiring a licensee to risk losing the benefits of its patent
license through a license termination in order to bring a patent
challenge constitutes a considerable disincentive to challenge and,
arguably, frustrates the public's interest in eliminating worthless
patents to a greater extent than would the enforcement of the royalty
payment provisions rejected in Lear and in Bayer. Based on this line
of reasoning, one would conclude that a "termination-for-challenge"
clause in a patent license agreement is an unenforceable violation of
the "spirit of Lear." Moreover, as discussed in section III.C.4.c.ii, a
number of the post-Lear regional circuit and district courts that have
considered the right of a patent licensor to terminate the license
agreement in the context of a licensee patent validity challenge have
concluded that such a termination is not consistent with the public's
interest in the early adjudication of patent invalidity.'6o As the Crane
court stated, "just as the imposition of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel would have a chilling effect on meritorious challenges to
patents. . . , so would the threat of termination of the license have a
similar effect.""' In another case, Lee v. Lee Custom Engineering,562 a
district court held that once a patent licensee challenges the validity
of the licensed patent, "the law neither requires the making of royalty
payments nor permits the licensor to terminate the license
559. Id.
560. See Crane Co., 356 F. Supp. 733; 364 F. Supp. 547; 504 F.2d 1086; Precision
Shooting Equip. Co., 646 F.2d 313; Lee, 476 F. Supp. 361; but see, Nebraska Engineering
Corp., 557 F.2d 1257; Morton-Norwich Prods, Inc., 183 USPQ 748; Metallurgical Int'l, Inc.,
171 USPQ 348.
561. Crane, 356 F. Supp. at 738-39.
562. 476 F. Supp. at 361.
[Vol. 3:2
SUMMER 2011] PATENT LICENSING FOLLOWING MEDIMMUNE
agreements because the licensee has failed to make such payments," 63
since "the fear of termination and its potentially harsh
consequences"" would undermine the public's interest, as expressed
in Lear, of the elimination of worthless patents. It is true that neither
Crane nor Lee involved a "termination-for-challenge" clause and the
alleged contractual breach that prompted the licensor's attempt to
terminate the patent license agreement in each case was a
nonpayment of royalties. However, if the public policy articulated in
Lear is sufficiently compelling to prevent a licensor from terminating
a license agreement as a result of the licensee's failure to meet its
agreed-to royalty payment obligations in the context of a patent
challenge, that policy would certainly prevent the licensor from
terminating a licensee's rights for merely challenging the licensed
patent. While cases such as Crane and Lee have been described as
the high-watermark of pro-Lear case law, reflecting the view that the
Lear decision favors providing a licensee with "every possible
incentive to challenge patent validity,",6 1 the rationale behind the
holdings in Crane and Lee relied heavily on the very significant
disincentive effect of a termination of a challenging licensee's rights
under the licensed patent.
Support for the enforceability of the "termination-for-challenge"
clause can be found in a series of Federal Circuit cases that we
characterized in Part III of this Article as "challenge-but-face-the-
consequence" decisions.'6 Recall that these cases stand for the
proposition that a patent licensee that challenges the validity of the
licensed patent can be subject to consequences that could constitute a
disincentive to make the challenge in the first place, despite the public
interest, highlighted in Lear, in eliminating invalid patents. The
Government, in its MedImmune Brief, acknowledged the significance
of this line of cases in citing the Federal Circuit's holding in Cordis6 1
as support for the view that "[the Pope and Lear] decisions do not
necessarily entitle a licensee both to challenge the licensed patent and
563. Id. at 362.
564. Id. at 364.
565. See supra section III.C.4.c.ii.
566. See supra section III.C.4.c.iii. for a review of the Federal Circuit's "challenge-but-
face-the-consequence decisions"; C.R. Bard, Inc., 716 F.2d 874; Cordis Corp., 780 F.2d 991;
Sun Studs, Inc., 872 F.2d 978; Dow Chem. Co., 226 F.3d 1334.
567. Cordis, 780 F.2d 991.
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to retain all the benefits of his license agreement, if the agreement
expressly provides otherwise."
As discussed in section III.C.4.c.iii, the Federal Circuit in Cordis
relied on the reasoning articulated by the Second Circuit in Warner-
Jenkinson5 69 and endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in Nebraska
Engineerings7 o to conclude that neither the holding of, nor policy
statement in, Lear prevents a patent licensor from terminating the
rights of a licensee that ceases paying royalties due under the license
agreement during the pendency of a patent challenge. In ruling that a
licensee could not avoid facing the consequences of its breach of its
license agreement in the course of bringing a patent challenge, the
Cordis court echoed the view previously expressed in Morton-
Norwich that "permitting the licensee to unilaterally and offensively
ignore his contract obligation to make payments required under the
contract, and at the same time denuding the licensor of the remedy of
declaring a breach and seeking relief against the licensee as an
infringer, ... does violence to contract principles""' in a manner that
"might encourage more validity litigation, but at too high a price."S72
Like the courts in Morton-Norwich, Warner-Jenkinson and Nebraska
Engineering, the Federal Circuit in Cordis rejected the conclusion
that, under Lear, "any and all rules of contract law ... [must] be
ignored to give licensees every possible incentive to challenge patent
validity.",7 1
The decision in Cordis, as well as those in Morton-Norwich,
Warner-Jenkinson and Nebraska Engineering, addressed a patent
licensor's right to terminate a license agreement but did not require
an evaluation of a contract provision permitting the licensor to
terminate the agreement on the basis of a licensee's patent validity
challenge. In each case, the material breach that triggered the
licensor's termination right was a nonpayment of royalties due under
the agreement that would accompany the challenge. In Bard,5 74
however, the Federal Circuit considered the enforceability of a
contract termination provision that was based, in part, on the patent
568. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner, MedImmune,
Inc, 549 U.S. 118 at *28.
569. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 567 F.2d 184.
570. Nebraska Engineering Corp., 557 F2d. 1257.
571. Morton Norwich Prods, Inc., 183 USPQ at 750 (footnote omitted).
572. Id.
573. McCarthy, (Part II), supra note 321, at 568.
574. CR. Bard, Inc., 716 F.2d 874.
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challenge itself. In that case, discussed above in section III.C.4.c.iii.,
the court held that the enforcement of a "termination-for-challenge-
and-failure-to-pay-royalties" clause in a patent license agreement was
not incompatible with the "spirit of Lear." While the right of the
licensee in Bard to bring a patent challenge was protected under
Lear, the consequence of its challenge and the failure to pay the
agreed-to royalties put the licensee at risk for losing its rights under
the agreement, should the licensor elect to terminate it.
The Federal Circuit's Bard decision is consistent with that
circuit's other "challenge-but-face-the-consequence" decisions in
holding that a licensee that challenges the validity of a licensed patent
is accountable for a contractual breach related to the challenge, even
if the consequence of the breach is the licensee's loss of rights under
the patent. However, neither the Bard decision nor any other
Federal Circuit decision has answered the central question addressed
in this section, namely, is a contract provision that permits a licensor
to terminate a licensee's patent rights for merely challenging the
patent enforceable? The fact that this question has remained
unanswered, despite the Federal Circuit's prior consideration of a
patent licensor's termination rights, is not surprising. Under Federal
Circuit jurisprudence prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's MedImmune
decision, a patent licensee was required to repudiate its license
agreement by withholding agreed-to royalty payments before
bringing a patent validity challenge. Basing a right of termination on
the mere act by a licensee of challenging the licensed patent was not
necessary in that the requisite nonpayment of royalties was an
adequate termination trigger. In the aftermath of MedImmune,
however, where the weight of the evidence indicates that a patent
licensee in good standing can bring a patent challenge without
repudiating the licensee agreement, the enforceability of a
"termination-for-challenge" clause becomes a critical issue.
Permitting a licensor to terminate a licensee's patent rights for simply
challenging the licensed patent, where the licensee has otherwise
complied with all of its contractual obligations under its license
agreement, involves a "balancing of the equities among licensor,
licensee and the public interest""' that differs from that presented in
Morton-Norwich, Warner-Jenkinson, Nebraska Engineering or any of
the Federal Circuit's "challenge-but-face-the-consequences" cases,
and may well be incompatible with the "spirit of Lear." In the
575. Morton Norwich Prods, 183 USPQ at 749.
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absence of a specific ruling by either the Federal Circuit or the U.S.
Supreme Court on a "termination-for-challenge" clause, one can only
speculate as to its enforceability, forcing those who negotiate patent
license agreements to consider the effects of including such a
provision in their agreements, whether the provision is enforceable or
not.
Assuming that a "termination-for-challenge" clause is
enforceable, there is a legitimate concern that if such a clause is
included in a patent license agreement it will not operate to protect
the licensor as intended. The purpose of such a provision is to
provide a licensor with the right to terminate its agreement with a
licensee that challenges the validity of the licensed patent, thereby
depriving the licensee of authorization to operate under the patent.
Should the now-former licensee continue to practice the patented
technology, it would do so in the role of an infringer and a licensor
whose patent had been adjudicated as valid could prevent such future
use through obtaining injunctive relief while seeking damages for the
prior infringement. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,156 however, raises serious
questions as to whether a licensor can rely on this strategy to prevent
the unauthorized use of its patented technology by a former licensee.
In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
"general rule" that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
the holder of a valid patent should be granted a permanent injunction
to prevent an infringer from using its patented technology. Instead,
the Supreme Court ruled that the traditional four-factor test must be
applied in determining whether injunctive relief should be granted in
an infringement suit arising under the Patent Act.7 In applying the
standard set forth in eBay, a number of lower courts have
subsequently denied injunctive relief in patent infringement cases.
576. 547 U.S. 388.
577. Id. at 391. ("According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking
a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction .... These familiar principles apply with equal force
to disputes arising under the Patent Act." (citations deleted and paragraphing omitted)).
578. For a review of relevant post-eBay case law, see Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The
Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent
Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 631 (2007); Edward D. Manzo,
Injunctions in Patent Cases After EBay, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 44 (2007-
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For example, in Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 9 the Federal Circuit
reviewed a district court's ruling that a permanent injunction was not
warranted in a patent infringement case and that the infringer should
instead pay ongoing royalties for its continued use of the patented
technology. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
injunctive relief and concluded that "[u]nder some circumstances,
awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an
injunction may be appropriate"' (although the district court's failure
to articulate its reasons for the royalty amount that it imposed upon
the infringer required that the case be remanded for reevaluation of
that issue).
Commentators who have reviewed the relevant post-eBay case
law have identified a number of factors that have contributed to a
denial of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases."' Among the
factors identified is a prior willingness on the part of the patent holder
to grant royalty-bearing licenses under its patent, thereby
undermining the argument that monetary damages are inadequate to
compensate for another's use of the patent (one of the requirements
of the traditional four-factor test)."" In the case of a patent licensor
that terminates its license agreement pursuant to a "termination-for-
challenge" clause, this is particularly problematic. Should the trend
detected in the federal courts' application of the four-factor test for a
permanent injunction following eBay continue, a court would be less
likely to enjoin the use of patented technology by a former licensee
whose patent validity challenge had failed, electing instead to permit
future infringement in return for the payment of ongoing royalties. In
that case, the licensor may be no better off than had it not exercised
its "termination-for-challenge" right, with the former licensee still
practicing under the patent and paying the "reasonable" royalties
originally negotiated in the terminated agreement. In the next
section of this Part IV, we discuss the advantages of a contract
2008); Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for
Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 543 (2008); Kenneth R. Adamo, Ryan B.
McCrum, and Chad A. Jira, Licensing in the Wake of the Supreme Court's Decision in
eBay v. MercExchange: How Can Non-Practicing Entities Maintain Leverage?, 30 LIC. J. 1
(2010).
579. 504 F.3d 1293.
580. Id. at 1314.
581. See supra note 578.
582. Manzo, supra note 578, at 94 ("[A] patentee's offer of a royalty-bearing license ...
is a factor indicating that money damages are adequate"); Adamo, supra note 578, at 6
("[T]he pursuit of licenses undermines the argument for the inadequacy of money
damages....").
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provision that increases a licensee's royalty payment obligation
following an unsuccessful challenge of the licensed patent by the
licensee, in order to reflect the added value of a patent that has been
adjudicated as valid. This would be an effective means of establishing
a reasonable ongoing royalty, more favorable to the patent holder, in
the event that the license agreement is terminated. Suffice it to say at
this point that a patent licensor that fails to consider the various
possible effects of including an enforceable "termination-for-
challenge" clause in its license agreement may be disappointed in the
outcome upon exercising its termination right under the provision.
Should a "termination-for-challenge" clause prove to be
unenforceable, there is still a question as to whether its inclusion in a
patent license agreement would have unintended consequences.
There is no basis for concluding that the inclusion of such a provision
would void the entire agreement, especially if the agreement contains
a standard severability clause that specifies that the validity of the
remaining provisions of the agreement are not affected by an
unenforceable provision.583 Moreover, it is unlikely that the inclusion
of a "termination-for-challenge" clause would constitute patent
misuse, rendering the licensed patent unenforceable against
infringers. To the authors' knowledge, no court has specifically
addressed this issue7' However, as discussed in the preceding
section, the relevant case law suggests that the inclusion of a typical
"no-challenge" clause in a license agreement is not patent misuse, and
it would be difficult to argue that the less restrictive "termination-for-
challenge" clause would be judged any differently from the
perspective of patent misuse.
In the end, a decision by a patent licensor to use a "termination-
for-challenge" clause in its license agreement involves a degree of
uncertainty that is not likely to be lessened in the near future, but
such a decision is probably justified on the basis of the available
information. Unlike in the case of a typical "no-challenge" clause,
which eliminates one of the protections of the Lear doctrine and is
almost certainly unenforceable, there is credible support for the
583. See, Brian G. Brunsvold & Dennis P. O'Reilley, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE
AGREEMENTS, 205-06 (5th ed. 2004).
584. While the district court in Bayer AG, 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, considered whether the
inclusion in a patent license agreement of a contract provision that contained a
"termination-for-challenge" clause constituted patent misuse, the court ruled that the
"termination-for-challenge" portion of the provision was enforceable and, therefore,
never reached the question of patent misuse as to that portion of the provision.
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enforceability of a "termination-for-challenge" clause." As noted
above, the effect of enforcing a "termination-for-challenge" clause
may lead to an unintended result (i.e., that a terminated licensee is
permitted to continue to use the patented technology), but such a
result can be modified to the licensor's advantage through the use of a
related provision in the agreement (i.e., one that increases the royalty
payment obligation of the licensee in the event of an unsuccessful
patent challenge). If the "termination-for-challenge" clause proves to
be unenforceable, the inclusion of the provision in the patent license
agreement appears to present little risk, either from the standpoint of
voiding the agreement or rendering the licensed patent unenforceable
based on patent misuse. Taken together, the available information
supports the view, adopted by an increasing number of patent
licensors, that the "termination-for-challenge" clause is an effective
counter to the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's MedImmune
decision, and a licensor has little to lose by including such a provision
in its license agreements, possibly in combination with other pro-
licensor contract provisions (some of which are discussed in the
sections of this Part IV that follow).5*
585. It is noteworthy that European Union competition law recognizes the distinction
between a "no-challenge" clause and a "termination-for-challenge" clause. According to
the Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer
Agreements (2004/C 101/02) (the "Guidelines"), "[a]ny direct or indirect obligation on the
licensee not to challenge the validity of intellectual property rights held by the licensor in
the common market [Guidelines I 108(c)]," is excluded from the technology transfer
block exemption regulation (TTBER), which exempts agreement provisions from
individual assessment of their anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects. According to
the Guidelines, "[t]he reason for excluding non-challenge clauses from the scope of the
block exemption is the fact that licensees are normally in the best position to determine
whether or not an intellectual property right is invalid. In the interest of undistorted
competition and in conformity with the principles underlying the protection of intellectual
property, invalid intellectual property rights should be eliminated. Invalid intellectual
property stifles innovation rather than promoting it. [Guidelines, 1 112]." In contrast,
"the TTBER does cover the possibility for the licensor to terminate the license agreement
in the event that the licensee challenges the validity of the licensed technology.
[Guidelines 108(c)]." As stated in the Guidelines, "[t]he TTBER covers the possibility
for the licensor to terminate the license agreement in the event of a challenge of the
licensed technology. Accordingly, the licensor is not forced to continue dealing with a
licensee that challenges the very subject matter of the license agreement, implying that
upon termination any further use by the licensee of the challenged technology is at the
challenger's own risk. [Guidelines, $ 113]."
586. For articles that endorse the use of a "termination-for-challenge" clause in patent
license agreements, see Taylor, supra note 321 and Schlicher, supra note 530, at 388.
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3. Royalty payment provisions
Another type of pro-licensor contract provision that is receiving
increasing attention is one that links a licensee's patent validity
challenge with its obligation to pay royalties under the license
agreement." This type of provision can vary on the basis of the event
that triggers a consequence (e.g., the patent challenge itself as
opposed to the failure of the challenge) and the nature of the
consequence (e.g., a continuing obligation to pay the agreed-to
royalties as opposed to an increase in the royalty amount to be paid
by the licensee). At least one variation of this type of provision has
been ruled unenforceable in that it eliminated one of the protections
of the Lear doctrine." Other variations, however, are likely to be
enforceable, especially one that requires an increase in the royalty
payment obligation of a licensee whose patent challenge fails,
reflecting the added value of a patent that has been adjudicated as
valid. As will be discussed below, this last version of a royalty
payment provision lacks a punitive element that penalizes a licensee
for merely challenging the licensed patent and, when used in
conjunction with a "termination-for-challenge" clause, can benefit a
licensor whether it elects to terminate the license agreement or not.
The relationship between a patent licensee's right to challenge
the validity of the licensed patent and its obligation to pay royalties
was originally explored in Lear. Recall that the Supreme Court in
Lear ruled that an express contractual obligation of a licensee to pay
royalties "until such time as the 'patent *** is held invalid,'"8
effectively requiring the licensee to pay during the pendency of any
patent challenge, is unenforceable (the second prong of the Lear
doctrine). According to the Lear Court, such an obligation would
encourage a licensor to postpone a final determination regarding the
licensed patent's validity and could deter the licensee from bringing
the patent challenge in the first place, thereby frustrating the public's
interest in eliminating worthless patents. Considering the holding in
Lear, it is not surprising that a district court in Bayer AG v. Housey
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'9 rejected a royalty payment provision that
stated that "LICENSEE agrees to make all payments due under this
587. For articles discussing examples of pro-licensor royalty payment provisions, see
McCarthy, (Part I), supra note 321, at 538 and Schlicher, supra note 530, at 384-87 and
389-91.
588. See Bayer AG, 228 F. Supp. 2d 467.
589. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
590. 228 F. Supp. 2d 467.
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License Agreement notwithstanding any challenge... by
LICENSEE ... to the Licensed Patent Rights, so long as the
applicable patent(s) or patent application(s) remain in effect."'9 As
was already discussed in the preceding section, the Bayer court
concluded that the provision was unenforceable in that it
impermissibly eliminated one of the protections of the Lear doctrine,
but its inclusion in the license agreement was not patent misuse.
The Bayer court did not consider the question of whether a
licensee that exercises its Lear-protected right to withhold agreed-to
royalties during the pendency of its patent challenge and, thereby,
breaches an unenforceable royalty payment provision such as the one
under consideration in the case could have its license agreement
terminated by the licensor on the basis of the breach." This question
has already been addressed, however, in our analysis in section
IV.B.2. of the conflicting case law relating to a patent licensor's right
to terminate a license agreement in the context of a breach related to
a licensee's patent validity challenge. As discussed in that section,
post-Lear district court decisions in Crane'9 and in Lee594 support the
view that the nonpayment of agreed-to royalties associated with a
patent challenge is an insufficient basis for the termination of a
license agreement, in light of the public's interest in the early
adjudication of patent invalidity. In contrast, the Federal Circuit's
"challenge-but-face-the-consequence" decisions take the position that
a breach by a licensee of a contractual provision in the course of
bringing a patent challenge can subject the licensee to an unwanted
consequence, including the loss of rights under the license agreement,
despite the public policy articulated in Lear. In Cordis,"' for
example, the Federal Circuit relied on the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in Warner-Jenkinson96 to conclude that the Lear decision did
not prevent a patent licensor from terminating the right of a licensee
that had ceased paying royalties due under a license agreement
591. Id. at 473.
592. Addressing this question in the Bayer case was unnecessary from a practical
standpoint in that the court's tacit endorsement of the associated "termination-for-
challenge" clause in the agreement under consideration (see supra section IV.B.2.) already
provided the licensor with a termination right upon the licensee's patent challenge,
irrespective of whether the licensee ceased making royalty payments following the
challenge.
593. 356 F. Supp. 733.
594. 476 F. Supp. 361.
595. 780 F.2d 991.
596. 567 F.2d 184.
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during the pendency of a patent challenge. The Federal Circuit's
other "challenge-but-face-the-consequence" decisions are consistent
with this position, although in no instance did that court directly
consider a contractual provision such as the one in Bayer that, on its
face, constituted such a blatant attempt on the part of the patent
licensor to deprive its licensee of the protection of the royalty
payment prong of the Lear doctrine." In the absence of additional
guidance, the Federal Circuit's prior rulings on the scope of a patent
licensor's termination right must be considered controlling law. A
question remains, however, as to whether an unqualified application
of Federal Circuit precedent should result in a licensee's loss of rights
under a patent license agreement based on its breach of a royalty
payment provision that could not be specifically enforced by a court,
and whether the U.S. Supreme Court would reject such an outcome
as incompatible with the "spirit of Lear." Suffice it to say that the
potential effect of the inclusion in a patent license agreement of a
royalty payment provision that is unenforceable under Lear is unclear
and that, as in the case of the licensee "no-challenge" clause, the use
of such a provision is best avoided.
While a royalty payment provision that eliminates one of the
protections of the Lear doctrine (such as the one rejected in Bayer) is
almost certainly unenforceable, assessing the enforceability of other
pro-licensor royalty payment provisions presents a greater challenge.
For example, one of the provisions that has been suggested in
response to the Supreme Court's MedImmune decision would require
a licensee that brings a patent validity challenge to pay increased
royalties.' The U.S. Government, in its MedImmune Brief, noted
that such a provision could "anticipate and ameliorate the effects of
the filing of a declaratory judgment action by a licensee [challenging
the validity of the licensed patent]."5" However, as stated in the
Government's Brief, the enforceability of such a provision "is an
open question in light of the strong public policy favoring patent
597. While a district court ruling in the Bayer case was appealed to the Federal Circuit,
the appellate court's review was limited to an interpretation of the scope of 35 U.S.C §
271(g) in the context of the facts of the case and did not involve an evaluation of the
Housey contract provision under consideration in this Article. See Bayer AG, 340 F.3d
1367. For a more complete discussion of the Bayer case, see Server, Mousavi & Love,
supra note 192, at 90-92, 105, n.195.
598. See Schlicher, supra note 530, at 390.
599. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner, MedImmune,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, at 28.
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challenges as reflected in Pope and Lear."6o A provision that burdens
a patent licensee with an unwanted consequence for the mere act of
challenging the validity of the licensed patent could be viewed as too
much of a disincentive to challenge to be compatible with the "spirit
of Lear."
One way to lessen the impact of a pro-licensor contract provision
that calls for an increase in a licensee's royalty payment obligation
following a patent challenge is to have the increase triggered only by
an unsuccessful challenge by the licensee, i.e., one in which the
challenged patent is ultimately adjudicated as valid. There is a
reasonable basis for such a royalty increase that is not punitive in
nature, namely, that a patent that has been adjudicated as valid is of
greater value than one that is merely presumed to be valid as a result
of its issuance. This additional value has been recognized by the
courts in a number of different contexts. For example, the Federal
Circuit in Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Chemicals' held that a patent
owner seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent an accused
infringer from continuing its allegedly infringing actions is likely to
make the requisite "clear showing" of probable success on the merits
if the patent-in-suit had previously been found to be valid in a prior
adjudication involving a third party infringer. In contrast, the mere
presumption of validity that attaches to an issued patent is not
*602
adequate to support the granting of a preliminary injunction.
Another example, and one that is more germane to the topic of this
section, is the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Amado v. Microsoft
Corp.603 that considered the appropriate royalty to be paid by an
infringer for its ongoing, post-verdict, infringement during a court-
ordered stay of an injunction. In this post-eBay case, the court
concluded that the continued use by an infringer of technology
600. Id. See also Schlicher, supra note 538, at 390 ("A patent owner should also
consider a royalty provision under which royalties increase in the event a licensee
challenges validity, and regardless of the outcome. Such an increase is more likely to run
into Lear unenforceability issues.").
601. 773 F.2d 1230.
602. See Chisum, Remedies 20-673, § 20.04[1][c] ("When a patent owner requests a
preliminary injunction against infringement, the courts refuse to rely solely on the
presumption of validity to establish a probability of success. Rather, the plaintiff must
make a strong showing that the patent will likely be upheld as valid and enforceable ....
Such a showing must usually rest upon either (1) a prior adjudication of the patent's
validity in a suit against another party, or (2) a long period of acquiescence by the industry
in the patent owner's rights. Absent prior adjudication or acquiescence, a patent owner
may obtain preliminary injunctive relief only in exceptional circumstances.").
603. 517 F.3d 1353.
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claimed in a patent that had been adjudicated as valid commanded a
higher royalty than the reasonable royalty that was to be paid for pre-
judgment infringement. In the words of the court,
[tihere is a fundamental difference... between a reasonable
royalty for pre-verdict infringement and damages for post-
verdict infringement. Cf. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
504 F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[P]re-suit and post-
judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant
different royalty rates given the change in the parties' legal
relationship and other factors.") (Rader, J., concurring). Prior
to judgment, liability for infringement, as well as the validity of
the patent, is uncertain, and damages are determined in the
context of that uncertainty. Once a judgment of validity and
infringement has been entered, however, the calculus is
markedly different because different economic factors are
involved [justifying a post-verdict royalty that exceeds a pre-
verdict reasonable royalty]. See id. at 1315.6
A contractual provision that requires an increase in the royalties
owed under a patent license agreement following an unsuccessful
patent validity challenge by the licensee is not only likely to be
enforceable under Lear, but has additional value when used in
conjunction with a "termination-for-challenge" clause. As discussed
elsewhere in this Part IV, the holder of a patent that has been
adjudicated as valid and infringed cannot be certain of obtaining a
permanent injunction preventing future infringement in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court's eBay decision. Consider the scenario in
which (1) a licensor whose patent is challenged by its licensee elects
to terminate the license agreement pursuant to a "termination-for-
challenge" clause, (2) the patent is ultimately adjudicated as valid and
yet (3) the court concludes that a permanent injunction preventing
604. Id. at 1361-62. Note that the Federal Circuit in Amado distinguished the facts in
the instant case from those in Paice. In Amado, the royalties under consideration were to
be paid for post-verdict infringement that had occurred during a court-ordered stay of an
injunction. In Paice, the royalties to be paid were for post-verdict infringement under
circumstances in which the court had concluded that an injunction was not warranted.
While this distinction may require that the set of factors to be considered in determining
the appropriate royalty in the two situations may differ somewhat, it does not undermine
the fundamental point being made by reference to the Amado decision in this section, i.e.,
that a court's decision that a patent is valid, reducing uncertainty with respect to that issue,
increases the value of the patent and supports the patent holder's demand for increased
post-judgment royalties.
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future infringement by the former licensee is not warranted but
instead requires the payment of ongoing royalties. The presence in
the license agreement of a royalty payment provision specifying the
increased royalties to be paid by the licensee in the event of an
unsuccessful patent challenge provides a reasonable basis for
determining the ongoing royalties. In this instance, the royalty
payment provision is not operating strictly as intended, in that the
language of the provision contemplates that the licensee will pay the
increased royalties under a license agreement that has not been
terminated by the licensor and remains in effect. However, the
increased royalty amount specified in the provision reflects an
agreement between the patent holder and its licensee as to the value
of the patent after it has been adjudicated as valid, and such amount
can serve as a useful data point, favorable to the patent holder, for a
court in making its determination of the ongoing royalties to be paid
for future infringement of the patent by the former licensee.
A number of other royalty payment provisions have been
proposed to account for the increased likelihood of a licensee patent
validity challenge following the Supreme Court's MedImmune
decision,6 although to the authors' knowledge none has undergone
judicial review where compatibility with Lear was at issue. Some of
these provisions are intended to maximize a licensor's return on a
licensed patent prior to any patent challenge by the licensee (e.g.,
requiring the licensee to pay a higher royalty from the outset than
would otherwise have been sought in the absence of the increased
threat of a challenge)i0 Other provisions are designed to guarantee
605. See Schlicher, supra note 530, at 364.
606. Id. at 389-90 ("A patent owner, who is not confident that other measures will
deter Lear and Medimmune actions, should license at a rate appropriate for a patent that
is certain to be valid, and that will require validity litigation costs to collect .... This rate
is much higher than a rate appropriate to a legal setting free of Lear and Medimmune ....
[However, a] licensee may not agree to a rate appropriate for a patent certain to be valid.
To address this problem, a patent owner may propose that royalties be defined and paid at
that rate, and that the patent owner pay back or rebate part of those royalties to the
licensee so long as the licensee does not seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity (while
paying). Under that approach, if the licensee does not assert a Medimmune claim, its
effective royalty rate is the lower rate appropriate to the pre-Medimmune situation. Once
it asserts a Medimmune claim, the rebate ends, and the patent owner retains the full
royalty, appropriate for the risk that the payment will end if the patent is found invalid. In
order to keep the license during a Medimmune action, the licensee must continue paying
at the appropriate rate. If the patent is found valid, payments continue at the appropriate
rate. [paragraphing omitted]."). See also McCarthy, supra note 321, at 538 ("A[n] ...
approach for minimizing Lear problems is to provide for higher royalties during the
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the continuation of a licensee's royalty payment despite a patent
challenge (e.g., making the royalty payment obligation independent
of the validity of the licensed patent).& Putting aside the question of
whether a licensee would agree to any of these royalty payment
provisions, each such provision must be assessed for its enforceability
and effect using an approach such as the one suggested in this
Part IV. What can be said with respect to all of these provisions is the
following: (1) the more punitive the provision, burdening a licensee
for merely exercising its Lear-protected right to challenge the validity
of the licensed patent, the greater the risk of unenforceability, and (2)
the possibility that the inclusion of the provision in a patent license
agreement constitutes patent misuse must be given careful
consideration.
4. Other pro-licensor contract provisions
In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's MedImmune
decision, patent licensors have been particularly active in crafting pro-
licensor contract provisions to account for an increased likelihood of
a licensee patent validity challenge. As noted in the introduction to
this Part IV, a review of each of these provisions is beyond the scope
of this Article and would, of necessity, be incomplete as novel
strategies to address licensee patent challenges are regularly being
incorporated into patent license agreements. Accordingly, we have
proposed an approach to assess the enforceability and effect of any
such provision in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with its
use. In this section, we simply list a few of the more frequently
encountered pro-licensor contract provisions that we have yet to
discuss, leaving the assessment of these provisions to the interested
reader."
A contract provision that is increasingly popular among patent
licensors requires that a licensee that intends to challenge the validity
of the licensed patent provide advanced notice to the licensor and
beginning of the license term. In this way, the patentee tries to ensure his return on the
patent before the licensee challenges the patent.").
607. See Schlicher, supra note 530, at 385 ("In future licenses, patent owners should
obviously define the products on which royalties are payable without reference [to]
validity. They should not use the language Genentech used, and should not, as many
have, define licensed products as those that would infringe a 'Valid Claim' but for the
license . . .. Patent owners should also consider defining the products on which royalties
are payable without reference [to] the patent." (footnotes omitted) (paragraphing
omitted)).
608. For a more extensive list of pro-licensor contract provisions, see Schlicher, supra
note 530. See also, Treadway, supra note 509, at 326-32.
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disclose the basis for the challenge. The following is an example of
such a provision:
In the event LICENSEE intends to assert in any forum that any
LICENSED PATENT is invalid..., LICENSEE will, not less
than ninety (90) days prior to making any such assertion,
provide to LICENSOR a complete written disclosure of each
and every basis then known to LICENSEE for such assertion
and, with such disclosure, will provide LICENSOR with a copy
of any document or publication upon which LICENSEE
intends to rely in support of such assertion. LICENSEE's
failure to comply with this provision will constitute a material
breach of this Agreement.609
A provision of this type will allow for a dialogue between
licensor and licensee that may avert a patent challenge and will, if
necessary, aid the licensor in its preparation of a defense of its patent.
Other pro-licensor contract provisions are intended to limit the
information available to a licensee in its challenge of the licensed
patent. For example, a patent license agreement may contain a
provision that expressly prohibits the licensee from using any
confidential information of the licensor, provided to the licensee
under the agreement, in challenging the licensed patent. An even
more restrictive provision has been suggested that "requir[es] ... that
the licensee disclose the prior art it knows about before entering the
license, and provid[es] ... that the licensee will have the right to
challenge validity in defense to an action for royalties, or as [a]
declaratory judgment claim based only on other and closer prior art
that the licensee learns of after entering the license." 610
One of the more frequently encountered pro-licensor provisions
obligates a licensee that challenges the validity of the licensed patent
to pay the patent holder's litigation costs, including attorney's fees,
that result from the challenge. Such a provision varies on the basis of
whether the licensee's payment obligation attaches irrespective of the
success of its challenge or only in the event that the patent challenge
fails.' In endorsing the latter version of the provision, one
commentator has opined that "Lear says that the royalty obligation
must end when the litigation begins, if the licensee wins on invalidity.
609. Brunsvold & O'Reilley, supra note 583, at 169-70.
610. See Schlicher, supra note 530, at 392.
611. Id. at 391.
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If the licensee loses, and the patent is found valid, the licensee (under
Lear logic) has done nothing of value to anyone, and has wasted the
patent owner's money. Therefore, this obligation should be
enforceable."612
The list of pro-licensor contract provisions, to be used alone or in
combination, will grow as creative transactional attorneys continue to
grapple with the increased likelihood of a licensee patent validity
challenge following MedImmune. In the absence of case law
confirming the enforceability of such a provision, its inclusion in a
patent license agreement will entail a degree of uncertainty. The
approach presented in this Part IV to assess the enforceability and
effect of any such provision is intended to reduce that uncertainty. In
the end, however, a number of pro-licensor contract provisions will
fall within a gray zone where a finding of patent misuse is unlikely,
but the question of enforceability will remain open until resolved by a
court. The licensor inclined to incorporate such a provision will need
to be advised as to the risk of unenforceability, which risk increases to
the extent that the provision appears to penalize a licensee for a
patent validity challenge in a manner and to a degree that is likely to
prevent the challenge in the first place, thereby frustrating the
important public interest, articulated in Lear, in eliminating worthless
patents.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in MedImmune v. Genentech
resolved a jurisdictional question in concluding that the case-or
controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution does
not require that a patent licensee terminate or be in breach of its
license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment that the
licensed patent is invalid. The MedImmune Court's elimination of
the jurisdictional barrier to a patent validity challenge by a licensee in
good standing has been viewed by many as a pronounced shift in
favor of the licensee in the balance of rights between licensor and
licensee in patent license agreements. In this Article, we addressed
the following questions relevant to the efforts of patent licensor's to
redress this shift in the balance of rights: Is there a vestige of the
doctrine of licensee estoppel to protect a patent licensor from a
validity challenge by a licensee in good standing and, if one cannot
rely on the doctrine, are explicit contract provisions that prohibit,
612. Id.
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reduce the incentive for, and/or specify a consequence of, a licensee's
challenge of the validity of a licensed patent enforceable?
Answers to these questions are to be found in the holding of, and
policy argument articulated in, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Lear v. Adkins, the Court's controlling precedent regarding the
common law doctrine of licensee estoppel. Based on an analysis of
the Lear case and relevant case law and commentary interpreting the
scope of its holding, we concluded that if and when the issue is
presented, the U.S. Supreme Court will interpret its prior Lear
decision as having rejected the doctrine of licensee estoppel without
limitations imposed by the particular facts in the case. According to
this view, a patent licensee may challenge the validity of the licensed
patent even if it neither repudiates nor terminates its patent license
agreement and intends to continue to reap the benefits provided
pursuant to the agreement. A patent licensor would, therefore, be ill-
advised to rely on some vestige of the doctrine of licensee estoppel to
prevent its licensee from challenging the validity of its licensed
patent. Rather, the concerned licensor should consider introducing
explicit contractual provisions in the patent license agreement to
account for the increased likelihood of such a patent challenge.
However, the licensor must determine which provisions are
enforceable and, if not clearly enforceable, which are least likely to
give rise to unintended consequences, including a reasonable claim of
patent misuse. Provisions that eliminate one of the protections
afforded a patent licensee under Lear are almost certainly
unenforceable when included in a typical patent license agreement
and should be avoided. Other pro-licensor provisions, however, may
fall within a gray zone where a finding of patent misuse is unlikely,
but the question of enforceability will remain open until finally
resolved by a court. Such provisions will need to be analyzed on a
case-by-case basis to determine the likelihood of their being
enforceable and their possible effects, if included in a patent license
agreement. Recognizing that a detailed review of each of the various
provisions that have been considered by patent licensors is beyond
the scope of this Article, we presented an approach to analyze any
such provision to reduce the uncertainty associated with its use. We
concluded the Article with an application of the approach to a
number of representative pro-licensor provisions that are frequently
encountered in patent license agreements.
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